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Split  credit  ratings  and  the  prediction  of  bank  ratings  in  the 
Basel  II  environment 
By  Amanda  Barton 
This  thesis  investigates  two  aspects  of  credit  risk  measurement  in  the  context  of  Basel  II:  The 
International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurement  and  Capital  Standards.  The  first  is  the 
problem  arising  when  two  credit  rating  agencies  disagree  over  the  rating  assigned  to  an 
issuer  and  a  split  rating  arises.  This  has  implications  for  the  Standardised  approach  to 
assessing  risk  weighted  assets  under  Basel  II.  The  second  area  is  the  determination  of 
internal  credit  rating  models  for  use  under  the  Internal  ratings-based  approach.  A  very  small 
amount  of  the  extensive  literature  in  this  area  covers  bank  rating  models.  This  thesis 
presents  a  variety  of  bank  rating  modes  for  individual  and  long  term  ratings  across  different 
agencies  and  regions. 
Using  an  extensive  database  of  credit  rating  agencies  with  a  sample  of  over  52,000  split 
ratings  covering  a  four  year  period  from  1999  -  2004  the  first  study  shows  that  there  is  a 
ranking  of  agencies  from  the  most  to  least  generous  that  is  stable  over  time.  In  most  cases, 
the  differences  between  the  mean  ratings  of  the  agencies  are  significantly  different  from  each 
other  at  the  1%  level.  As  reported  in  earlier  studies,  the  greatest  differences  arise  between 
the  US  and  Japanese  agencies.  When  the  split  ratings  are  compared  in  terms  of  Basel  II  risk 
weights  the  differences  between  the  US  and  Japanese  agencies  are  still  highly  significant  and 
the  conclusion  is  that  supervisors  should  alter  the  mapping  of  the  Japanese  agencies  to  the 
risk  assessments  under  the  provisions  of  Annex  2  to  Basel  II. 
Contrary  to  earlier  research  this  study  does  not  find  that  the  highest  level  of  split  ratings  arise 
for  banks.  The  level  of  consensus  between  agencies  appears  to  correspond  to  the  average 
credit  quality  of  the  industry  in  question.  Evidence  is  found  that  agencies  are  more  generous 
to  issuers  from  their  own  country  (home  country  bias)  and  the  level  of  agreement  is  higher 
between  agencies  from  the  same  country. 
Bank  credit  ratings  are  modelled  from  financial  ratios  and  variables  using  ordinal  logistic 
regression.  Sample  sizes  exceeded  1,100  banks  for  the  largest  agencies.  Fitch  Individual 
ratings  could  be  accurately  modelled  from  the  holdout  sample  68%  of  the  time  but  long  term 
ratings  are  more  difficult  to  model  consistently  because  part  of  a  rater's  assessment  of  a  bank 
takes  into  consideration  whether  financial  assistance  would  be  offered  should  the  bank  run 
into  difficulties.  This  is  called  the  support  element  and  is  predominantly  driven  by 
macroeconomic  rather  than  financial  inputs.  Moody's  BFSRs  are  modelled  with  65% 
accuracy  when  Moody's  long  term  ratings  are  included  as  one  of  the  independent  variables. Table  of  Contents 
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Introduction 
A  brief  glance  at  the  results  of  Moody's  and  S&P  will  show  that  issuing  credit  ratings  is 
a  profitable  business.  With  average  margins  of  48%  the  two  big  players  in  the  credit 
rating  market  show  that  plenty  of  companies  take  their  ratings  seriously  and  pay 
substantial  sums  for  the  ratings  of  their  debt.  A  good  rating  plays  an  important  part  in 
determining  a  company's  cost  of  debt  and  can  either  send  a  positive  or  negative  signal 
to  financiers  and  investors  alike. 
The  importance  of  credit  ratings  and  the  success  of  the  agencies  has  been  closely 
linked  to  the  role  that  they  play  in  regulation.  Since  the  1930s  the  distinction  between 
investment  grade  and  sub-investment  grade  debt  has  been  very  important  and  the 
rating  decisions  made  by  the  agencies  have  a  direct  influence  on  the  population  of 
investments  available  to  certain  banks  and  insurance  companies.  With  the 
introduction  of  the  New  Basel  Accord  (Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  2005) 
the  role  of  credit  ratings  in  legislation  will  be  extended  again.  The  Standardised 
approach  to  the  assessment  of  credit  risk  requires  the  direct  use  of  credit  ratings  from 
approved  agencies  to  be  input  into  the  calculation  of  risk  weighted  assets.  The  first 
studies  in  this  thesis  consider  the  ratings  of  external  agencies  in  detail.  The  frequency 
and  extent  of  differences  between  the  ratings  assigned  by  different  agencies  are 
analysed  along  with  the  implication  of  these  differences  to  the  risk  weights  assigned  to 
bank  assets. 
Many  banks  will  opt  for  the  internal  ratings-based  approach  to  calculate  their  risk 
weighted  assets.  Most  large  and  internationally  active  banks  already  have  models  in 
place  to  determine  internal  ratings  to  the  satisfaction  of  supervisors.  The  methodology 
behind  models  predicting  credit  ratings  and  the  financial  variables  most  often  used  are 
studied  in  this  thesis  and  models  are  built  to  predict  bank  credit  ratings.  There  is  a 
substantial  body  of  literature  dating  from  the  1960s  covering  the  prediction  of 
corporate  credit  ratings  but  there  are  few  studies  focusing  specifically  on  banks. 
The  two  primary  objectives  of  this  thesis  are  as  follows.  Firstly  to  revisit  earlier  studies 
focusing  on  the  split  ratings  between  credit  rating  agencies.  This  study  will  add  to  prior 
research  by  using  a  larger  and  current  data  sample  and  more  sophisticated  software 
to  allow  a  wider  range  of  different  analyses.  The  data  used  covers  a4  year  period Chapter  One  Introduction 
rather  than  one  point  in  time.  The  second  objective  is  to  extend  the  area  of  bank  credit 
rating  models  with  a  comparison  of  individual  and  long  term  rating  models  for  Fitch 
and  Moody's  as  well  as  long  term  rating  models  for  eight  other  rating  agencies.  The 
importance  of  estimating  individual  models  for  each  region  is  also  considered. 
The  data  used  in  this  study  was  kindly  provided  by  Financial  Times  Information  Limited 
and  Fitch  Ratings  Group.  The  quarterly  publication  Financial  Times  -  Credit  Ratings 
International  for  the  periods  May  1999  -  March  2004  formed  the  database  used  for 
studies  into  split  credit  ratings  and  bank  rating  models.  Fitch  Ratings'  detailed  bank- 
specific  financial  accounting  database  was  used  for  the  selection  of  financial  variables 
for  the  estimation  of  individual  and  long  term  rating  models. 
The  structure  of  this  thesis  is  as  follows: 
Chapter  two  looks  in  detail  at  many  aspects  of  the  credit  rating  industry.  This  includes 
the  purpose  of  credit  ratings  and  how  they  are  assigned,  the  history  of  the  rating 
agencies  and  how  regulation  came  to  play  such  and  important  part  in  the  demand  for 
ratings.  Observers  have  criticised  a  number  of  potential  conflicts  of  interest  within  the 
industry  such  as  the  reliance  on  issuers  fees  and  unsolicited  ratings.  Finally  this 
chapter  reviews  studies  into  the  information  content  of  credit  ratings  and  problems 
arising  from  procyclicality  and  the  assignment  of  ratings. 
Chapter  three  reviews  the  New  Basel  Capital  Accord  in  detail  (Basel  II).  It  outlines  the 
way  in  which  Basel  II  differs  from  the  existing  Accord  and  analyses  the  Standardised 
approach  in  detail.  In  later  chapters  the  rules  setting  out  the  allocation  of  risk  weights 
to  corporate,  bank  and  sovereign  claims  according  to  external  credit  ratings  are  used 
to  assess  the  importance  of  split  ratings  in  the  context  of  Basel  ll.  Chapter  three  also 
summarises  some  of  the  major  themes  and  criticisms  that  arose  in  the  responses  to 
the  Consultative  Papers  issued  while  Basel  II  was  being  finalised.  Finally  this  chapter 
looks  in  detail  at  Annex  2  of  Basel  II  which  sets  out  guidelines  as  to  how  individual 
country  supervisors  are  to  map  agency  ratings  to  the  risk  assessments  of  the  Accord 
and  works  through  examples  with  current  cumulative  default  rates. 
Chapter  four  reviews  the  literature  directly  relating  to  the  studies  in  this  thesis.  These 
cover  two  separate  areas;  split  credit  ratings  and  bond  rating  prediction  models.  There 
is  a  limited  amount  of  research  in  the  area  of  split  credit  ratings  with  several  studies 
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being  extremely  relevant.  These  are  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992a  and  1992b)  and 
Cantor  and  Packer  (1995).  These  studies  also  used  data  from  the  Financial  Times 
Credit  Rating  International  database  but  the  data  sample  for  this  thesis  uses  more 
data,  for  a  wider  number  of  countries  and  industries  and  over  a  considerably  longer 
time  period. 
The  second  part  of  the  literature  review  gives  a  chronological  review  of  the  empirical 
studies  on  the  modelling  and  prediction  of  credit  ratings.  The  methodology  used  is 
discussed  in  detail  highlighting  the  continual  efforts  of  researchers  to  refine  the 
prediction  models.  The  selection  of  independent  variables  is  also  extremely  important 
to  the  quality  of  the  rating  model.  The  variables  used  in  previous  studies  are  reviewed 
and  the  chapter  concludes  with  a  discussion  of  the  most  suitable  variables  for  use  in 
this  thesis. 
Chapter  five  discusses  the  data  used  for  the  split  rating  and  rating  prediction  studies. 
Two  large  databases  were  used  for  the  studies  in  this  thesis;  the  FT  CRI  database  of 
worldwide  credit  rating  data  for  ten  major  agencies  and  the  bank  financial  accounting 
data  from  Fitch  Ratings  Group.  Different  agencies  use  different  rating  definitions  and 
scales.  In  order  to  compare  split  ratings  these  must  be  mapped  to  a  comparable 
scale.  The  problems  with  this  mapping  process  and  the  maps  chosen  for  this  study 
are  discussed  in  chapter  five.  The  way  in  which  split  ratings  are  compared  is  also 
shown  and  a  brief  description  is  given  of  the  software  used  to  analyse  such  a  large 
volume  of  split  ratings.  The  chapter  goes  on  to  describe  the  bank  financial  accounting 
database  used  and  how  this  was  mapped  to  the  credit  rating  data  to  give  independent 
and  dependent  variables  in  order  to  build  bank  rating  prediction  models. 
Chapters  six  to  nine  give  the  results  of  the  studies  comparing  split  credit  ratings  of 
different  rating  agencies.  Chapter  six  focuses  on  the  level  of  inter-rater  agreement 
and  compares  overall  rater  agreement  as  well  as  the  consensus  between  particular 
pairs  of  agencies.  The  study  asks  why  some  agencies  agree  much  more  frequently 
than  others  and  reviews  the  quality  distribution  of  the  issuers  to  see  if  consensus  is 
determined  by  credit  quality. 
Chapter  seven  establishes  a  ranking  between  the  rating  agencies  where  some  appear 
to  be  consistently  more  generous  than  others.  Changes  in  ranking  which  arise  due  to 
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changes  in  credit  quality  are  reviewed.  The  final  part  of  this  chapter  re-examines 
findings  from  previous  studies  that  show  agency  consensus  to  be  greater  when  they 
are  rating  issuers  from  the  same  country  and  when  agencies  from  the  same  country 
are  compared  with  one  another. 
Chapter  eight  reviews  the  level  of  split  ratings  by  country  and  industry.  Previous 
research  has  found  that  the  highest  level  of  disagreement  is  over  the  ratings  of  banks. 
This  study  does  not  support  that  finding  and  shows  that  the  ratings  of  manufacturing- 
type  companies  have  a  higher  level  of  split  ratings  than  finance-type  companies. 
Chapter  nine  is  the  final  chapter  presenting  results  of  the  studies  of  split  ratings.  This 
analyses  split  ratings  in  terms  of  Basel  II  risk  weights  and  asks  the  question  as  to 
whether  the  split  ratings  identified  in  early  chapters  are  likely  to  have  a  significant 
impact  on  the  risk  weighting  allocated  under  the  Standardised  approach  of  the  Accord. 
Chapter  ten  applies  ordinal  logistic  regression  techniques  to  the  matched  bank  credit 
rating  and  financial  accounting  data  described  in  chapter  five.  A  wide  range  of  models 
are  built  and  dealt  with  in  a  number  of  different  sections  within  the  chapter.  The  first 
set  of  models  look  at  the  different  results  of  modelling  individual  vs.  long  term  bank 
ratings  for  Fitch  and  Moody's.  Models  are  then  built  for  each  of  the  ten  agencies 
included  in  the  FT-CRI  database  and  a  range  of  different  prediction  accuracies  are 
shown.  Results  are  also  reported  for  models  which  breakdown  the  data  sample  by 
region,  bank  size  and  type  to  identify  circumstances  in  which  bank  rating  models 
based  on  financial  accounting  information  have  a  high  prediction  accuracy. 
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The  Credit  Rating  Industry 
This  chapter  provides  an  introduction  and  background  to  the  credit  rating  industry. 
The  first  part  of  the  chapter  looks  at  the  nature  of  credit  ratings  and  considers  the 
process  by  which  they  are  determined  by  the  rating  agencies.  It  goes  on  to  look  at  the 
history  of  the  credit  rating  industry  and  how  this  has  grown  from  small  roots  in  the  US 
to  about  130  worldwide  agencies. 
The  second  part  of  the  chapter  considers  some  current  topics  in  the  industry.  Four  key 
issues  are  discussed: 
9  The  role  of  regulation  in  the  growth  of  wealth  and  importance  of  the  credit  rating 
agencies. 
"  Payment  of  fees  by  issuers  to  the  agencies  and  the  potential  conflict  of  interests 
this  presents. 
9  The  timeliness  of  ratings  and  their  information  content. 
"  The  impact  of  credit  ratings  on  procyclicality  in  capital  markets. 
2.1  What  is  a  credit  rating? 
"Credit  ratings  are  the  very  structure  of  the  marketplace.  They  are  the  risk  language 
that  we  all  speak  and  rely  on.  "  (Strauss  2002) 
Credit  rating  agencies  argue  that  they  provide  superior  information  about  the  ability  of 
corporations  or  governments  to  make  timely  repayment  of  principal  and  interest  on 
borrowings. 
But  not  everyone  agrees: 
"'Senseless'.  'Nonsense'.  'Irrelevant'.  Capital-markets  folk  with  a  kind  word  for 
credit-ratings  agencies  are  almost  as  rare  as  modest  bond-traders.  "  (Economist 
1999) 
In  Standard  and  Poor's  word's  "a  credit  rating  is  Standard  and  Poor's  opinion  of  the 
general  credit  worthiness  of  an  obligor,  or  the  creditworthiness  of  an  obligor  with 
respect  to  a  particular  debt  security  or  other  financial  obligation,  based  on  relevant  risk 
factors"  (Standard  and  Poor's  2002a).  In  the  words  of  Moody's  it  is  "..  an  opinion  on 
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the  future  ability  and  legal  obligation  of  an  issuer  to  make  timely  payments  of  principal 
and  interest  on  a  specific  fixed  income  security"  (Moody's  2006). 
One  of  the  original  purposes  of  credit  ratings  was  to  distinguish  investment  grade 
ratings  from  non-investment  grade.  There  is  still  a  clear  cut-off  between  the  two 
categories  but  there  are  also  a  wide  variety  of  ratings  within  each  section.  Full  details 
of  the  rating  scales  used  by  the  main  agencies  is included  in  Appendix  1. 
2.1.1  Measuring  relative  and  absolute  credit  risks 
A  credit  rating  is  a  grade  or  score  intended  to  distinguish  relatively  risky organisations 
or  issues  from  ones  that  are  relatively  safe.  For  credit  ratings  to  be  meaningful  they 
need  to  be  able  to  indicate  the  relative  level  of  credit  risk  of  one  issuer  in  comparison 
with  others  as  well  as  providing  an  estimate  of  the  absolute  risk,  i.  e.  the  probability  of 
default.  Credit  ratings  perform  better  as  ordinal  rankings  of  default  risk  rather  than 
absolute  measures  of  default  probability  that  are  constant  through  time. 
Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  argue  that  the  rating  industry  measures  relative  credit  risks 
with  reasonable  accuracy.  This  is  demonstrated  by  the  relationship  between  bond 
ratings  and  average  bond  yield  spreads  and  also  the  correlation  between  average 
short  term  and  long  term  default  rates  and  credit  ratings.  Shin  and  Moore  (2003) 
compare  US  and  Japanese  credit  ratings  and  find  that  the  relative  default  risk  is  quite 
similar  although  Japanese  agencies  are  considerably  more  lenient  in  their  ratings  than 
US  agencies.  Altman  (1989)  shows  that  each  letter  grade  decline  in  ratings 
corresponds  with  an  increase  in  yield  spread.  He  finds  this  result  to  be  robust  for  S&P 
ratings.  Moody's  and  S&P  publish  corporate  bond  default  studies'  that  show  lower 
corporate  bond  ratings  to  be  associated  with  a  higher  probability  of  default.  The 
default  probability  increases  as  the  time  horizon  is  lengthened  but  the  relationship 
between  ratings  and  default  probability  remains  the  same.  The  relationship  between 
ratings  and  bond  yield  spreads  as  well  as  default  studies  suggests  that  ratings  are  an 
effective  way  to  rank  relative  credit  risk. 
A  review  of  trends  in  five  year  cumulative  default  ratest  (CDRs)  over  time  illustrates 
large  fluctuations  in  the  percentage  of  defaulting  companies  over  the  business  cycle. 
I  e.  g.  Moody's  Investors  Service  (2006) 
2  The  definition  and  calculation  of  annual  and  cumulative  default  rates  are  covered  in  detail  in  chapter 
three. 
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Figures  2.1  and  2.2  show  that  ratings  do  not  correspond  to  the  same  probability  of 
default  at  every  point  in  time.  Agencies  state  that  they  do  not  make  rating  changes 
based  on  short-term  business  cycles  even  though  default  probabilities  will  go  up 
during  recession.  They  argue  that  long-term  default  probabilities  at  the  different 
ratings  levels  should  exhibit  relative  stability  over  long  periods  of  time  (Cantor  and 
Packer  1995).  Figures  2.1  and  2.2  show  5  year  CDRs  over  a  twenty  eight  year 
period,  the  default  rates  show  little  stability  over  this  time  period. 
Figure  2.1:  Trends  in  five  year  cumulative  default  rates  by  credit  rating  - 
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Figure  2.2:  Trends  in  5  year  cumulative  default  rates  by  credit  rating:  sub- 
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When  legislators  embed  specific  credit  rating  grades  into  law  and  regulation  they  are 
relying  on  long  term  stability  but  accept  that  in  the  short  term  the  probability  of  default 
associated  with  a  particular  rating  will  fluctuate. 
2.1.2  Organisation  and  issue  credit  ratings 
Ratings  may  be  provided  on  a  specific  organisation  (issuer)  or  a  particular  bond  issue. 
The  instrument-specific  credit  ratings  are  a  current  opinion  of  the  creditworthiness  of 
an  obligor  with  respect  to  a  specific  financial  obligation  or  class  of  obligations.  It  will 
take  into  account  the  credit  worthiness  of  the  issuer  but  also  factors  specific  to  that 
issue.  Often  instrument  ratings  are  the  same  as  organisation  ratings  but  they  may  be 
lower,  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  obligation. 
For  example  S&P  show  the  following  ratings  for  IBM  Corporation: 
Organisation  ratings 
Long  term  rating  A+ 
Watch  grade  Stable 
Short  term  rating  A-1 
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Instrument  ratings 
Commercial  paper  A-1 
Euro  8bn  Senior  unsecured  medium 
term  notes  issued  3/9/1999  A+ 
$20bn  Senior  unsecured/ 
subordinated  issued  1/2/2003  A 
An  organisation  credit  rating  gives  an  opinion  as  to  the  obligor's  overall  capacity  to 
meet  its  financial  obligations.  This  is  not  specific  to  any  particular  bond  or  debt  issue. 
Since  the  first  credit  rating  agency  was  set  up  in  the  US  in  1909,  rating  credit  has 
become  big  business.  Rating  changes  are  found  in  the  financial  press  each  day, 
regulation  around  the  world  uses  ratings  to  determine  which  investments  can  legally 
be  held  by  certain  organisations  and  agencies  are  powerful  and  wealthy  organisations. 
2.1.3  Bank  Individual  and  support  ratings 
Banks  differ  substantially  from  other  entities  in  that  they  have  access  to  outside 
support  if  they  run  into  serious  financial  difficulties.  Because  of  the  repercussions  of 
bank  failure  on  other  parts  of  the  economy  most  Governments  would  step  in  to  assist  a 
bank  at  risk  of  default.  A  crucial  part  of  the  raters'  assessment  of  a  bank  consists  in 
considering  whether,  and  in  what  circumstances,  a  bank  in  trouble  would  be  rescued 
and  by  whom.  A  support  rating  is  a  judgement  of  the  likelihood  of  support  for  a  bank 
and  is independent  to  the  financial  stability  of  the  bank  itself. 
Individual  Ratings  (called  Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings  by  Moody's)  are 
internationally  comparable  and  express  a  judgment  as  to  how  a  bank  would  be  viewed 
if  it  were  entirely  independent  and  could  not  rely  on  external  support.  These  ratings  are 
designed  to  assess  a  bank's  exposure  to,  appetite  for,  and  management  of  risk,  and 
thus  represent  the  raters'  view  on  the  likelihood  that  it  would  run  into  significant 
difficulties  such  that  it  would  require  support.  The  traditional  long  term  ratings  issued 
for  a  bank  combine  the  individual  rating  with  the  support  element. 
Individual  bank  ratings  are  published  by  Moody's  and  Fitch  Ratings.  These  are  called 
Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings  (BFSR)  and  Individual  ratings  by  Moody's  and  Fitch 
respectively.  S&P  have  no  publicly  available  equivalent  to  these  individual  ratings. 
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Fitch  Ratings  specifically  state  that  their  long  term  debt  ratings  are  derived  from  the 
support  and  individual  ratings.  Moody's  are  less  specific  about  the  relationship 
between  BFSRs  and  the  support  element  but  they  do  say  that  the  ratings  do  not  take 
into  account  the  probability  that  the  bank  will  receive  external  support.  They  go  onto 
explain  that  BFSRs  include  bank-specific  elements  as  well  as  other  risk  factors  in  the 
bank's  operating  environment  such  as  the  economy  and  quality  of  bank  regulation. 
2.2  The  process  of  assigning  a  credit  rating 
Usually  a  company  will  approach  Moody's  or  Standard  and  Poor's  when  it  is  going  to 
sell  or  register  a  new  debt  issue.  Issuers  often  like  to  find  out  the  likely  rating  in 
advance  so  that  they  can  asses  the  impact  of  the  new  debt  on  existing  debt.  The 
process  is  outlined  in  figure  2.3. 
Figure  2.3:  Standard  and  Poor's  debt  ratings  process 
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Source:  Dinwoodie  (2002) 
An  analyst  is  allocated  to  the  issuer  who  has  specialism  in  that  sector.  There  will  be 
one  key  day-to-day  contact  but  other  analysts  will  also  be  involved  who  have  general 
knowledge  of  the  issuer. 
A  meeting  with  management  will  be  arranged  and  a  preliminary  assessment  will  be 
made  by  the  agency.  Financial  statements,  descriptions  of  operations,  products  and 
corporate  structure  will  all  be  reviewed. 
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At  the  management  meeting  the  analyst  will  gather  information  to  conduct  a 
quantitative,  qualitative  and  legal  analysis.  They  will  also  find  out  about  key  strategic, 
operating  and  financial  plans,  management  policy,  other  credit  factors,  quality  of  senior 
management,  information  about  the  industry  and  undertake  a  tour  of  the  facility. 
Figure  2.4:  Moody's  rating  analysis  of  an  industrial  company 
Sovereign/Macro-Economic  Analysis 
Figure  2.4  illustrates  how  Moody's  describe  their  rating  process.  They  start  by 
reviewing  sovereign  and  macro-economic  issues,  industry  outlook  and  regulatory 
trends,  then  look  at  specific  attributes  of  the  organisation  including  the  quality  of 
management,  operating  and  financial  positions  and  company  structure.  Finally  the 
issue-specific  structure  of  the  financial  instrument  is  considered.  Both  major  agencies 
stress  that  many  qualitative,  rather  than  purely  quantitative  aspects  are  considered. 
After  the  management  meeting,  the  rating  committee  within  the  agency  will  meet  to 
determine  the  credit  rating.  There  are  usually  5  to  7  voting  members  at  the  meeting. 
The  analyst  will  make  a  presentation  which  includes  the  nature  of  the  company's 
business  and  its  operating  environment,  evaluation  of  the  company's  strategic  and 
financial  management,  financial  analysis  and  a  rating  recommendation. 
The  company  will  be  notified  of  the  rating  and  has  the  opportunity  to  appeal  and 
provide  additional  data.  If  there  is  an  appeal  it  is  conducted  as  quickly  as  possible  and 
the  company  is  informed  again  of  the  rating  before  it  is  released  to  the  media.  The 
ratings  are  monitored  at  least  once  a  year. Chapter  Two  The  Credit  Rating  Industry 
2.3  History  of  the  credit  rating  industry 
Credit  rating  agencies  as  they  exist  today  were  not  found  anywhere  in  the  world  until 
the  first  was  established  in  the  US  by  John  Moody  in  1909  (Partnoy  1999).  This 
seems  surprising  as  the  first  government  bonds  had  been  created  by  the  Dutch  shortly 
before  1600.  England's  financial  system  became  increasingly  developed  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  with  the  founding  of  the  Bank  of  England  in  1694,  and  overtook 
the  Dutch  economy  as  the  leading  economy  of  the  world  in  the  eighteenth  and 
nineteenth  centuries.  As  Sylla  points  out  (Sylla  2001), 
"By  the  time  of  John  Moody's  bond  rating  innovation  in  1909,  Dutch 
investors  had  been  buying  bonds  for  three  centuries,  English  investors  for 
two  and  American  investors  for  one  century,  all  the  time  without  the  benefit 
of  agency  ratings.  Why?  " 
The  answer  is  that  most  of  the  bond  investment  was  in  public,  or  sovereign  debts  of 
nations  and  governments  that  were  trusted  by  their  investors.  Businesses  were  still 
operating  on  a  small  scale  so  their  financing  requirements  could  be  met  by  bank  loans 
and  equity  issues. 
In  the  US  growth  started  to  occur  during  the  nineteenth  century  on  a  scale  that  could 
no  longer  be  funded  on  a  local,  or  state,  level.  In  the  US  there  was  less  state  and 
national  debt,  partly  because  there  had  not  been  the  same  need  to  finance  wars  as  in 
Europe  and  also  because  the  country  was  segmented  into  a  number  of  different 
states.  US  states  did  issue  sovereign  bonded  debt  to  build  canals  and  other 
infrastructure  projects  but  largely  withdrew  from  this  after  nine  states  defaulted  in  the 
early  1840s.  As  the  country  grew  local  governments  replaced  states  as  bond  issuers 
but  they  were  dwarfed  by  the  private  sector,  the  corporate  bond  market. 
Funding  railroads  became  a  key  reason  to  raise  money.  At  the  outset  these 
companies  were  locally  based  and  could  raise  funds  from  local  banks  and  stock  issues 
but  as  the  companies  merged  together  and  became  larger  it  was  not  possible  to  raise 
local  finance  and  bonds  were  required.  A  huge  market  in  bonded  debt  of  US  railroad 
corporations  grew  from  the  1850s.  By  1909  the  US  corporate  bond  market  (essentially 
US  railroad  bond  market)  was  several  times  larger  than  that  of  any  other  country.  It  is 
interesting  that  the  business  survived  for  at  least  50  years  without  a  rating  industry  and 
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this  may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  industry  was  relatively  small  and  confined  to 
one  sector. 
However  investors  were  helped  with  their  decisions  by  the  financial  press  and 
specialist  journals.  A  publication  called  The  American  Railroad  Journal  started 
publishing  information  for  investors  when  Henry  Poor  became  editor  in  1849.  The 
journal  contained  information  on  property,  assets,  liabilities  and  earnings  of  railroads 
corporations.  Henry  and  his  son  John,  specialised  in  their  own  publication  Poor's 
Manual  of  the  Railroads  of  the  United  States  in  1868.  Henry  died  in  1905  but  the  Poor 
company  went  on  and  entered  the  bond  rating  business  itself  in  1916.  The  company 
merged  with  Standard  Statistics,  another  information  and  ratings  company,  in  1941  to 
form  Standard  and  Poor's  (S&P).  This  company  was  taken  over  by  McGraw  Hill  in  the 
1960s  and  is  still  owned  by  this  publishing  company  today.  Standard  and  Poor's 
remains  one  of  the  largest  credit  rating  agencies  in  the  world. 
A  separate  branch  of  the  development  of  the  credit  rating  industry  was  started  by 
Lewis  Tappan  in  1841  when  he  founded  the  Mercantile  Agency  from  his  own  extensive 
records  of  credit  worthiness  of  his  dry  goods  and  silk  customers  (Sylla  2001,  Cantor 
and  Packer  1995).  Robert  Dun  later  acquired  the  company  which  became  R.  G.  Dun 
and  Company  and  published  the  first  ratings  guide  in  1859.7,000  business  were 
covered  in  the  1870's,  this  grew  to  40,000  in  the  1880's  and  one  million  by  1900.  A 
similar  mercantile  agency  was  established  by  John  Bradstreet  in  Cincinnati  in  1849 
and  merged  with  RG  Dun  and  Company  in  1933  to  form  Dun  and  Bradstreet. 
Sylla  (2001)  argues  that  a  third  factor  led  to  the  emergence  of  credit  rating  agencies  at 
the  start  of  the  twentieth  century.  The  role  of  investment  bankers  was  growing  in  the 
railroad  industry.  The  bankers  provided  a  large  proportion  of  the  required  finance  but 
in  exchange  expected  to  be  granted  access  to  detailed  information  about  the  company 
or  a  seat  on  the  board.  Other  investors  resented  this  access  to  privileged  information 
by  the  bankers  and  there  was  a  push  to  make  more  information  publicly  accessible. 
The  railroad  bond  rating  agency  established  in  1909  by  John  Moody  is  seen  as  the 
first  real  credit  rating  agency  (Sylla  2001).  In  1910  they  extended  the  coverage  to 
utility  and  industrial  bonds.  Moody's  did  not  rate  US  state  and  government  bonds  until 
1919.  In  1962  Dun  and  Bradstreet  took  over  Moody's  and  disposed  of  them  in 
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September  2000  when  they  became  freestanding  with  a  market  capitalisation  of  $5 
billion. 
Fitch  Publishing  Company  was  established  in  1924.  Duff  and  Phelps  entered  the  bond 
rating  market  in  1982  and  McCarthy,  Crisanti  and  Maffer  was  founded  in  1975  and 
acquired  by  Xerox  Financial  Services  before  it  was  merged  into  Duff  and  Phelps  in 
1991  (see  Cantor  and  Packer  1995).  Fitch  later  merged  with  IBCA,  the  only  UK  credit 
rating  agency,  in  1997  and  the  combined  entity  was  subsequently  bought  by  a  French 
company  FIMLAC.  In  June  2000  Fitch  IBCA  bought  Duff  and  Phelps.  In  December 
2000  Fitch  absorbed  Thomson  BankWatch  (White  2000). 
Estrella  et  al  (2000)  state  that  at  September  1999  it  was  believed  that  there  were 
about  130  agencies  world-wide  but  this  number  may  be  closer  to  150. 
2.4  Current  issues  in  the  credit  rating  industry 
The  second  part  of  this  chapter  looks  at  four  issues  that  concern  the  credit  rating 
industry  and  considers  alternative  views  put  forward  by  credit  rating  agencies  and 
other  commentators: 
Regulation  and  the  credit  rating  industry 
"  Conflicts  of  interest  between  the  agency  and  the  issuer 
"  Do  credit  ratings  have  information  content? 
"  Procyclicality  and  the  credit  rating  industry 
2.4.1  Regulation  and  the  credit  rating  Industry 
The  largest  and  most  powerful  credit  rating  agencies  are  based  in  the  US.  There  are 
many  smaller  agencies  around  the  world  but  none  except  Fitch  Ratings  come  close  to 
either  the  profitability  or  the  coverage  or  Moody's  and  Standard  and  Poor's.  The 
influence  and  wealth  of  the  large  credit  rating  agencies  is  closely  linked  to  the  position 
given  to  them  by  the  regulators,  especially  in  the  US,  but  this  influence  may  be 
extended  in  other  countries  by  the  proposals  of  Basel  II. 
"Take  ratings  out  of  regulation  altogether,  and  return  the  agencies  to  their  role 
as  servants  not  masters  of  the  capital  markets'  (Economist  2003b) 
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Commentators  such  as  the  Economist  argue  strongly  that  the  credit  rating  agencies 
should  be  taken  out  of  financial  regulation  altogether.  The  argument  is  that  regulation 
restricts  competition  and  increases  the  risk  of  conflicts  of  interest. 
"When  ratings  become  not  just  a  tool  for  investors  but  the  very  basis  for  regulation, 
they  are  likely  to  become  distorted,  and  conflicts  of  interest  risk  becoming  sharper.  " 
(Economist  2002) 
The  agencies  themselves  argue  that  they  serve  an  important  function  in  capital 
markets; 
"Credit  ratings  are  the  very  structure  of  the  marketplace.  They  are  the  risk 
language  that  we  all  speak  and  rely  on.  "  (Strauss  2002) 
In  addition  they  argue  that  taking  credit  ratings  out  of  regulation  would  be  extremely 
disruptive  and  unnecessary  as  "replicating  the  expertise,  experience,  commitment  and 
objectivity  of  the  large  agencies  would  be  difficult  if  not  impossible  to  achieve.  " 
Dominion  Bond  Rating  Service  (2003). 
At  present,  eleven  of  the  twelve  member  countries  of  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision  (BCBS)  use  credit  ratings  in  financial  regulation.  Of  these,  seven  use 
ratings  only  in  their  prudential  supervision  of  banks  solely  to  determine  a  qualifying 
debt  security  for  the  calculation  of  the  capital  requirement  for  specific  interest  rate  risk. 
This  is  the  market  risk  amendment  to  the  original  Basel  Accord  (Basel  Committee  on 
Banking  Supervision  1988  and  1996).  The  remaining  four  countries,  UK,  US,  Belgium 
and  Switzerland  use  agency  ratings  in  their  prudential  supervision  of  banks  for 
purposes  other  than  market  risk  (Estrella  et  al.  2001).  To  understand  more  about  the 
influence  that  regulation  has  had  on  the  credit  rating  agencies  it  is  useful  to  look  at  the 
background  of  the  use  of  agency  ratings  in  regulation. 
2.4.1.1  How  credit  ratings  came  to  be  used  in  regulation 
Regulators  at  the  US  Federal  and  State  levels  started  using  credit  ratings  for 
regulatory  purposes  for  the  first  time  in  the  1930s.  This  was  a  controversial  step  and 
made  the  front  page  of  The  Wall  Street  Journal  because  of  the  high  level  of  defaults  at 
the  time  (Partnoy  1999).  Once  better  financial  times  arrived,  which  generally 
continued  until  the  1970s,  there  was  less  concern  about  the  impact  of  credit  ratings  in 
regulation. 
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In  1930  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  devised  a  system  to  express  the 
safety  of  a  bank's  portfolio  as  a  single  number  based  on  credit  ratings.  In  1931 
regulation  was  introduced  by  the  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  (US  Treasury 
department)  to  cover  national  bank's  bond  accounts.  Bonds  with  a  credit  rating  of 
BBB  or  higher  could  be  carried  at  cost  but  all  bonds  with  a  lower  rating  required 
fractional  write-offs.  State  banking  superintendents  adopted  this  rule  in  the  years  that 
followed. 
In  1935  and  1936  the  Comptroller  tightened  up  the  rules  so  that  rather  than  having  to 
make  a  fractional  write-off  on  bonds  below  BBB  grade  it  was  now  totally  prohibited  to 
purchase  securities  that  fell  below  a  certain  credit  rating  (i.  e.  were  speculative  grade). 
Citing  Harold  (1938),  Partnoy  (1999)  says  "in  one  day,  the  Comptroller  had  slashed  in 
half  the  universe  of  publicly-traded  bonds  banks  could  purchase.  "  Harold  said  "it  is 
common  knowledge  in  bond  circles  that  since  the  issuance  of  the  Comptroller's  ruling, 
a  bond  rated  below  that  of  a  'business  man's  investment'  (BBB,  Baa,  B,  or  B1+)  can 
almost  never  be  sold  to  a  bank". 
Partnoy  argues  that  regulation  turns  a  credit  rating  into  a  valuable  "regulatory  licence" 
that  can  be  sold  by  the  rating  agencies.  Without  a  good  credit  rating  an  issuer  cannot 
attract  investors  as  purchase  of  the  bond  would  be  prohibited.  The  "licence"  has  great 
value  as  it  reduces  the  costs  for  the  issuer  and  the  investor.  He  argues  that  regulation 
explains  the  growth  in  wealth  and  recognition  of  the  credit  rating  agencies  in  the  1930s 
and  their  continuing  success  today. 
Another  impact  of  the  1930s  regulation  was  that  ratings  were  made  public  before  a 
bond  issue,  this  also  contributed  to  make  ratings  more  widely  used. 
"Prior  to  the  Comptroller's  ruling  the  rating  agencies  had  not  rated  bonds  until 
after  they  were  issued.  The  ruling  created  incentives  for  bond  issuers  to 
obtain  a  rating  before  the  bonds  were  issued.  Bond  issuers  were  forced  to 
look  to  rating  agencies  as  sources  of  authority  concerning  their  bond  issues, 
regardless  of  what  information  the  rating  agencies  actually  generated.  " 
Partnoy  (1999). 
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These  rules  still  effect  investment  decisions  of  US  banks  today.  The  legislation  is 
referred  to  as  "safety  and  soundness"  (prudential)  regulation  and  has  forced  those 
institutions  to  make  use  of  ratings  in  their  purchase  and  holding  decisions  with  respect 
to  bonds  (White  2002). 
There  was  very  little  change  in  regulation  concerning  credit  ratings  between  the  period 
1940  to  1973.  Sylla  (2001)  argues  that  there  is  a  connection  between  credit  rating 
agency  expansion,  regulation  and  times  of  high  levels  of  default.  This  certainly 
appears  to  be  true  for  the  periods  1931  -  1936  and  the  early  1970s  and  would  explain 
why  the  period  in  between  was  quiet  for  the  agencies  as  there  were  few  major 
defaults.  By  the  early  1970s  the  agencies  had  become  small  and  had  only  a  handful 
of  analysts. 
2.4.1.2  Nationally  Recognized  Statistical  Rating  Organizations 
The  small  scale  of  the  agencies  all  changed  in  1973  when  the  first  of  hundreds  of 
rules,  releases  and  regulations  were  issued  requiring  credit  ratings  to  be  used  in  the 
regulation  of  banks,  securities,  pensions,  banking,  real  estate  and  insurance 
regulation.  The  changes  were  driven  by  some  liquidity  crises  and  large  defaults  such 
as  Penn  Central  on  $82  million  of  commercial  paper.  One  of  the  most  significant 
regulations  of  this  period  was  the  adoption  by  the  SEC  of  Rule  15c3-1  in  1975,  a 
securities  rule  which  formally  incorporated  credit  ratings  and  approved  the  use  of 
ratings  from  certain  agencies  know  as  Nationally  Recognized  Statistical  Rating 
Organizations  (NRSRO's).  At  this  time  the  rule  effectively  froze  the  then  approved 
credit  rating  agencies  Moody's,  Standard  and  Poor  and  Fitch.  Partnoy  (1999)  argues 
that  "these  barriers  to  entry  have  remained  insurmountable". 
Other  agencies  sought  NRSRO  designation  from  the  SEC.  In  1982  Duff  and  Phelps 
received  designation  as  did  McCarthy,  Crisanti  and  Maffei  in  1983  (they  were 
subsequently  acquired  by  Duff  and  Phelps  in  1991).  IBCA  and  Thomson  BankWatch 
gained  NRSRO  status  in  1991  and  1992  respectively  but  these  companies  were  later 
acquired  by  Fitch  bringing  the  total  number  of  NRSRO  designated  agencies  back  to 
three.  Dominion  Bond  Rating  Service  (DBRS)  was  recognised  as  an  NRSRO  in 
February  2003. 
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The  SEC's  procedures  and  conditions  for  granting  designation  have  come  under 
substantial  criticism  for  creating  an  anti-competitive  environment  within  the  industry. 
There  are  no  specific  conditions  that  have  to  be  fulfilled,  designation  is  very  much  at 
the  discretion  of  the  SEC  and  based  on  recognition  and  status  of  the  agency  within  the 
US.  This  is  a  double  edged  sword  as  agencies  cannot  gain  widespread  usage  of  their 
ratings  without  NRSRO  status  and  cannot  gain  the  status  without  users  already  relying 
on  the  ratings.  The  SEC  did  publish  proposed  guidelines  for  NRSRO  recognition  in 
1997  but  these  guidelines  have  never  been  formally  adopted. 
The  position  of  the  NRSRO's  is  currently  under  review  as  the  SEC  issued  a  Concept 
Release  "Rating  Agencies  and  the  Use  of  Credit  Ratings  under  the  Federal  Securities 
Laws"  (SEC  2003).  Comments  were  invited  on  a  wide  range  of  issues  under  review, 
including  whether  credit  ratings  should  continue  to  be  used  for  regulatory  purposes 
under  the  federal  securities  laws,  and,  if  so,  the  process  of  determining  whose  credit 
ratings  should  be  used  and  the  level  of  oversight  to  apply  to  such  credit  rating 
agencies.  These  questions  tackle  many  of  the  current  concerns  at  the  core  of  the 
industry  and  the  SEC  is  going  so  far  as  to  question  whether  or  not  credit  rating 
agencies  should  exist  at  all.  In  2005  the  SEC  issued  a  proposed  definition  of  an 
NRSRO  but  nothing  has  been  finalised. 
Despite  this,  given  the  position  of  the  large  credit  rating  agencies  within  US  regulation 
it  seems  very  unlikely  that  any  significant  changes  will  be  made  to  the  industry. 
2.4.2  Conflicts  of  interest 
The  second  issue  relevant  to  the  credit  rating  industry  is  the  potential  conflict  of 
interest  between  the  agency  and  the  issuer. 
There  are  three  potential  areas  where  a  conflict  could  arise. 
1.  Reliance  by  the  agency  on  issuer  fees  could  potentially  lead  raters  to  improve  a 
rating  to  ensure  retention  of  the  account  or  in  return  for  an  additional  fee. 
2.  Credit  rating  agencies  also  offer  consultancy  and  other  advisory  services, 
commentators  feel  that  seeking  growth  in  this  business  could  lead  to  conflicts  of 
interest. 
3.  There  has  been  widespread  concern  that  the  issuing  of  an  unsolicited  rating 
might  be  a  way  to  force  an  issuer  to  pay  for  the  full  service. 
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2.4.2.1  Reliance  on  issuer  fees 
There  is  a  potential  conflict  of  interest  at  the  core  of  the  credit  rating  business.  The 
credit  rating  agencies  are  in  business  to  maximise  earnings  while  the  investors  and 
other  end  users  of  the  information  need  to  use  the  ratings  to  make  financial  decisions. 
The  potential  problems  occur  when  the  agencies'  primary  source  of  income  comes 
from  fees  paid  by  the  issuers  rather  than  the  end  users  of  the  rating.  According  to 
Moody's  10-K  it  obtains  more  than  85%  of  its  compensation  from  issuers. 
Since  1973  rules  depending  on  credit  ratings  have  been  enacted  under  the  Securities 
Act  of  1933,  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1974,  the  Investment  Company  Act  of 
1940  as  well  as  banking  regulations.  More  than  a  dozen  financial  regulations  depend 
upon  the  use  of  credit  ratings  (Economist  2001).  Partnoy  (1999)  argues  that  "the 
resulting  web  of  regulation  is  so  thick  that  a  thorough  review  would  occupy  hundreds, 
perhaps  thousands  of  pages.  ' 
From  1909  to  the  1970's  the  agencies  were  funded  from  the  sale  of  their  agency 
reports  to  subscribers.  After  the  1970s  the  revenue  source  changed  from  the 
investors  to  the  issuers  of  the  securities.  This  became  possible  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly,  because  issuers  were  hoping  to  reassure  nervous  investors  of  the  quality  of 
their  bonds  after  the  failure  of  Penn  Central  and  secondly  the  agencies  themselves 
were  worried  that  low-cost  photocopying  would  make  it  hard  to  prevent  free  duplication 
of  their  information.  Fitch  and  Moody's  started  to  charge  in  1970  and  S&P  followed  a 
few  years  later. 
White  (2000)  quotes  "list  prices"  for  the  requested  ratings:  3.25  basis  points  on  issues 
up  to  $500  million  with  a  minimum  fee  of  $25,000  and  a  maximum  of  $125,000  (S&P) 
or  $130,000  (Moody's).  Both  agencies  charge  an  additional  2  basis  points  on  amounts 
above  $500  million.  White  quotes  rates  for  Fitch  and  Duff  and  Phelps  prior  to  their 
merger,  these  fees  are  lower  than  the  two  large  agencies  at  between  2.5  and  2.75 
basis  points. 
Estrella  et  al  (2000)  surveyed  26  agencies  around  the  world  and  asked  whether 
payments  for  ratings  are  made  by  the  rated  body  or  subscribers.  17  of  these  agencies 
disclosed  information  and  of  these  seven  receive  payment  from  the  rated  body  rather 
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than  the  subscriber.  This  research  suggests  that,  while  100%  of  NRSROs  obtain 
revenue  from  the  issuer,  the  majority  of  smaller  agencies  do  not. 
For  the  major  agencies  the  vast  majority  of  their  total  revenue  comes  from  issuers 
fees,  not  from  the  sale  of  the  rating  information  to  investors.  Ederington  and  Yawitz 
(1987)  state  that  eighty  percent  of  S&P's  revenue  comes  from  issuer  fees  and  Partnoy 
(2001)  gives  the  equivalent  figure  for  both  agencies  as  95%  of  revenue  coming  from 
issuer  fees. 
The  agencies  argue  that  the  risk  of  a  conflict  of  interest  is  mitigated  by  a  number  of 
policies  and  procedures  designed  to  guarantee  the  independence  and  objectivity  of 
the  rating  process.  For  example,  rating  decisions  are  made  by  a  ratings  committee, 
there  are  fixed  fee  schedules  and  analysts  are  not  compensated  on  the  basis  of  the 
level  of  issuer  fees. 
An  argument  that  has  been  used  time  and  again  to  defend  the  agencies  against  any 
accusation  of  a  conflict  of  interest  over  fees  is  that  the  agency's  reputation  is  so 
important  to  the  business. 
"A  reputation  for  technical  competence,  continuity,  transparency,  objectivity  and 
impartiality  comprises  the  principal  asset  of  the  rating  agencies,  without  which  there 
would  be  no  justifiable  demand  for  their  ratings.  "  Smith  and  Walter  (2001) 
"Apparently,  [the  agencies']  institutional  concerns  about  their  long-run  reputations  have 
been  sufficiently  strong  so  as  to  keep  the  moral  hazard  tendencies  in  check.  "  White 
(2000) 
"The  reliability  of  ratings  can  be  explained  by  reputational  costs;  the  profitability  of 
rating  agencies  is  directly  dependent  on  their  reputations.  Inaccurate  ratings  will 
impair,  if  not  destroy  a  rating  agency  reputation.  "  Schwarcz  (2002) 
This  appears  to  be  the  prevailing  view  and  is  widely  accepted  within  the  industry  and 
issuers,  investors,  regulators  and  researchers  alike  agree  that  the  agencies  have  a 
huge  incentive  to  provide  reliable  ratings  and  have  done  a  reasonably  good  job  to 
date. 
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Partnoy  (1999)  takes  a  different  view  and  does  not  agree  that  `reputational  capital'  has 
been  such  a  key  driver  in  the  success  of  the  credit  rating  industry  or  protection  against 
moral  hazard.  He  argues  that  rating  agencies  are  still  very  successful  despite  having 
made  some  serious  mistakes  in  rating  bonds  during  the  troubled  times  of  the  1930s 
and  mid  1970s. 
2.4.2.2  Consultancy  and  other  advisory  services 
Credit  rating  agencies  are  increasingly  offering  consultancy  and  other  services. 
Commentators  are  worried  about  this  new  business  departure  as  it  draws  agencies 
closer  to  the  companies  that  they  rate.  There  is  a  risk  that  issuers  could  be  pressured 
to  purchase  advisory  services.  The  agencies  have  a  large  amount  of  power  over 
issuers  as  the  ratings  have  such  significance  to  the  cost  of  their  borrowing  and 
reputation  in  the  market  place. 
Consultancy  is  a  relatively  new  departure  for  the  credit  rating  agencies  but  may 
already  exceed  one  third  of  their  income.  Moody's  say  that  36%  of  revenue  is  now 
"relationship-based"  (Economist  2001).  The  agencies  argue  that  there  are  extensive 
guidelines  and  firewalls  to  separate  the  ratings  services  from  other  businesses. 
2.4.2.3  Unsolicited  ratings 
Moody's  and  S&P  state  that  they  rate  and  make  public  all  SEC-registered  corporate 
bonds,  whether  requested  by  the  issuer  or  not.  If  the  issuer  does  not  request  a  rating 
the  agency  will  still  issue  a  rating  on  the  basis  of  publicly  available  information.  In  the 
industry  this  is  called  an  unsolicited  rating  but  Moody's  and  S&P  do  not  use  those 
terms  as  they  believe  all  ratings  are  solicited.  S&P  marks  unsolicited  ratings  with  the 
prefix  "pi"  to  make  it  clear  that  this  is  based  on  public  information. 
"A  public  information  credit  rating  is  a  local  currency  credit  rating  identified  by 
the  "pi"  subscript  and  based  on  an  analysis  of  the  obligor's  published  financial 
information,  as  well  as  additional  information  in  the  public  domain.  Public 
information  ratings  are  not  ordinarily  modified  with  "+"  or  -"  designations  and 
are  not  assigned  outlooks.  Ratings  with  a  "pi"  subscript  are  reviewed  annually 
based  on  the  current  financial  statements,  but  may  be  reviewed  on  an  interim 
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basis  if  a  major  event  that  may  affect  an  issuer's  credit  quality  occurs.  " 
(Standard  and  Poor  2002a) 
Moody's  state  in  the  rating  assignment  press  release  whether  a  rating  was  unsolicited 
by  the  comment,  "this  rating  was  initiated  by  Moody's,  the  issuer  did  not  participate  in 
the  assignment  process"  (Moody's  1999).  Until  January  2000  they  did  not 
differentiate  between  unsolicited  and  solicited  ratings.  Poon  (2003)  comments  that  it 
was  impossible  to  establish  which  ratings  were  solicited  and  which  were  not  as 
Moody's  do  not  publish  a  list  of  customers.  In  their  announcement  of  the  policy 
change,  Moody's  say: 
"Since  we  do  not  consider  unsolicited  ratings  which  lacked  issuer  participation 
to  be  anything  less  than  full-fledged  Moody's  ratings,  we  had  been  reluctant  to 
designate  them  as  different.  However,  we  recognize  that  market  participants 
have  shown  an  interest  in  knowing  which  ratings  lack  the  issuer's  participation, 
and  we  have  therefore  concluded  that  it  is  appropriate  to  do  so  going  forward.  " 
Moody's  (1999) 
Moody's  argue  that: 
"Unsolicited  ratings  perform  a  useful  role.  They  enable  us  to  maintain  broad 
coverage,  especially  below  investment  grade.  They  are  also  the  market's  best 
defence  against  rating  shopping  (which  occurs  when  issuers  shop  among  various 
agencies  for  the  highest  ratings  and  seek  to  suppress  lower  conclusions).  Under 
such  circumstances,  rating  agencies  risk  the  moral  hazard  of  competing  to  provide 
the  highest  rating  in  order  to  obtain  the  issuer's  business.  "  Moody's  (1999) 
Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  comment  that  "Moody's  and  Standard  &  Poor's  usually 
receive  fees  for  ratings  they  would  have  issued  anyway  because  companies  want  the 
opportunity  provided  by  the  formal  rating  process  to  put  their  best  case  before  the 
agencies.  "  This  implies  that  issuers  believe  that  by  giving  the  agencies  access  to 
company  staff  and  internal  information  they  will  achieve  a  better  rating  than  if  it  is 
based  entirely  on  information  in  the  public  domain.  A  survey  of  259  financial 
institutions  in  Japan  (Japan  Center  for  International  Finance  2000)  shows  that  70%  of 
respondents  provide  internal  information  not  available  to  institutional  investors  and 
financial  analysts  for  solicited  ratings  but  less  than  30%  provide  such  information  for 
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unsolicited  ratings.  Harington  (1997)  states  that  some  banks  consider  the  practice  of 
assigning  unsolicited  ratings  as  equivalent  to  "financial  blackmail"  because  they  feel 
they  should  co-operate  and  pay  the  agency  to  receive  a  more  favourable  rating. 
Fitch  has  also  stated  that  Moody's  uses  the  threat  of  an  unsolicited  rating  to  scare 
reluctant  customers  into  requesting  a  rating.  A  managing  director  from  Duff  &  Phelps 
Credit  Rating  Co.  stated  that  "unsolicited  ratings  are  tantamount  to  blackmail.  "  (House 
1995) 
In  1995  a  lawsuit  was  brought  against  Moody's  over  a  unsolicited  rating.  Jefferson 
County  (Colorado)  School  District  filed  a  lawsuit  accusing  Moody's  of  "fraud,  malice, 
and  willful  and  wanton  conduct"  for  publishing  a  "punishment"  rating  on  the  district's 
bonds,  because  the  district  did  not  hire  the  agency  to  rate  it.  The  motion  was 
dismissed  by  the  US  District  Court  and  later  the  US  Court  of  Appeal  on  the  basis  that 
the  bond  market  depended  upon  the  free,  open  exchange  of  information  concerning 
bond  issues.  However,  the  reputation  of  the  credit  rating  agencies  suffered  and  the 
case  attracted  a  lot  of  attention  to  the  controversial  practice  of  unsolicited  ratings. 
In  1996  Moody's  was  the  subject  of  an  antitrust  investigation  by  America's  Justice 
Department.  The  company  was  suspected  of  issuing  "unsolicited"  ratings  on 
companies  to  force  them  to  pay  up  for  a  full  service.  No  charges  were  brought  on 
Moody's  but  there  are  widespread  references  to  this  practice  in  the  literature. 
In  March  1996  the  Justice  Department's  Antitrust  Division  investigated  the  possibility  of 
anti-competitive  practices  in  the  bond  rating  industry,  including  the  use  of  unsolicited 
ratings.  At  the  time  the  claims  were  dismissed  but  in  April  2001,  Moody's  was  ordered 
to  pay  a  fine  of  $195,000  as  it  pleaded  guilty  to  destruction  of  documents  demanded 
for  this  investigation.  Federal  authorities  said  "one  or  more  of  Moody's  executives  in 
addition  to  the  one  who  destroyed  the  documents  knew  of,  or  should  have  known  of, 
the  destruction.  "  CNN  Money  Magazine  (2001) 
The  strong  legal  position  of  the  agencies  was  also  illustrated  in  the  case  of  Orange 
County,  California  in  December  1994.  The  county  defaulted  a  few  months  after  the 
highest  short  term  rating  had  been  given  to  $600  million  of  debt.  In  1996  Orange 
Country  made  a  complaint  to  the  US  Bankruptcy  Court  for  breach  of  contract, 
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professional  negligence  and  aiding  and  abetting  breach  of  fiduciary  duty  by  S&P. 
Most  of  the  claims  were  dismissed  by  the  courts  as  the  First  Amendment  protected 
publishers  from  professional  negligence  actions  (Partnoy  1999). 
There  are  two  reasons  for  the  strong  legal  position  of  the  agencies.  Firstly,  that  debt 
ratings  issued  by  rating  agencies  are  not  financial  advice  but  speech  that  is 
constitutionally  protected  under  the  First  Amendment.  Secondly,  credit  ratings  are 
extensively  disclaimed  and  are  not  a  recommendation  to  buy,  sell,  or  hold  securities 
(Partnoy  2001). 
In  reality  this  has  meant  that  agencies  will  very  rarely  be  found  to  be  liable.  In  the 
case  of  Orange  Country,  S&P  did  make  a  small  settlement  payment  of  $149,000.  This 
compares  to  hundreds  of  millions  of  dollars  paid  by  the  investment  banking  defendants 
in  the  settlement.  This  case  shows  very  clearly  that  it  would  be  extremely  hard  to 
bring  a  successful  case  against  the  US  credit  rating  agencies  in  the  event  of  default  of 
investment  grade  corporate,  or sovereign  debt. 
Poon  (2003)  has  studied  the  relative  rating  grades  of  unsolicited  ratings  relative  to 
solicited.  She  finds  that  unsolicited  ratings  are  generally  lower  but  also  that  those 
issuers  who  choose  not  to  obtain  ratings  from  S&P  have  a  weaker  financial  profile. 
However  for  Japanese  ratings  she  does  find  that  unsolicited  ratings  are  still  lower, 
even  after  controlling  for  differences  in  sovereign  risk  and  financial  characteristics. 
Byoun  and  Shin  (2002)  look  at  the  price  impact  of  unsolicited  rating  announcements. 
They  find  that  for  unsolicited  new  ratings  and  rating  down-grades  there  are  negative 
stock  price  reactions  to  announcements.  However,  for  solicited  ratings,  there  are 
negative  effects  only  for  rating  down-grades. 
Unsolicited  ratings  are  acknowledged  to  be  a  potential  problem  in  the  draft  of  the  New 
Basel  Capital  Accord.  Basel  II  states  that  banks  should  use  solicited  ratings  and  can 
only  use  unsolicited  ratings  if  national  regulators  allow  banks  to  do  so.  They  suggest 
that  any  agency  that  uses  unsolicited  ratings  to  put  pressure  on  entities  to  obtain  a  full 
rating  should  lead  supervisors  to  consider  whether  to  continue  recognising  that  agency 
under  regulations  (BCBS  2005). 
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2.4.3  Do  credit  ratings  have  information  content? 
A  number  of  previous  studies  have  examined  whether  debt-security  ratings  convey 
new  information  to  the  market.  The  findings  are  not  consistent.  For  example,  Partnoy 
(2001)  discusses  the  paradox  of  the  "continuing  prosperity  of  credit  rating  agencies  in 
the  face  of  declining  informational  value  of  ratings".  He  states  that  "there  is 
overwhelming  evidence  that  credit  ratings  are  of  scant  informational  value.  "  In 
contrast,  Jewell  and  Livingston  (1999)  argue  that  "in  the  academic  literature,  the 
consensus  is  growing  that  bond  ratings  convey  useful  information  to  the  market" 
Research  does  show  that  agency  ratings  lag  behind  the  information  already  available 
to  the  market.  Weistein  (1977),  Hettenhouse  and  Sartoris  (1976)  and  Pinches  and 
Singleton  (1978)  examine  bond  returns,  bond  yields  or  stock  returns  at  the  time  of 
announcements  of  ratings  changes.  The  hypothesis  of  this  research  is  that  no  capital 
market  reaction  at  the  time  of  the  rating  change  suggests  that  ratings  convey  no  new 
information  to  the  market. 
These  early  studies  into  the  information  content  of  bond  ratings  found  that  rating 
agency  revisions  do  lag  earlier  established  market  perceptions.  They  followed  the 
argument  that  in  a  perfect  market,  with  no  taxes,  credit  quality  is  irrelevant  to  the  value 
of  the  firm.  In  those  papers,  rating  agencies  were  thought  to  use  only  publicly  available 
financial  data.  Consequently,  it  was  thought  that  bond  rating  agencies  did  little  more 
than  certify,  validate,  and  verify  publicly  available  financial  information  and 
subsequently  should  have  little  impact  on  market  value  (Larrymore,  Liu  and  Rimbey 
2003).  In  general  these  researchers  argue  that  the  bond  market  has  anticipated  most 
of  the  rating  process  long  before  the  rating  change  announcements. 
For  example,  Weistein  (1977)  reported  no  bond  price  reaction  at  the  time  of  a  rating 
change  and  no  post  announcement  price  adjustment.  He  finds  that  bond  price 
changes  are  fully  anticipated  during  the  period  of  18  to  7  months  preceding  the  bond 
rating  revisions  made  by  Moody's.  He  concluded  that,  in  an  efficient  market,  bond 
rating  agency  announcements  do  not  provide  any  new  information  to  the  market. 
Hettenhouse  and  Sartoris  (1976)  support  the  view  that  there  is  a  lag  between  the 
arrival  of  new  information  and  rating  changes.  Pinches  and  Singleton  (1978)  found 
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that  stock  price  adjustments  preceded  the  announcement  of  bond  rating  changes  by 
several  months. 
Another  branch  of  the  literature  argues  that  bond  ratings  do  convey  some  useful 
information  to  the  market.  This  seems  to  be  especially  true  of  bond  downgrades  in 
that  there  is  a  significant  negative  market  reaction  to  falls  in  bond  ratings.  This 
asymmetry  in  the  bond  market's  reaction  to  positive  and  negative  announcements  is 
found  by  many  researchers. 
Griffin  and  Sanvicente  (1982)  show  that  share  prices  respond  negatively  to  bond  rating 
agency  downgrade  announcements.  They  examined  the  adjustments  in  a  firm's 
common  stock  price  during  the  eleven  months  before  and  during  the  month  of 
announcement  of  a  bond  rating  change  and  found  that  bond  downgradings  convey 
information  to  common  stockholders.  Using  daily  data,  Holthausen  and  Leftwich 
(1986)  found  significant  negative  abnormal  returns  associated  with  bond  rating 
reductions  but  found  that  equity  returns  anticipate  both  upgrades  and  downgrades. 
Goh  and  Ederington  (1993)  find  negative  stock  market  reaction  only  to  downgrades 
associated  with  a  deterioration  of  firm's  financial  prospects  but  not  to  those  attributed 
to  an  increase  in  leverage  or  reorganization. 
Cross  sectional  variation  in  stock  market  reaction  is  documented  by  Goh  and 
Ederington  (1999)  who  find  a  stronger  negative  reaction  to  downgrades  to  and  within 
non-investment  grade  than  to  downgrades  within  the  investment  grade  category.  Hite 
and  Warga  (1997)  also  find  that  the  strongest  bond  price  reaction  is  associated  with 
downgrades  to  and  within  the  non-investment  grade  class.  They  analyse  changes  in 
ratings  during  the  life  of  a  bond  and  find  some  information  content  for  downgrades  at 
announcement,  and  little  or  none  for  upgrades.  They  show  that  the  cumulative 
abnormal  bond  return  within  6  months  prior  to  rating  changes  is  about  two  to  ten  times 
larger  than  that  in  the  announcement  month.  This  finding  adds  strength  to  the  views  of 
researchers  of  the  1970s  such  as  Weistein  who  reported  no  bond  price  reduction  at 
the  time  of  a  rating  change  and  no  post  announcement  price  changes. 
Wansley  et  al.  (1992)  confirm  the  strong  negative  effect  of  downgrades  (but  not 
upgrades)  on  bond  returns  during  the  period  just  before  and  just  after  the 
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announcement.  Their  study  concludes  that  negative  excess  returns  are  positively 
correlated  with  the  number  of  rating  notches  changed  and  to  prior  excess  negative 
returns.  In  contrast  to  the  findings  of  Goh  and  Ederington  (1999)  and  Hite  and  Warga 
(1997),  Wansley  et  al.  (1992)  find  that  this  effect  is  not  related  to  whether  the  rating 
change  caused  the  firm  to  become  non-investment  grade. 
Using  daily  bond  prices,  Hand,  Hoithausen  and  Leftwich  (1992)  find  significant 
abnormal  bond  returns  associated  with  reviews  and  rating  changes.  A  study  by 
Steiner  and  Heinke  (2001)  uses  Eurobond  data  and  detects  that  negative  reviews  and 
downgrades  cause  abnormal  negative  bond  returns  on  the  announcement  day  and  the 
following  trading  days  but  no  significant  price  changes  are  observed  for  upgrades  and 
positive  review  announcements. 
Another  thread  covered  by  this  research  concerns  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
agencies  are  party  to  inside  information  due  to  the  nature  of  their  relationship  with 
bond  issuers.  Ederington  and  Yawitz  (1987)  contend  that  bond  rating  agencies  claim 
to  be  given  inside  information.  Goh  and  Ederington  (1993)  argue  that  it  is  hard  to 
ascertain  whether  the  bond  rating  agencies  actually  receive  much  inside  information. 
Nonetheless,  the  significantly  negative  market  reaction  to  corporate  bond  rating 
downgrade  announcements  indicates  a  perception  of  information  asymmetry.  In  1974 
Professon  Lehn  wrote  to  J.  G.  Katz,  Secretary  of  the  SEC,  arguing  that  credit  ratings 
must  have  substantial  informational  content  because  of  the  hundreds  of  stories  that 
appear  in  the  financial  press  about  bond  rating  changes.  While  inclusion  in  the 
financial  press  is  not  necessarily  proof  of  information  content,  it  is  true  that  you  cannot 
scan  the  business  news  without  finding  some  mention  of  credit  ratings. 
Ederington,  Yawitz  and  Roberts  (1987)  investigate  whether  market  participants  base 
their  evaluation  of  a  bond  issue's  default  risk  on  agency  ratings  or  on  publicly  available 
financial  information.  Their  results  suggest  that  the  ratings  bring  some  information  to 
the  market  above  and  beyond  publicly  available  accounting  variables.  Danos,  Holt, 
and  Imhoff  (1984)  indicate  that  information  provided  to  the  market  might  be  due  more 
to  bond  rating  agency  experience  in  efficiently  processing  and  analyzing  public 
information  and  less  due  to  their  possession  of  private  information.  In  contrast, 
Ederington  and  Yawitz  (1987)  survey  the  bond  rating  process  and  find  that,  at  that 
time,  there  were  insufficient  analysts  in  Moody's  and  S&P  to  rate  corporate  bonds, 
27 Chapter  Two  The  Credit  Rating  Industry 
they  could  not  afford  a  day-to-day  monitoring  on  thousands  of  corporate  bonds  in  the 
market.  This  would  provide  a  good  explanation  as  to  why  many  surveys  found  that 
there  is  a  lag  between  the  arrival  of  new  information  and  rating  changes 
The  reasons  for  these  conflicting  results  may  be  to  do  with  many  problems  with  credit 
rating  and  bond  or  stock  price  data.  In  some  studies  only  one  agency  was  used 
without  analysis  of  any  of  the  others.  Many  of  the  studies  have  used  monthly  data 
which  means  that  other  information  may  have  been  released  during  that  time  that 
impacted  the  bond  returns. 
2.4.4  Procyclicality  and  the  credit  rating  industry 
Procyclicality  in  the  financial  system  means  that  the  peaks  and  troughs  of  underlying 
economic  cycles  are  excessively  amplified.  Default  and  credit  problems  multiply  in 
times  of  recession  but  new  bond  issues  and  total  bank  lending  increase  during  the 
good  times  contributing  to  possible  overheating  of  the  economy.  Credit  ratings  are 
cyclical  in  that  they  look  best  at  the  top  of  a  boom,  when  things  are  about  to  turn  bad, 
and  worst  at  the  bottom  of  a  slump,  when  business  is  about  to  pick  up.  "  (Economist 
2003a). 
A  key  driver  of  changes  in  regulation,  accounting  standards,  risk  measurement 
practices  and  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy  is  the  aim  to  enhance  both  the  financial 
system  and  macroeconomic  stability.  The  worst  fear  is  that  if  one  bank  gets  into 
trouble  during  a  downturn  a  systemic  crisis  can  be  set  off  leading  to  general  panic. 
With  the  introduction  of  Basel  II  (BCBS  2003)  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision  has  a  stated  objective  of  making  the  capital  requirements  more 
representative  of  the  banks'  actual  risk  profiles.  If  the  capital  requirement  is  risk- 
sensitive,  it  is  likely  to  increase  during  recessions  and  decease  during  expansions 
tending  to  exacerbate  the  business  cycle  waves.  Since  a  risk-sensitive  capital 
requirement  is  likely  to  fluctuate  over  the  business  cycle  the  Basel  II  objective  is  to 
some  extent  at  odds  with  the  concern  about  procyclicality  (Pederzoli  and  Torricelli 
2005).  The  extent  of  this  problem  depends  on  whether  credit  rating  agencies  rate 
"through  the  cycle"  or  at  one  point  in  time. 
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The  major  credit  rating  agencies  maintain  that  their  ratings  should  generally  be  stable 
through  credit  cycles  (see  Altman  and  Kao  1992,  Hamilton  and  Cantor  2004,  Altman 
and  Rijken  2005),  this  is  called  rating  "through  the  cycle".  This  means  that  the  issuer 
is  graded  according  to  their  expected  creditworthiness  over  the  life  of  the  loan  or  entire 
credit  cycle  rather  than  according  to  current  conditions.  Treacy  and  Carey  (1998) 
comment  that  only  borrowers  that  are  very  weak  at  the  time  of  their  initial  assessment 
would  be  rated  according  to  the  current  condition. 
Estrella  et  al  (2000)  conducted  a  survey  of  28  international  rating  agencies  and 
showed  whether  they  use  through-the-cycle  or  point-in-time  methodology.  17  gave 
responses  on  this  issue  and  of  these  8  use  through-the-cycle  methodology.  These  are 
Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch,  Thomson  BankWatch  (now  part  of  Fitch),  Euro  Ratings  AG, 
Japan  Credit  Rating  Agency,  R@S  Rating  Service  and  Untemehmensratingagentur 
AG. 
"The  ideal  is  to  "rate  through  the  cycle".  There  is  no  point  in  assigning  high  ratings  to  a 
company  enjoying  peak  prosperity  if  that  performance  level  is  expected  to  be  only 
temporary.  Similarly,  there  is  no  need  to  lower  ratings  to  reflect  poor  performance  as 
long  as  one  can  reliably  anticipate  that  better  times  are  just  around  the  corner.  " 
(Standard  and  Poor  2002a) 
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Figure  2.5:  Credit  rating  "through  the  cycle"  vs.  "point  in  time" 
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In  Figure  2.5,  Standard  and  Poor's  would,  ideally,  rate  the  company  as  an  A  even 
though  its  rating  at  a  particular  point  in  time  over  the  cycle  may  range  from  AA  to  BBB. 
They  state  that  this  approach  works  well  for  highly  stable,  investment  grade,  major 
industry  participants  but  S&P  admit  that  may  be  the  "incorrect  model"  for  other  issuers. 
However,  rating  accurately  through  the  cycle  is  extremely  difficult.  The  cyclical  pattern 
needs  to  be  predictable,  the  business  needs  to  react  to  the  cycle  in  the  same  way  and 
needs  to  survive  the  downturn.  S&P  state  in  their  Corporate  Rating  Criteria  (Standard 
and  Poor  2002a)  that  "ratings  may  well  be  adjusted  with  the  phases  of  the  cycle"  but 
"within  a  relatively  narrow  band".  Figure  2.6  shows  how  this  works.  S&P  emphasise 
that  the  range  of  ratings  would  not  fully  mirror  the  cyclical  highs  and  lows,  this  is 
important  as  following  the  full  range  of  the  cycle  or  even  amplifying  this  would  mean 
the  ratings  are  indeed  procyclical.  S&P  comment  that  for  non-investment  grade  firms 
cyclical  fluctuations  will  lead  to  ratings  changes  as  these  firms  are  more  volatile  in 
nature. 
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Figure  2.6:  Patinas  a  dj_ýýtei  ..  +f-l  'ý-e  chases  of  the  cycle 
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This  explanation  is  useful  as  it  highlights  the  problems  with  the  "through  the  cycle" 
policy  and  how  these  problems  are  dealt  with  in  reality. 
Moody's  have  the  same  policy  as  S&P  and  state  that  they  rate  "through  the  cycle"  but 
in  reality  their  ratings  are  also  cyclical  to  some  extent.  "While  we  say  that  we  "look 
through  the  cycle"  ...  our  rating  behavior  is  actually  cyclical",  Christopher  Mahoney, 
Credit  Policy  Committee,  (Moody's  2003a). 
The  difference  between  "through  the  cycle"  and  "point  in  time"  rating  raises  an 
interesting  question  for  building  models  to  predict  credit  ratings.  Regression  estimates 
of  rating  determinants  implicitly  assume  that  ratings  adjust  instantaneously  to  new 
information.  This  assumes  a  "point  in  time"  rating  policy  which  we  have  established  is 
not  the  correct  model  to  follow,  at  least  for  the  three  major  rating  agencies. 
Research  supports  the  view  that  credit  ratings  are  cyclical.  Ferri,  Liu  and  Majnoni 
(2001),  Monfort  and  Mulder  (2000),  Reisen  (2000)  and  Amato  and  Furfine  (2004)  all 
find  evidence  that  ratings  agencies  behave  cyclically.  Figure  2.7  shows  the  number  of 
rating  changes  made  by  S&P  that  were  upgrades  in  comparison  to  all  changes  in  a 
given  quarter.  The  shaded  areas  indicate  recessions  as  defined  by  the  National 
Bureau  of  Economic  Research.  This  suggests  that  during  recessions,  rating  changes 
are  far  more  likely  to  be  downgrades  than  upgrades. 
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Figure  2.7:  The  fraction  of  rating  upgrades  across  the  business  cycle 
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Figure  2.7  supports  the  explanation  of  actual  rating  activity  given  by  Standard  and 
Poor  as  "adjustment  with  phases  of  the  cycle",  but  can  give  no  indication  as  to  the 
level  of  adjustment  relative  to  the  total  fluctuation  of  an  issuer's  underlying  risk  (or 
probability  of  default)  at  any  point  in  time.  Without  this  information  it  is  not  possible  to 
say  that  credit  ratings  move  procyclically,  it  can  only  be  concluded  that  they  are 
cyclical.  Nickell,  Perraudin  and  Varotto  (2000)  also  find  that  there  is  a  higher  frequency 
of  downgrades  during  a  recession  and  a  higher  occurrence  of  upgrades  during  booms. 
Many  researchers  have  found  that  rating  agencies  move  slowly  and  their  ratings  are 
often  inflexible  (Altman  and  Saunders  2001a).  The  same  view  is  held  by  the  market, 
71%  of  institutional  investors  thought  credit  ratings  on  corporate  bonds  lagged  behind 
an  issuers'  creditworthiness  at  any  given  moment  (CFO  2002).  At  his  testimony  to  the 
Senate  hearing  before  the  Committee  on  Governmental  Affairs  (2002)  Steven 
Schwarcz  said; 
"There  is  a  recent  internal  analysis  by  Standard  &  Poor's  that  is  publicly 
available  which  uses  information  extracted  from  its  proprietary  database  on 
over  9,000  companies  with  rated  debt  that  confirms  the  stability  of  investment 
grade  ratings,  finding,  for  example,  that  all  A-  rated  companies  at  the  beginning 
of  a  given  year  would  have  an  87.94  percent  chance  of  maintaining  that  same 
rating  by  year-end"  Schwarcz  (2002). 
The  bank  rating  data  from  Moody's  used  for  one  of  the  studies  in  this  thesis  is 
shown  in  table  2.1.  The  total  number  of  ratings  in  each  category  is  split 
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between  those  ratings  that  have  changed  within  the  last  12  months  and  those 
that  have  not  changed  in  more  than  a  year.  This  shows  that  higher  grade 
ratings  change  less  frequently  than  ratings  of  BBB  and  below.  Rating 
transitions  appear  to  be  much  more  frequent  around  the  investment  grade/sub- 
investment  grade  boundary  than  for  BBB+  and  above.  This  is  interesting  as 
Johnson  (2001)  finds  that  the  largest  downgrades  start  from  the  BBB-  grade. 
The  results  shown  in  table  2.1  do  not  support  the  findings  of  previous  research 
that  ratings  tend  to  be  very  static,  on  average  38%  of  ratings  have  changed  in 
the  last  12  months. 
Table  2.1:  Observations  of  Moody's  ratings  showing  %  of  ratings  that  have 
changed  within  the  last  12  months  (data  for  banks) 
%  of  ratings  %  of  ratings 
Total  that  changed  that  changed 
no.  of  within  last  12  >  12  months 
ratings  months  ago 
AAA  109  7.3  92.7 
AA+  118  27.1  72.9 
AA  260  35.4  64.6 
AA-  546  44.5  55.5 
A+  437  42.6  57.4 
A  422  37.0  63.0 
A-  396  39.6  60.4 
BBB+  260  35.4  64.6 
BBB  180  60.6  39.4 
BBB  -  126  46.8 
- 
53.2 
----  -  BB  ---  186  -  --  --  44.1  55.9 
B  75  61.3  38.7 
C  50  52.0  48.0 
-  Data  from  Moody's  (FTCRI) 
In  a  study  based  on  US  firms  rated  by  S&P  in  1981  -  2001  Amato  and  Furfine  (2004) 
observe  that  ratings  of  most  firms  change  very  little  and  do  not  exhibit  excess 
sensitivity  to  business  cycles.  They  test  their  findings  by  using  a  second  data  set 
containing  only  initial  ratings  and  ratings  changes.  This  data  does  exhibit 
procyclicality.  They  also  find  evidence  of  procyclicality  in  investment  grade  firms. 
Their  findings  support  the  view  that  the  ratings  of  existing  issues  are  stable  but  when 
changes  do  occur  they  are  procyclical. 
In  Japan,  a  review  of  bank  credit  ratings  over  the  period  1994  to  2001  has  shown  a 
clear  example  of  stability  (1994  to  the  first  half  of  1997)  despite  growing  concerns 
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about  the  creditworthiness  of  some  banks.  When  the  Japanese  bubble  economy  burst 
in  the  early  1990s  confidence  fell  and  a  rapid  series  of  downgrades  took  place  in  the 
second  half  of  1997  and  1998.  Japan  Center  for  International  Finance  (2001)  argue 
that  the  downgrades  came  too  late  and  should  have  taken  place  before  the  second 
half  of  1997. 
Newspaper  articles  also  accuse  the  rating  agencies  of  being  slow  to  adjust  ratings 
(Economist  2003a)  or  over  reactive  when  changes  are  made  (Economist  1999).  Ferri 
et  al  (1999)  argue  that  agencies  failed  to  downgrade  East  Asian  bonds  before  the 
crisis  in  that  region  in  the  late  1990s  and  when  they  did  the  downgrades  were  late  and 
excessively  conservative.  This  exacerbated  the  crisis  by  raising  the  cost  of  borrowing 
and  reducing  the  supply  of  capital.  The  poor  track  record  of  rating  agencies  in  less 
developed  countries  may  be  due  to  lack  of  investment  in  information  gathering  in 
comparison  with  the  US  (Ferri  2004). 
The  agencies  and  issuers  aim  for  stability  and  would  avoid  making  a  change  if  there 
was  a  risk  that  the  change  would  shortly  be  reversed,  perhaps  this  factor  explains  the 
high  degree  of  rating  stability  identified  by  Amato  and  Furfine  (2004).  It  is  interesting 
that  the  chairman  of  Moody's  Credit  Policy  Committee  states, 
"Ratings  are  observed  to  follow  market  price  movement;  yes,  that  has  been 
empirically  observed.  But  ratings  are  intended  to  provide  a  stable  signal  of 
"fundamentally  derived"  credit  risk.  On  the  tradeoff  between  accuracy  and 
stability,  ratings  offer  stability.  "  (Moodys  2003a) 
Cantor  and  Mann  (2003)  demonstrate  that  credit  ratings  have  been  remarkably  stable 
over  past  credit  cycles. 
Studies  have  also  shown  that  rating  changes  tend  to  exhibit  serial  correlation  (or  serial 
dependence).  Altman  and  Kao  1992  showed  that  a  downgrade  is  more  likely  to  be 
followed  by  a  downgrade  and  an  upgrade  by  an  upgrade.  Lando  and  Skodeberg 
(2002)  also  support  this  finding. 
Figure  2.7  has  already  shown  that  the  number  of  downgrades  exceeds  the  number  of 
upgrades.  Evidence  suggests  that  credit  rating  agencies  are  slow  to  change  their 
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ratings  but  when  they  do  they  tend  overreact  and  downgrade  more  often  than 
upgrade.  Blume,  Lim  and  MacKinlay  (1998)  find  that,  for  the  sample  they  studied,  the 
trend  was  for  credit  ratings  tend  to  fall  over  time  as  there  are  more  downgrades  on 
average  than  upgrades.  Lucas  and  Lonski  (1992)  show  that  for  Moody's,  the  number 
of  firms  downgraded  has  increasingly  exceeded  the  number  upgraded.  Figure  2.8  and 
2.9  from  Moody's  (2003a)  show  the  number  of  downgrades  for  Moody's  relative  to 
upgrades.  This  supports  the  finding  that  the  number  of  downgrades  exceed  upgrades. 
Not  all  studies  support  the  view  that  rafings  become  more  stringent  over  time,  Amato 
and  Furfine  (2004)  show  that  in  some  cases  rating  agencies  have  become  more 
lenient.  Feinberg  et  al  (2004)  find  that  Moody's  and  S&P  generally  downgrade  sooner 
than  D&P  and  Fitch  but  all  the  agencies  tend  to  upgrade  at  the  same  time. 
Figure  2.8:  Comparison  of  number  of  downgrades  to  upgrades  from  1982  -  2002 
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Source:  Moody's  Investors  Service  (2003a) 
Although  studies  have  drawn  different  conclusions,  it  appears  that  ratings  for  existing 
issuers  generally  appear  to  be  static  as  agencies  rate  "through  the  cycle".  However 
credit  ratings  are  cyclical  and  when  changes  are  made  they  can  be  procyclical  and 
amplify  business  cycles. 
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2.5  Summary 
This  chapter  has  looked  in  detail  at  the  credit  rating  industry,  its  history  and  current 
issues  that  face  the  industry.  In  summary,  the  main  findings  which  are  of  most 
relevance  to  the  rest  of  this  thesis  are  as  follows: 
9  Credit  ratings  perform  well  as  measures  of  relative  risk  but  are  not  intended  to 
provide  a  measure  of  the  absolute  level  of  risk  of  an  organisation  or  issue  at  all 
points  through  the  business  cycle. 
"  Regulation  has  played  an  important  part  in  establishing  the  success  of  the 
credit  rating  industry.  Basel  II  increases  this  regulatory  importance  but  at  the 
same  time  competition  is  restricted  by  the  difficultly  of  obtaining  NRSRO  status. 
The  credit  rating  market  is  dominated  by  3  major  companies. 
"  Credit  ratings  appear  to  be  relatively  stable  because  raters  attempt  to  rate 
"through  the  cycle"  but  there  is  evidence  that  when  ratings  do  change  they  are 
downgraded  more  frequently  than  upgraded;  changes  and  ratings  of  new  issues 
tend  to  be  procyclical. 
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The  Basel  Capital  Accord 
3.1  Why  regulate  banks? 
Banks  are  not  like  other  entities  because  their  most  important  product  is  money.  A 
loss  of  confidence  in  a  bank  can  lead  customers  to  simultaneously  withdraw  their 
funds  and  a  lack  of  liquidity  can  rapidly  erode  the  net  worth  of  a  bank  and  threaten  it 
with  insolvency. 
The  inherent  fragility  of  the  banking  system  is  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  there  is 
usually  heightened  speculative  activity  by  investors  during  the  good  times  and  without 
regulation  banks  may  not  make  sufficient  provisions  for  risk.  When  the  downturn 
comes  they  could  be  under  capitalised  and  poorly  protected  against  a  liquidity  crisis. 
This  contributes  to  procyclicality  and  systemic  risk. 
Heffernan  (1996)  argues  that  because  the  reputation  of  banks  is  so  important  a  lack  of 
confidence  could  subject  even  healthy  banks  to  a  bank  run.  Problems  spread  to  other 
parts  of  the  economy  and  carry  a  high  social  cost.  She  argues  that  the  role  of 
prudential  supervision  "is  to  minimise  the  possibility  of  financial  collapse  in  the  system, 
because  the  social  costs  of  bank  risk-taking  exceed  the  private  costs.  " 
3.2  Banking  regulation  in  the  UK  and  US 
Given  the  sensitivity  of  the  economy  to  banking  crises  it  is  surprising  that  the  first 
specific  banking  law  in  the  UK  was  only  introduced  in  1979.  Two  acts  in  1844  (control 
of  the  money  supply)  and  in  1914  (establishment  of  the  Bank  of  England  as  the  lender 
of  last  resort)  regulated  the  Bank  of  England  but  private  banks  were  treated  like  other 
commercial  concerns.  The  1979  Banking  Act  (amended  1987)  required  banks  and 
deposit  takers  to  seek  recognition  from  the  Bank  of  England  and  it  was  a  key  factor 
that  the  banks  had  an  excellent  reputation  in  the  financial  community. 
There  is  a  far  greater  range  of  banking  regulation  in  the  US  than  in  the  UK. 
Regulators  have  sought  statutory  remedies  to  problems  far  more  than  in  the  UK  which 
has  led  to  piecemeal  legislation  and  complex  banking  supervision.  Small  depositors 
have  great  importance  in  US  regulation  and  their  protection  is  a  central  pillar  of 
legislation.  Another  key  influence  is  the  American  philosophy  of  free  competition  in  all 
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industries.  Concern  about  potential  collusion  between  banks  has  also  received  much 
weight  in  the  regulation. 
3.3  Basel  Capital  Accord  (1988) 
In  1988,  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  of  central  banks  and  banking 
regulators  from  the  Group  of  Ten  countries  introduced  global  standards  for  regulating 
the  capital  adequacy  of  internationally  active  banks.  The  Basle  Capital  Accord  1988 
(Basel  1)  sets  down  the  agreement  to  apply  common  minimum  capital  standards  to 
banking  industries,  to  be  achieved  by  the  end  of  1992  (BCBS  1988).  The  accord  is 
almost  entirely  addressed  to  credit  risk,  the  main  risk  incurred  by  banks. 
The  guiding  principle  of  Basel  1  was  that  banks  should  have  a  capital  cushion  to  cover 
unexpected  losses.  It  attempted  to  introduce  a  uniform  approach  to  credit  risk  and  a 
general  methodology  for  its  measurement.  Basel  1  defined  four  risk  "buckets"  and  the 
minimum  capital  ratio  of  8%.  The  aim  was  to  minimise  the  so-called  regulatory 
arbitrage,  i.  e.  where  advantages  are  won  by  one  institution  operating  in  various 
countries  with  different  regulation  of  banking  and  financial  activities. 
Although  Basel  1  represented  a  huge  step  forward  towards  the  international 
harmonization  of  credit  risk  regulation  it  became  the  subject  of  heavy  criticism.  The 
methodology  (i.  e.  the  risk  "buckets")  was  comparatively  simple  and  was  applied  to  all 
relevant  banking  institutions.  There  was  a  "one-size-fits-all"  approach  that  did  not 
reflect  the  varying  level  of  economic  risk  applicable  to  different  assets.  For  example,  a 
corporate  bond  of  a  successful  blue  chip  company  is  substantially  less  risky  than  that 
of  a  junk  bond.  Under  Basel  1a  risk  weight  of  100%  is  applied  to  all  corporates, 
irrespective  of  their  relative  economic  risk.  This  means  that  the  assets  must  be 
included  in  the  capital  adequacy  calculations  at  their  full  value  whether  the  bond  is  a 
AAA  or  a  BB-.  This  did  not  suit  more  advanced  institutions  with  a  more  detailed 
internal  methods  of  risk  analysis  and  internal  modeling  expertise. 
In  1997,  the  market  risk  amendment  to  the  original  Basel  Accord  was  adopted.  Many 
banks  now  use  external  credit  ratings  in  their  prudential  supervision  solely  to 
determine  what  is  a  qualifying  debt  security,  or  other  interest  rate  related  instrument, 
for  the  calculation  of  the  capital  requirement  for  specific  interest  rate  risk.  This  is  set 
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out  in  the  standardised  methodology  of  the  market  risk  amendment  to  the  original 
Basel  Accord. 
3.3.1  The  Basel  Capital  Asset  Ratio 
The  capital  asset  ratio  was  first  introduced  in  the  UK  in  1980  by  the  Bank  of  England. 
The  Bank  of  England  and  US  authorities  were  the  first  to  recognise  the  importance  of 
the  ratio.  The  definition  of  capital  to  risk  weighted  assets  that  is  still  used  around  the 
world  today  was  defined  by  the  Basle  risk  asset  ratio,  introduced  by  Basel  1. 
Basel  risk  asset  ratio: 
Tier  one  and  Tier  two  capital 
Risk  weighted  assets 
The  Bank  for  International  Settlements  define  Tier  one  capital  in  their  press  release 
(BCBS  1998).  It  includes  equity  capital  and  disclosed  reserves: 
"  issued  and  fully  paid  ordinary  shares 
"  non-cumulative  preference  shares 
"  share  premiums 
"  retained  profits 
"  general  reserves 
"  legal  reserves 
Cumulative  preference  shares  and  revaluation  reserves  are  excluded.  Tier  two  capital 
includes  all  other  capital,  revaluation  and  loan  loss  reserves,  cumulative  preference 
shares  and  subordinated  long-term  debt. 
Risk  weighted  assets  is  the  multiple  of  bank  assets  and  one  of  five  risk  weights 
assigned  by  Basel  1.  The  higher  the  risk  weight,  the  riskier  the  asset.  The  risk 
"baskets"  are  determined  as  follows  (taken  from  Annex  2  of  BCBS  1988): 
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0%  Cash 
Claims  on  central  governments  denominated  and  funded  in  national  currency 
(sovereigns) 
Claims  on  all  OECD  central  governments 
Claims  on  central  banks 
20%  Claims  on  multilateral  development  banks  and  claims  guaranteed  by  these 
banks 
Claims  on  banks  incorporated  in  OECD  and  loans  guaranteed  by  these  banks 
Claims  on  banks  outside  OECD  with  maturity  of  up  to  one  year 
50%  Loans  secured  by  mortgage  on  residential  property 
100%  Claims  on  corporates 
Claims  on  banks  outside  OECD  with  maturity  of  more  than  one  year 
Claims  on  central  governments  outside  the  OECD  not  denominated  and  funded 
in  national  currency 
All  other  assets 
Off-balance  sheet  assets  are  also  given  risk  weights  and  also  should  be  included  in 
the  risk  weighted  asset  calculations. 
The  risk  asset  ratio  must  not  fall  below  8%,  an  illustration  of  how  this  could  be 
calculated  is  as  follows: 
Tier  one  +  tier two  capital:  £1.6  million 
On-balance  sheet  assets 
Cash 
Government  Bonds  (OECD) 
Claims  on  OECD  banks 
Mortgages 
Claims  on  Corporates 
Total 
£5  million 
£10  million 
£7.5  million 
£12  million 
£12  million 
£46.5  million 
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After  applying  the  risk  weights,  risk  weighted  assets  sum  to: 
(5x0)+(10x0)+(7.5x0.2)+(12x0.5)+(12x1)=£19,500,000 
Risk  ratio  =  100  x  1,600,000/19,500,000  =  8.2%  which  is  just  inside  the  minimum  of 
8%. 
3.4  Basel  II:  International  Convergence  of  Capital  Measurement  and 
Capital  Standards:  a  Revised  Framework 
In  June  1999  the  Committee  released  a  proposal  for  a  new  Capital  Accord  to  replace 
Basel  1,  the  progress  of  publications  has  been  as  follows: 
June  1999  First  Consultative  Paper  on  Basel  II,  setting 
out  broad  overview  proposals 
January  2001  Second  Consultative  Paper  on  Basel  II, 
providing  detailed  proposals 
Since  April  2001  A  series  of  Quantitative  Impact  Studies  (QIS) 
to  assess  the  impact  of  the  proposal  on  a 
wide  range  of  banks 
April  2003  Third  and  final  Consultative  Paper, 
consultation  period  until  end  of  July  2003 
November  2005  Latest  draft  of  International  Convergence  of 
Capital  Measurement  and  Capital  Standards: 
a  Revised  Framework 
2006  Implementation  into  EU  law 
2007  Implementation  of  Basel  II 
3.4.1  The  three  pillars  of  Basel  II 
The  overall  objective  of  Basel  II  (BCBS  2005)  is  to  increase  the  safety  and  soundness 
of  the  international  financial  system  by: 
"  making  capital  requirements  for  banks  more  risk  sensitive  while, 
"  maintaining  the  same  level  of  overall  average  regulatory  capital  in  the  banking 
system. 
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Although  Basel  II  focuses  primarily  on  internationally  active  banks,  the  Committee 
expects  the  New  Accord  to  be  adhered  to  by  all  significant  banks  worldwide.  However 
US  authorities  have  limited  the  application  of  Basel  II  to  about  a  twenty  internationally 
active  banks.  The  EU  plans  to  make  the  New  Accord  applicable  to  all  banks  and 
investment  firms  in  the  region. 
The  New  Accord  aims  to  establish  regulatory  capital  requirements  that  more  closely 
reflect  the  true  economic  risks  that  banks  face.  Its  sets  up  a  system  that  is 
conceptually  more  in  line  with  banks'  own  efforts  at  measuring  risk.  Basel  II  is  not 
intended  to  change  the  aggregate  level  of  capital  in  the  system.  Rather,  the  proposal 
aims  at  reallocating  capital  requirements,  aligning  regulatory  capital  more  closely  to 
economic  risk.  This  means  that  more  capital  will  be  needed  for  the  riskier  activities  and 
less  for  those  where  there  is little  risk,  departing  from  the  "one-size-fits-all"  approach  of 
Basel  1.  Also,  increased  risk  sensitivity  should  provide  an  incentive  for  innovation, 
encouraging  more  sophisticated  risk management  systems  and  practices. 
The  underlying  rationale  of  Basel  II  is  the  Committee's  conviction  that  safety  and 
soundness  in  today's  dynamic  and  complex  financial  system  can  be  attained  only  by 
the  combination  of  effective  bank-level  risk  management,  supervision,  and  market 
discipline.  Consequently,  the  New  Accord  proposes  a  system  based  on  a  model  of 
three  mutually  reinforcing  pillars. 
Figure  3.1:  The  Three  Pillars  of  Basel  II 
PILLAR  I  PILLAR  II  PILLAR  III 
MINIMUM  CAPITAL  SUPERVISORY  DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENTS  REVIEW 
Credit  Risk  Additional  capital  Increased  market 
(new  measurement)  requirements  discipline 
Market  Risk  (discretion  of 
(unchanged)  national  supervisors) 
Operational  Risk 
(new) 
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3.4.1.1  Pillar  I:  Minimum  capital  requirements 
The  rules  contained  in  Pillar  I  set  out  the  minimum  ratio  of  capital  to  risk-weighted 
assets. 
The  current  definition  of  capital  and  the  8%  minimum  capital  requirement  remain 
unchanged.  However,  the  way  that  risk  weights  are  determined  will  become  more  risk 
sensitive. 
Regulatory  Capital  Under  Basel  II 
rxA=RWA->RWAx8%=RC 
r=  risk  weight  RWA  =  risk-weighted  assets 
A=  assets  RC  =  regulatory  capital 
In  departing  from  the  current  Accord,  the  Committee  advances  three  approaches  to 
measure  credit  risk  and  the  resulting  capital  requirements: 
"  Standardized  Approach 
"  Internal  ratings-based  (IRB)  Foundation  Approach 
"  IRB  Advanced  Approach 
The  standardized  approach  is  a  relatively  simple  method  conceptually  in  line  with  the 
existing  approach.  This  will  be  used  by  small  banks  with  less  sophisticated  risk 
management  tools  and  larger  banks  during  the  transition  period. 
Under  the  New  Accord,  there  will  be  more  risk  sensitivity  since  risk  weights  are  to  be 
refined  by  reference  to  a  rating  provided  by  an  external  rating  agency.  For  example, 
the  1988  Accord  provides  only  one  risk  weight  category  for  ordinary  corporate  lending 
(100%),  whereas  Basel  II  will  provide  four  categories  (20%,  50%,  100%  and  150%). 
Both  IRB  approaches  are  more  sophisticated  methods  to  measure  credit  risk  and  allow 
banks'  internal  estimates  to  serve  as  primary  inputs  to  the  determination  of  capital. 
Whether  a  bank  can  opt  for  IRB  Foundation  or  Advanced  approaches  is  contingent 
upon  its  supervisor's  authorization  and  depends  on  whether  the  bank  can  provide 
internal  data  verifying  its  calculations  of  probabilities  of  default  (PD)  or,  in  the  case  of 
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the  IRB  Advanced  Approach,  all  relevant  variables  (PD,  loss  given  default  (LGD)  and 
exposure  at  default). 
Whereas  credit  risk  rules  are  refined  by  Basel  II,  the  treatment  of  market  risk  is 
unchanged  compared  with  the  1996  amendment  to  the  1988  Accord.  For  the  first  time, 
an  explicit  treatment  of  operational  risk  (e.  g.  the  risk  of  loss  from  IT  failures)  is 
included. 
Basel  II  sets  out  three  approaches  to  be  used  to  determine  the  capital  requirement  for 
operational  risk.  The  Basic  Indicator  Approach  (BIA)  and  the  Standardized  Approach 
(STA)  are  based  on  gross  income  in  the  bank,  whereas  the  Advanced  Measurement 
Approach  (AMA)  will  give  banks  more  flexibility  to  develop  more  sophisticated 
methods  to  measure  operational  risk.  Banks  may  rely  on  their  own  calculation 
methods  for  operational  risk,  provided  these  methods  are  comprehensive  and 
systematic. 
3.4.1.2  Pillar  II:  Supervisory  review  of  capital  adequacy 
The  second  pillar  of  the  New  Accord  provides  for  supervisory  review  of  banks'  capital 
adequacy  and  their  internal  assessment  processes.  National  supervisors  will  be 
responsible  for  evaluating  and  ensuring  that  banks  have  sound  internal  processes  in 
place  to  assess  the  adequacy  of  their  capital  and  to  evaluate  their  risks  and  can 
impose  additional  capital  requirements. 
3.4.1.3  Pillar  III:  Disclosure/market  discipline 
Finally,  Basel  II  promotes  market  discipline  through  enhanced  disclosure  requirements 
for  banks,  e.  g.  regarding  the  risk  measurement  methods  used.  This  increased 
transparency  should  give  market  participants  a  better  idea  of  a  bank's  risk  profile  and 
its  capital  cushion.  Pillar  III  is  intended  to  be  a  complement  to  the  minimum  capital 
requirements  and  the  supervisory  review  process. 
In  summary,  Basel  II  provides  for  a  more  risk-sensitive  determination  for  capital 
adequacy  and,  for  the  first  time,  requires  capital  for  operational  risk.  It  also  establishes 
supervisory  review  and  calls  for  new  disclosure  rules,  intended  to  increase  market 
discipline 
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3.4.2  A  detailed  review  of  the  Standardised  approach 
A  summary  of  the  proposals  detailed  in  Pillar  I:  Minimum  capital  requirements  are  set 
out  below: 
3.4.2.1  Claims  on  sovereigns 
Sovereigns  and  their  central  banks  will  have  the  following  risk  weights: 
Credit  AAA  to'  A+  to  A--BBB+  to  BB  -to---  Below  Unrated 
Assessment  AA-  BBB-  B-  B- 
Risk  Weight  0%  20%  50%  100%  150%  100% 
Country  risk  scores  assigned  by  Export  Credit  Agencies  can  also  be  used  and  risk 
weights  are  shown  in  Basel  II. 
Under  Basel  1  sovereigns  and  their  central  banks  have  a  risk  weight  of  0%  unless  they 
are  outside  the  OECD  and  not  denominated  in  national  currency  or  funded  in  that 
currency,  in  which  case  the  risk  weight  is  100%. 
3.4.2.2  Claims  on  banks 
There  are  two  options  for  claims  on  banks,  national  supervisors  will  decide  which  to 
apply: 
(1)  All  banks  incorporated  in  a  given  country  will  be  assigned  a  risk  weight  one 
category  less  favourable  than  the  sovereign  of  that  country. 
Credit  AAA  to  A+  to  A-  BBB+  to  BB+  to  Below  Unrated 
Assessment  AA-  BBB-  B-  B- 
Risk  Weight  20%  50%  1000/6-  -1  150%  100% 
(2)  The  risk  weighting  will  be  based  on  the  external  credit  assessment  of  the  bank 
itself.  Preferential  rates  are  available  for  claims  with  an  original  maturity  of  three 
months  or  less. 
Credit  AAA  to 
Assessment  AA- 
Risk  Weight  20% 
Risk  Weight  20% 
-  short  term 
claims 
A+  to  A-  BBB+  to  BB+  to  Below 
BBB-  B- 
50%  50%-  ---100%  150% 




Some  special  cases  have  been  written  into  the  accord,  certain  banks,  such  as  the 
Bank  for  International  Settlements  and  the  IMF  have  risk  weights  of  0%.  Public  sector 
entities  will  be  attributed  risk  weights  using  option  1  or  2  for  banks  at  the  regulator's 
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discretion.  Multilateral  development  banks  (MDB's)  will  be  given  risk  weights 
according  to  option  2  for  banks.  Certain  MDBs  such  as  the  World  Bank  Group  and 
European  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development  will  have  risk  weights  of  0%. 
Under  Basel  1,  Banks  incorporated  in  the  OECD  and  claims  on  non-OECD  banks  with 
maturity  of  up  to  one  year  had  a  risk weight  of  20%,  all  other  banks  had  a  risk weight 
of  100% 
3.4.2.3  Claims  on  corporates 
Corporates,  including  insurance  companies  have  risk  weights  as  follows: 
Credit  AAA  to  A+  to  A-  BBB+  to  Below  BB-  Unrated 
Assessment  AA-  BB- 
Risk  Weight  20%  50%  100%  150%  100% 
At  national  discretion  supervisors  may  allow  banks  to  use  a  uniform  risk  weight  of 
100%  for  all  corporates. 
Under  Basel  1  all  corporates  had  a  risk  weight  of  100%. 
3.4.2.4  Claims  on  retail  portfolios 
If  exposure  is  to  an  individual  or  a  small  business,  if  it  relates  to  credit  cards  or 
overdrafts,  personal  loans  or  leases,  small  business  facilities,  bonds  or  equities  it  will 
qualify  as  a  regulatory  retail  portfolio  and  be  risk  weighted  at  75%.  Clearly,  there  are 
no  requirements  for  external  ratings  for  retail  claims. 
3.4.2.5  Claims  on  residential  mortgages 
Lending  fully  secured  by  mortgages  on  residential  property  will  be  risk  weighted  at 
35%. 
3.4.2.6  Claims  on  commercial  real  estate 
Mortgages  on  commercial  real  estate  will  be  risk  weighted  at  100%. 
3.4.2.7  Off-balance  sheet  items 
Off-balance  sheet  items  should  be  converted  into  credit  exposure  equivalents  and 
given  risk  weights  just  like  on-balance  sheet  claims.  If  the  commitment  has  an  original 
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maturity  of  up  to  one  year  it  will  be  given  a  risk  weight  of  20%  and  if  more  than  one 
year  a  risk  weight  of  50%. 
3.4.2.8  Securitisation 
The  risk-weighted  amount  of  a  securitisation  exposure  is  computed  by  multiplying  the 
amount  of  the  position  by  the  appropriate  risk  weight  determined  in  accordance  with 
the  table  below. 
For  B+  assessments  and  below  the  bank  is  required  to  deduct  the  securitisation 
exposure  from  regulatory  capital,  the  deduction  will  be  taken  50%  from  Tier  1  and  50% 
from  Tier  2. 
Long-tern  rating  category 
External  Credit  1  AAA  to  ý  A+  to  BBB+  t  Tgg+  to  B+  and  below 
Assessment  AA-  A-  BBB-  BB-  or  unrated 
Risk  Weight  20%  50%  100%  350%  Deduction 
3.4.2.9  Credit  risk  mitigation  (CRM) 
Off-balance-sheet  items  under  the  standardised  approach  will  be  converted  into  a 
credit  exposure  equivalents  amount.  There  is  a  general  principle  that  no  asset  with 
credit  risk  mitigation  should  receive  a  higher  risk  weight  than  one  without  CRM.  The 
mitigation  can  itself  give  rise  to  a  legal,  operational,  liquidity  or  market  risk  so  controls 
need  to  be  in  place  and  supervisory  review  via  Pillar II.  Basel  II  details  the  treatment  of 
claims  were  the  credit  risk  has  been  mitigated  by  one  of  the  following  techniques: 
Collareralised  transactions 
Two  methods  are  available.  In  the  simple  method  the  risk  weight  of  the  collateral 
should  be  used  in  place  of  the  risk  weight  of  the  underlying  claim.  In  the 
comprehensive  method  a  fuller  offset  is  made  of  the  collateral  against  the  underlying 
exposure. 
Guarantees  by  third  parties  and  credit  derivatives 
The  guarantee  or  derivative  can  only  be  taken  into  account  if  the  guarantee  has  a 
lower  risk  weight  than  the  underlying  exposure. 
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Short  term  claims 
Short  term  assessment  may  only  be  used  for  short  term  claims  as  follows. 
Credit  A-1/P-I1  A-2/P-2  A-3/P-3  Others 
assessment  F12  F2  F3 
-------------------  ----------  ---  - 
_ 
Risk  weight  2-0%0  50%  100%  100% 
On-balance  sheet  netting 
This  is  where  banks  agree  to  net  loans  owed  to  them  against  deposits  from  the  same 
counterparty.  The  net  credit  exposure  should  be  used  to  assess  the  appropriate  risk 
weight 
Maturity  mismatch 
Where  the  maturity  of  the  CRM  is  less  than  the  underlying  credit  exposure  there  is  a 
maturity  mismatch.  Where  the  CRM  has  a  residual  maturity  of  less  than  one  year  the 
CRM  is  not  recongnised  in  the  process  of  determining  the  capital  requirement. 
Otherwise  a  partial  recognition  of  the  CRM  is  made  depending  on  the  time to  maturity 
of  the  CRM  and  the  exposure. 
3.4.3  External  credit  assessments 
External  credit  assessments  from  approved  external  credit  assessment  institutions 
(rating  agencies)  can  be  used  to  assign  risk  weights  to  sovereign,  bank  and  corporate 
claims.  National  supervisors  will  be  responsible  for  giving  rating  agencies  agency 
status.  They  must  meet  the  following  six  criteria: 
"  Objectivity  -  agencies  must  have  a  systematic  and  rigorous  methodology  for 
assigning  credit  assessments. 
"  Independence  -  the  rating  should  not  be  influenced  by  political  or  economic 
pressures. 
"  International  access/transparency  -  the  rating  should  be  available  to  domestic 
and  foreign  institutions  at  equivalent  terms. 
"  Disclosure  -  methodologies,  meaning  of  ratings  and  default  rates  should  be 
published. 
Notations  used  by  Standard  &  Poor's  and  Moody's  respectively 
2  Notation  used  by  Fitch,  this  has  been  added  to  this  table  and  not  included  in  Basel  II 
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"  Resources  -  agencies  need  to  have  the  resources  to  perform  a  detailed,  high 
level  assessment.  They  should  use  quantitative  and  qualitative  approaches. 
9  Credibility  -  if  agency  ratings  are  widely  relied  upon  this  shows  their  credibility. 
If  supervisors  consider  that  an  agency  meets  these  criteria  they  will  give  them  agency 
status  and  banks  can  use  their  risk  assessments  to  determine  the  appropriate  risk 
weight  to  be  used  in  the  calculation  of  capital  adequacy.  Many  small  national 
agencies  that  only  operate  in  one  country  may  achieve  recognition  in  their  home 
country  which  will  provide  a  great  boost  to  the  credit  rating  industry  outside  the  US. 
One  possible  problem  with  this  is  that  the  rating  scales  used  in  a  single  country  are 
intended  to  reflect  credit  worthiness  in  a  local  context  and  may  not  be  directly 
comparable  with  global  agencies  (Griep  and  De  Stefano  2001). 
3.4.3.1  Multiple  assessments 
Banks  must  choose  the  agency's  that  they  are  going  to  use,  disclose  the  names  of 
these  agencies  and  then  apply  them  consistently  across  all  types  of  claim.  It  is  not 
possible  to  "cherry  pick"  different  assessments  to  achieve  the  lowest  risk  weighting. 
If  there  are  two  assessments  from  different  agencies  that  map  into  different  risk 
weights  the  higher  risk  weight  is  applied.  If  there  are  three  or  more  assessments  with 
different  risk  weights  the  lowest  two  risk  weights  are  compared  and  the  higher  of  the 
two  risk  weights  is  applied. 
Rating  agencies  usually  produce  an  issuer  rating  and  an  issue-specific  rating.  If  a 
bank  holds  a  particular  bond  issue  the  credit  rating  used  should  be  the  rating  for  that 
issue-specific  investment.  The  issuer  rating  typically  applies  to  senior  unsecured 
claims.  Only  senior  claims  on  that  issuer  should  use  an  issuer  rating,  if  the  claim  is  of 
a  lower  quality  and  has  no  issue-specific  rating  it  should  be  treated  as  unrated. 
Table  3.1  shows  14  claims  in  an  imaginary  bank  portfolio,  all  are  senior 
unsubordinated  claims.  The  bank  uses  the  credit  assessments  from  Moody's,  S&P 
and  Fitch.  Fictitious  long  and  short  term  ratings  have  been  created  for  each  issue  and 
are  mapped  to  the  appropriate  risk  weight.  Note  that  this  example  only  covers  the 
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type  of  claims  which  would  be  risk  weighted  using  external  assessments;  corporate, 
sovereign  and  bank. 
Using  this  information  a  risk  weight  has  been  attributed  to  each  issue  and  is  shown  in 
table  3.1. 
Table  3.1:  Basel  II  risk  weights  for  an  imaginary  portfolio 
Short-  Basel 
term  risk 
Issuer  Fitch  S&P  Moody's  rating  weight 
Asda  Group  plc  (corporate)  20%  20% 
Hanson  PLC  (corporate)  100%  50%  100% 
Hilton  Group  PLC  (corporate)  50%  100%  100% 
Anglian  Water  PLC  (corporate)  50%  50%  50% 
La  Poste  (corporate)  20%  20% 
Dixons  Group  plc  (corporate)  50%  20% 
Landesbank  Hessen- 
Thuringen  Girozentrale  (bank)  20%  20%  20% 
Union  de  Banques  Arabes  et 
Francaises  (bank) 
Bank  of  Scotland  (bank)  20%  20%  20% 
Bank  of  Scotland  (bank)  20%  50%  20% 
Alliance  &  Leicester  (bank) 
Landesbank  Baden- 
Wuerttemberg  (bank) 
Bremer  Landesbank  (bank)  20%  50%  20% 








50%  50% 
20% 
50% 
20%  20% 





















In  this  simple  example  the  risk  weighted  assets  would  require  a  regulatory  capital  for 
credit  risk  of  at  least 
191,000,000  * 0.08  =  15,280,000 
The  final  level  of  regulatory  capital  under  Basel  11  would  also  take  into  account  the 
operational  risk  and  market  risk. 
3.5  How  Is  Basel  II  going  to  affect  banks? 
During  the  development  of  the  Basel  II  proposals  five  Quantitative  Impact  Studies 
(QIS)  have  been  untaken  (the  results  of  QIS  4  and  5  have  not  been  published  at 
March  2006).  The  purpose  of  these  is  to  allow  the  Basel  Committee  to  gauge  the 
impact  of  the  Basel  II  proposals.  QIS  3  (BCBS  2003a)  was  published  in  May  2003  and 
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involved  365  banks  from  43  countries.  The  banks  were  asked  to  quantify  the  impact  of 
the  proposed  capital  adequacy  regime  on  their  existing  portfolios. 
The  banks  were  split  by  region  and  by  size.  The  regions  were  G10,  EU  and  other;  the 
sizes  were  one  and  two.  Group  one  contained  banks  that  are  large,  diversified  and 
internationally  active.  That  was  defined  as  those  having  a  Tier  1  capital  of  more  than 
euros  3  billion.  Group  two  banks  are  smaller  and  often  more  specialized.  One  feature 
of  group  two  banks  is  that  they  often  have  a  higher  proportion  of  retail  activity. 
The  variations  in  the  results  by  region  and  by  bank  size  are  shown  in  table  3.2. 
Table  3.2:  QIS3  World-wide  results  -  overall  percentage  change  in  capital 
requirements 
Standardised 
G10  Group  1  11% 
G10  Group  2  3% 
EU  Group  1  6% 
_  EUGroup2  % 
Other  _  _12% 
Groups  1&2 
Source:  Adapted  from QIS  3  (2O03ä) 
Credit  risk  Operational 
IRB  IRB  Risk 
Foundation  Advanced 
3%  -2%  8  -10% 
-19%  Na  -  12  -15% 
-4% 
---6  %-  8  -10%  - 
-20%0  --  n/a  12  -15% 
4%  n/a  11% 
In  all  cases  the  capital  requirements  go  up  under  the  standardised  approach.  This  is 
as  the  Committee  intended  as  they  want  to  provide  an  incentive  for  banks  to  apply  one 
of  the  IRB  approaches. 
The  fall  in  capital  requirements  for  G10  and  EU  group  2  banks  under  foundation  IRB  is 
due  to  the  fall  in  risk  weights  for  retail  portfolios  from  100%  to  75%.  This  particularly 
affects  the  smaller  banks  as  they  have  a  higher  proportion  of  retail  customers.  The 
Advanced  IRB  (AIRB)  option  is  only  used  by  larger  banks  due  to  its  additional 
complexity  over  Foundation  IRB  (FIRB).  The  estimates  of  operational  risk  capital 
requirements  use  the  Standardised  treatment.  The  Committee  state  in  QIS  3  that 
where  credit  risk  capital  requirements  have  fallen  using  the  standardised  approach  or 
the  FIRB  approach,  the  new  operational  risk  capital  requirements  more  than  outweigh 
any  reduction  in  credit  risk  capital  requirements.  This  means  that  the  overall  minimum 
regulatory  capital  in  the  banking  system  will  be  about  the  same  after  the 
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implementation  of  Basel  II  as  it  is  now.  This  was  the  goal  of  the  Basel  Committee  and 
they  seem  to  have  achieved  their  target  (Economist  2003c). 
However  there  are  criticisms  of  "cliff  effects"  (Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  2003)  as  you 
move  from  IRB  foundation  to  IRB  advanced.  Examples  of  this  are  G10  Group  I  from 
FIRB  to  AIRB  or  G10  Group  2  from  Standardised  to  FIRB.  RBS  argue  that  this 
creates  perverse  incentives  to  adopt  one  method  or  another. 
The  figures  in  table  3.3  show  the  overall  percentage  change  in  capital  requirements 
over  seven  different  types  of  portfolio.  These  break  down  as  follows: 
Table  3.3:  QIS  3  Change  in  capital  requirements  -  Standardised  approach 
Portfolio  G10  EU  Other 
Group  Group  Group-'  Group  Groups  1& 
12122 
Corporate  1%  -1%  -1%  -1%  0% 
Sovereign  0%  0%  0%  0%  1% 
'Bank  2%  0%  2%  1%  2% 
Retail  -5%  -10%  -5%  -7%  -4% 
SME3  -1%  -2%  -2%  -2%  -11% 
Securitised 
L-assets 
1%  0%  1%  0%  0% 
Other  portfolios  2%  1%  2%  -1%  3% 
Overall  credit  risk  0%  -11%  -3%  -11%  2% 
Operational  risk  10%  15%  8%  12%  11% 
Overall  change  11%  3%  6%  1%  12% 
Source:  QIS  3 
Table  3.3  shows  that  for  certain  banks  and  portfolios  a  reduction  in  the  credit  risk 
capital  requirement  can  be  anticipated  under  the  standardised  approach.  For 
corporate,  sovereign  and  bank  claims  there  is  very  little  change  overall  although 
individual  banks  will  fluctuate  greatly  around  these  averages. 
In  summary,  QIS  3  suggests  that  for  the  standardised  approach  there  will  be  an 
increase  in  credit  risk  capital  requirements  for  G10  Group  1  banks  but  a  slight 
decrease  for  all  other  groups.  These  decreases  will  be  more  than  offset  by  increases 
in  capital  required  by  the  new  operational  capital  risk  requirements.  In  the  Foundation 
IRB  approach,  Group  1  banks,  on  average,  report  only  small  changes  to  current 
3  SMEs  may  be  treated  as  retail  or  corporates  depending  on  the  nature  of  their  business 
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requirements  but  G10  and  EU  Group  2  banks  show  substantial  reductions.  This  is  the 
result  intended  by  the  Basel  Committee.  Group  1  banks  should  be  incentivised  to  use 
AIRB  while  Group  2  banks  should  be  encouraged  to  use  the  FIRB  rather  than  the 
standardised  approach. 
3.6  Main  concerns  with  Basel  II 
The  stated  objective  of  Basel  II  is  to  increase  the  safety  and  soundness  of  the 
international  financial  system.  While  market  participants  would  not  disagree  with  this 
goal  the  new  regulations  have  not  met  with  universal  support.  Six  key  areas  which 
have  caused  controversy  are  discussed  below. 
3.6.1  Cost  and  rigidity 
"There  is  a  very  real  risk  that  the  current  level  of  complexity  will  impact,  now 
and  in  the  future,  the  ability  of  banks  to  mange  risks,  the  ability  of  supervisors  to 
supervise,  and  the  capacity  of  markets  to  evolve  and  adapt.  These  are  not 
trivial  flaws.  "  Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  (2003) 
Basel  II  is  a  long  and  complicated  document.  The  nature  of  banking  regulation  is 
inherently  a  complex  area  and  the  final  document  has  evolved  thorough  a  process  of 
interested  parties  providing  feedback  on  consultative  documents.  As  a  consequence 
complying  with  the  new  Basel  II  rules  will  be  very  costly  and  complex.  For  example 
Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  (2003)  comment  that  "the  pillar  1  rules  are  highly  complex  and 
have  developed  beyond  the  level  needed  for  sensible  capital  regulation". 
Credit  Suisse  Group  (2003a)  estimate  that  the  initial  cost  to  implement  Basel  II  will  be 
about  $100  million  with  considerable  ongoing  costs.  Other  estimates  put  the  global 
spending  related  to  Basel  II  at  $7.5  billion  for  2003  and  $11  billion  in  2005  (Sidler  and 
David  2003). 
The  industry  feels  that  the  rules  are  too  prescriptive  and  detailed.  Regulation  that  aims 
to  establish  principles  rather  than  rules  may  allow  for  a  more  flexible  and  longer  lasting 
system.  Many  banks  also  believe  that  the  Accord  will  stifle  innovation  in  risk 
management.  BNP  Paribas's  comments  reflects  this  view; 
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"We  believe  that  Pillar  I  is  excessively  legalistic,  with  overwhelming  data 
collection  and  validation  requirements.  In  practice,  these  requirements  could 
become  a  costly  ceiling  on  risk  management  practices,  fixing  risk  management 
into  an  overly  rigid  structure  and  stifling  further  innovation  and  experimentation.  " 
BNP  Paribas  (2003) 
Implementation  costs  will  also  be  substantial  for  supervisors.  Credit  Suisse  Group 
(2003b)  argue  that  many  supervisors  in  non-G10  countries  are  not  up  to  speed  with 
the  new  rules.  America's  Community  Bankers  (2003)  also  voice  their  concern  in  their 
comments; 
"Although  the  most  recent  version  of  the  Accord  is  less  detailed  than  previous 
versions,  it  remains  an  extremely  complex  document  and  few  industry 
representatives  and  supervisory  personnel  will  have  a  good  grasp  of  all  of  the 
provisions  and  intricate  details.  With  that  being  the  case,  there  is  concern  about 
how  such  a  sophisticated  and  complex  capital  accord  can  be  adequately 
implemented,  supervised  and  enforced.  " 
Banks  in  emerging  markets  feel  that  the  complexity  of  the  regulation  imposes  a 
particularly  onerous  burden  and  so  places  them  at  a  disadvantage  compared  to  banks 
from  more  developed  countries.  The  Reserve  Bank  of  India  (2003)  makes  this 
comment; 
"The  complexity  and  sophistication  essential  for  banks  for  implementing  the  New 
Capital  Accord  restricts  its  universal  application  in  the  emerging  markets.  Banks 
in  these  emerging  markets  form  a  significant  segment  in  financial  intermediation 
and  are  likely  to  find  implementation  of  the  New  Capital  Accord  a  major  challenge 
in  the  medium  term.  Besides  banks,  supervisors  would  be  required  to  invest 
considerable  resources  in  upgrading  technology  systems,  and  human  resources 
to  meet  the  minimum  standards.  Banks  in  emerging  markets  would,  therefore, 
face  serious  implementation  challenges  due  to  lack  of  adequate  technical  skills, 
under  development  of  financial  markets,  structural  rigidities  and  less  robust  legal 
system.  " 
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3.6.2  The  lack  of  a  level  playing  field 
"it  came  as  an  enormous  surprise  to  some  observers,  including  this  writer,  that  only 
the  largest  10  U.  S.  banks,  and  perhaps  the  next  10-20  banks  in  terms  of  asset  size, 
would  be  required  (top  10)  or  will  have  the  option  (next  10-20)  to  follow  the  advanced 
Internal  Rate  Based  (IRB)  version  of  Basel  II's  Accord.  "  Altman  (2003) 
Altman's  comment  reflects  the  view  of  many  observers.  How  can  a  level  playing  field 
be  established  when  some  regulators  are  applying  Basel  II,  others  are  not  and  still 
others  will  be  using  some  combination  of  the  44  possible  areas  of  national  discretion4? 
The  reasons  why  the  US  is  only  requiring  the  top  20  internationally  active  banks  to 
apply  Basel  II  are  as  follows: 
"  Basel  11  is  complex  and  costly  to  introduce  and  enforce. 
"  The  U.  S.  banking  system  is  presently  more  than  adequately  capitalized. 
"  The  added  Basel  II  capital  required  for  operating  risk  is  highly  arbitrary  and 
based  on  variables  that  are  extremely  difficult  to  measure. 
"  The  Federal  Reserve  System's,  and  other  Bank  Regulatory  agencies',  policy  of 
"prompt  corrective  action,  "  and  maximum  leveraged  ratios,  when  bank  capital 
falls  below  a  certain  specified  level  has  worked  well  in  the  U.  S.  and  is  not 
specified  as  part  of  Basel  II  -  even  in  pillar  2's  regulatory  oversight. 
In  contrast,  in  the  EU  Basel  II  will  be  written  into  law  to  be  applied  to  all  banks  and 
investment  firms  regardless  of  size  and  scope.  China  and  India  have  opted  out 
entirely.  Japan  may  apply  Basel  II  in  a  less  stringent  way  as  their  banks  presently 
have  a  relatively  weak  capital  buffer.  Emerging  market  countries  will  struggle  to  apply 
the  Accord  in  full  as  they  lack  resources  as  discussed  above. 
As  supervisors  in  local  markets  adopt  their  own  approaches  and  strategies  the 
principle  of  a  level  playing  field  is  seriously  undermined. 
There  is  also  a  level  playing  field  issue  between  banks  and  non-banks.  Other  financial 
institutions  are  not  subject  to  rules  and  requirements  along  the  lines  of  Basel  II.  There 
4  "The  leaning  Tower  of  Base[",  Financial  Times  June  19,2004  p.  14 
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is  an  argument  that  this  will  place  banks  at  a  relative  disadvantage  compared  to  non- 
bank  competitors. 
3.6.3  Procyclicality 
The  issue  of  procyclicality  has  already  been  discussed  in  some  detail  in  chapter  two. 
There  is  a  concern  that  banks  will  lend  large  amounts  of  money  in  the  good  times  but 
not  provide  enough  capital  for  the  bad  times.  When  recession  comes  banks  will  be 
undercapitalized  and  finance  will  not  be  available  just  at  the  time  customers  need  it. 
This  is  not  a  new  phenomenon  but  research  by  Credit  Suisse  has  suggested  that 
Basel  II  will  greatly  exacerbate  the  problem: 
"We  have  analyzed  this  effect  over  the  last  20  years  of  credit  cycles.  Our 
calculations  suggest  that  the  impact  on  required  bank  capital  will  be  substantial.  In 
particular,  the  new  Basel  II  calculations  could  require  much  more  bank  capital 
during  economic  recessions  than  the  current  system.  "  Ervin  (2003) 
The  reason  for  this  increase  is  that  the  current  system  is  relatively  insensitive  to 
downgrades  but  under  the  new  accord  additional  capital  will  be  required  if  credit 
assessments  are  downgraded.  In  theory  credit  ratings  should  be  steady  through  the 
cycle,  as  discussed  in  chapter  two,  but  in  reality  agencies  can  be  slow  to  change 
ratings  and  then  overreact  and  downgrade  more  often  than  upgrade.  Between  2000 
and  2002  many  companies  have  been  downgraded  and  Ervin  goes  on  to  say; 
"My  personal  estimate  is  that  my  bank  [CSFB]  would  have  cut  back  its  lending 
by  perhaps  an  additional  20%  to  30%  if  the  Basel  II  rules  were  in  place  during 
2002.  If  all  banks  cut  back  at  the  same  time,  the  potential  adverse  impact  on 
the  real  economy  could  lengthen  and  deepen  the  recession.  " 
Some  commentators  have  suggested  that  capital  requirements  are  tightened  in  the 
upswings  and  eased  in  downswings  (Bono  2003).  Altman  (2003)  makes  a  similar 
comment,  "I  suggest  that  the  FED  consider  a  more  smoothed  capital  allocation  system 
to  even  out  the  normal  fluctuations  in  bank  reserves,  capital  allocations  and  lending 
behavior.  This  would  require  more  capital  to  be  set  aside  in  good  times  and  less 
during  periods  of  stress.  " 
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Altman  and  Saunders  have  written  several  papers  in  response  to  the  first  two 
consultative  documents  for  the  New  Accord  (Altman  and  Saunders  2001  a,  2001  b  and 
Altman  and  Saunders  2002).  In  the  first  they  argue  strongly  that  relying  on  traditional 
agency  ratings  could  produce  procyclical  effects  as  agency  ratings  lag  capital 
requirements.  They  show  that  the  percentage  of  issuers  in  the  higher  risk  buckets 
peaks  at  the  bottom  of  the  economic  cycle  exactly  when  problems  would  be 
exacerbated  by  belated  hikes  in  capital  requirements.  They  also  argue  that  the 
corporate  risk  buckets  are  too  broad  and  do  not  reflect  the  relative  risk  of  unexpected 
losses  on  loans  in  each  bucket.  Their  concern  is  that  the  size  of  relative  risk  weights 
could  induce  banks  to  risk-shift  towards  riskier  borrowers. 
3.6.4  Expected  and  unexpected  losses 
Under  Basel  II  there  are  capital  charges  for  unexpected  and  expected  losses. 
Expected  losses  are  covered  by  provisions  but  unexpected  losses  cannot  be 
anticipated  by  their  very  nature.  Existing  practice  requires  banks  to  make  capital 
charges  only  for  unexpected  losses.  Expected  losses  are  dealt  with  differently, 
through  provisions  and  pricing. 
The  Americans  have  raised  an  objection  about  this  definition  of  capital  under  Basel 
II  and  therefore  the  amount  that  banks  will  have  to  set  aside.  In  particular,  they  are 
concerned  about  capital  charges  for  expected  losses.  Partly  as  a  result  of  QIS3, 
the  magnitude  of  this  new  charge  has  become  clear.  American  banks,  which  have 
a  large  amount  of  business  from  credit-card  and  small-business  loans,  on  which 
expected  losses  are  high,  pushed  for  a  revision  to  Basel  II. 
Examples  of  respondents  to  the  Basel  11  consultative  document  who  expressed  this 
view  were  Citigroup,  Fortis  Bank,  Risk  Management  Association  and  Bank  One. 
In  their  press  release  of  11  October  2003  the  members  of  the  Basel  Committee 
announced  that  they  were  "changing  the  overall  treatment  of  expected  versus 
unexpected  credit  losses"  (BCBS  2003b).  Which  means  that  they  are  accommodating 
the  American  view  and  using  a  definition  of  capital  that  only  includes  unexpected 
losses.  American  approval  of  the  Accord  is  essential  and  the  Basel  Committee  has 
little  choice  but  to  review  this  issue. 
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3.6.5  Operational  risk  charge 
One  of  the  most  controversial  areas  of  the  New  Basel  Accord  is  the  operational  risk 
charge.  Opponents  to  the  inclusion  of  this  risk  in  Pillar  1  say  that  it  is  a  fundamentally 
different  risk  from  capital  and  market  risk.  It  is  the  risk  of  IT  problems  or  internal 
control  failures.  It  can  be  argued  that  these  types  of  risk  are  mainly  driven  by  the 
control  environment  of  the  bank  so  could  be  dealt  with  as  part  of  Pillar  2. 
The  comments  to  Basel  II  appear  to  be  split,  for  example  "Citigroup  strongly  supports 
[the]  inclusion  [of  operational  risk]  within  Pillar  I,  as  the  only  way  to  achieve 
consistency  and  transparency  in  the  banking  system  for  a  very  real  risk  area" 
(Citigroup  2003). 
In  contrast,  the  Credit  Suisse  Group  (2003b)  argues  strongly  that  operational  risk 
should  be  included  as  part  of  pillar  II  as  does  the  Hong  Kong  Association  of  Banks 
(2003),  Merrill  Lynch  &,  Co  (2003)  and  many  other  of  the  200  banks  that  replied. 
The  issues  concerning  operational  risk  are  not  dealt  with  in  detail  in  this  thesis  as  the 
key  area  of  concern  is  external  credit  assessments  and  split  credit  ratings. 
3.6.6  Disclosure  requirements 
Generally  banks  are  in  agreement  that  market  discipline  could  be  enhanced  by 
increased  public  disclosure  so  the  principle  of  Pillar  III  is  supported.  However  there  is 
a  general  feeling  that  the  emphasis  should  be  on  quality  not  on  quantity  and  the 
balance  of  Pillar  III  is  still  too  strongly  weighted  towards  quantity. 
3.7  Annex  2:  Standardised  approach  -  implementing  the  mapping 
process 
Basel  II  gives  details  of  the  way  in  which  credit  assessments  should  be  mapped  to 
particular  risk  weights  for  use  in  the  standardised  approach.  However,  different  rating 
agencies  have  different  rating  scales  so  how  should  agency  ratings  be  mapped  to 
particular  credit  assessments? 
Annex  2  of  Basel  II  details  how  supervisors  should  check  and  monitor  this  mapping 
process.  A  study  presented  in  chapter  six  shows  that  even  using  a  broad  scale  of 
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letter  grades5  only  63%  of  credit  ratings  agree.  If  the  level  of  agreement  between 
agencies  is  low  there  are  inherent  problems  with  taking  ratings  from  a  wide  variety  of 
different  agencies  and  mapping  them  to  the  same  risk  assessments. 
One  of  the  main  findings  to  have  emerged  from  the  literature  to  date  is  that  split  ratings 
arise  because  the  rating  scales  of  agencies  differ  (Beattie  and  Searle  1992a,  Cantor 
and  Packer  1997).  For  example,  an  A-  given  by  Moody's  is  not  the  same  as  an  A- 
given  by  Japan  Credit  Rating  Agency  (JCR).  These  studies  have  shown  that  some 
agencies  assign  systematically  higher  ratings  than  others.  This  finding  is  very 
important  for  Basel  II  as  the  Committee  and  supervisors  have  to  decide  on  broad 
tolerance  levels  based  on  cumulative  default  probabilities,  i.  e.  at  what  point  an  A- 
given  by  one  agency  is  not  the  same  as  an  A-  given  by  another. 
Tolerance  levels  will  be  based  on  default  rate  statistics  published  by  the  agencies. 
The  following  section  considers  the  annual  probability  of  default  and  cumulative  default 
ratings  which  are  used  in  the  mapping  process. 
3.7.1  Default  rate  statistics 
3.7.1.1  Annual  probability  of  default 
Moody's  and  S&P  calculate  the  annual  probability  of  default  as  the  ratio  of  defaulted 
issuers  during  a  year  divided  by  the  number  of  issuers  that  could  have  defaulted 
during  the  year  (measured  at  the  beginning  of  the  year).  Moody's  state  that  the  issuer 
is  the  unit  of  study  rather  than  outstanding  dollar  amounts  because  the  likelihood  of 
default  is  the  same  for  all  of  a  firm's  debt  issues  (Moody's  2002).  Alternative 
methodologies  weight  default  rates  either  by  the  number  of  bond  issues  or  their  par 
amounts.  The  argument  for  this  is  that  weighted  average  techniques  correctly  bias 
results  toward  the  larger-issue  years  (Caouette,  Altman  and  Narayanan  1998). 
The  issuer  rating  is  used  rather  than  an  issue  rating.  The  rating  that  is  considered  is 
the  company's  senior  unsecured  debt,  if  there  is  no  such  rating  a  statistically  derived 
rating  is  used.  This  is  referred  to  as  the  "implied  senior  rating". 
5  Letter  grades  used  for  this  comparison  are  AAA,  AA,  A,  BBB,  BB,  B,  000,  CC/C,  D.  The  map  used  is  shown  in 
Appendix  2. 
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3.7.1.2  Cumulative  default  rates 
A  cumulative  default  rate  is  the  sum  of  default  experience  over  successive  years. 
Moody's  and  S&P  calculate  their  cumulative  rates  using  slightly  different  methodology. 
Moody's  employs  a  dynamic  cohort  approach  to  calculating  multi-year  default  rates.  A 
cohort  consists  of  all  issuers  at  the  start  of  a  given  year.  These  issuers  are  then 
followed  through  time,  keeping  track  of  when  they  default  or  cease  to  be  rated  (i.  e. 
when  they  mature).  These  cohorts  are  dynamic  and  allow  the  estimation  of  cumulative 
default  risk  over  many  years.  For  each  year  the  default  rates  are  calculated  as  the 
ratio  of  issuers  who  did  default  to  those  bonds  that  were  outstanding  at  1  January  of 
that  year  and  therefore  members  of  that  cohort. 
Standard  and  Poors  employs  static  pools.  A  static  pool  is  formed  at  the  start  of  each 
year  and  followed  from  that  point  on.  The  pools  are  called  static  because  their 
membership  remains  constant  over  time.  This  is  where  they  differ  from  the  dynamic 
cohorts  which  are  updated  on  I  January  of  each  year.  S&P  form  a  new  static  pool 
each  year.  It  is  possible  to  aggregate  cohorts  across  years  (Bessis  2002)  but  not  static 
pools  (Standard  and  Poor  2002b). 
The  clearest  definition  of  how  cumulative  average  default  rates  (CDRs)  are  calculated 
is  contained  in  Standard  and  Poor's  2002  Ratings  Performance.  Default  rates  are 
calculated  for  all  static  pools,  these  are  split  into  sub-portfolios  by  rating  grade  and 
weighted  by  the  numbers  of  issuers  per  rating  per  pool.  Cumulative  average  default 
rates  are  derived  from  accumulating  these  results.  6  Caouette,  Altman  and  Narayanan 
1997  give  and  example  of  the  calculation  of  CDRs. 
"For  instance,  the  average  first-year  default  rate  on  'A'-rated  companies  for  all 
22  pools  [the  study  is  over  22  years]  was  0.05%.  Similarly,  the  second-  and 
third-year  averages  were  0.10%  for  the  first  21  pools  and  0.13%  for  the  first  20 
pools  [the  number  of  pools  will  drop  as  each  year  passes].  Accumulated,  these 
percentages  produced  ... 
0.05%,  0.15%,  and  0.28%.  As  these  cumulative 
average  default  rates  are  a  distillation  of  default  experiences  across  all  pools, 
6  There  are  alternative  methods  to  calculate  cumulative  default  rates,  these  are  detailed  in  full  in  Chapter 
15  of  Caouette,  Altman  and  Narayanan  1997 
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they  could  be  used  by  an  investor  to  assess  the  default  expectation  associated 
with  particular  ratings  over  different  time  horizons.  " 
3.7.2  The  Standardised  approach  and  mapping  risk  weights 
Annex  2  to  Basel  II  proposes  a  system  to  check  that  the  rating  scale  of  an  approved 
rating  agency  lies  within  an  acceptable  tolerance.  The  intention  of  this  is  to  ensure 
that  the  mapping  of  credit  assessments  to  risk  weights  is  applied  consistently 
whichever  agency  is  used.  It  is  of  particular  concern  if  a  rating  agency's  current 
default  experience  for  a  particular  credit  assessment  is  markedly  higher  than 
international  default  experience. 
Figure  3.2:  Comparisons  of  Cumulative  Default  Rate  (CDR)  measures 
International  experience  External  Credit 
(derived  from  the  Assessment  Institution 
combined  experience  of  Compare  to 
major  rating  agencies)  Calculated  by  national 
supervisors  based  on  the 
Set  by  the  Committee  as  agency's  own  default  data 
guidance 
Long-run  "reference"  CDR  Ten-year  average  of  the 
__  _  ___ 
three-year  CDR 
_  CDR  Benchmarks  Two  most  recent  three- 
Monitoring  level  and  year  CDR 
trigger  level 
-  --  --  -- 
There  are  two  comparisons  that  need  to  be  made,  these  are  both  comparing  the 
international  experience  of  major  agencies  with  the  individual  default  data  of  the  rating 
agency.  The  international  experience  is  measured  by  reference  rates  and 
benchmarks  recommended  by  Basel  II. 
The  Long-run  "reference"  cumulative  default  rate  (CDR)  is  based  on  the  Committee's 
observations  of  the  default  experience  reported  by  major  rating  agencies 
internationally.  Ten-year  average  of  the  three-year  CDR  is  calculated  from  default 
rates  published  by  the  agency.  This  measure  is  for  guidance  only  rather  than  a  strict 
target. 
Supervisors  should  also  look  at  the  CDR  benchmarks  set  by  the  Committee  and 
compare  these  to  the  two  most  recent  three-year  CDRs  of  the  agency.  There  will  be  a 
monitoring  level  and  a  trigger  level  set  by  the  Committee.  Exceeding  the  monitoring 
level  implies  that  the  agency's  current  default  experience  for  a  particular  credit 
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assessment  is  markedly  higher  than  international  experience.  However,  it  would  not  be 
necessary  to  change  the  associated  risk  weights  unless  they  considered  the  default 
rates  to  be  caused  by  the  agency's  weak  standards  in  assessing  credit  risk. 
Exceeding  the  trigger  level  implies  that  the  default  experience  is  considerably  higher 
and  a  change  to  the  risk  weights  should  take  place  if  the  trigger  level  is  exceeded  for 
two  consecutive  years. 
The  benchmarks  suggested  in  Annex  2  are  static  and  there  is  no  provision  for  these  to 
change  over  time  or  with  an  economic  downturn.  In  their  response  to  Basel  II,  Fitch 
Ratings  suggest  that  the  reference  CDRs  and  Benchmark  CDRs  should  move  and  be 
updated  annually.  They  point  out  that  ratings  are  not  static  or  absolute  but  are  a 
relative  measure  of  risk.  Studies  such  as  Cantor  and  Packer  1995  support  this  view. 
Therefore  the  CDRs  should  not  be  static  and  if  an  agency  does  not  meet  the 
benchmarks  in  one  year  their  default  rates  should  be  checked  against  the  figures  for 
the  last  two  years;  if  there  has  been  an  economic  downturn  that  may  have  increased 
default  rates.  They  argue  that  there  is  a  risk  that  agencies  could  be  delisted  during 
prolonged  recessionary  periods  under  the  existing  draft  of  Annex  2  (Fitch  Ratings 
2003).  However,  agencies  state  that  they  rate  "through  the  cycle"  so  ratings  should  not 
be  affected  by  short  term  economic  fluctuations. 
There  are  detailed  data  requirements  for  this  process.  The  Czech  National  Bank 
makes  the  observation  in  their  comment  to  Basel  II  that  some  smaller  agencies  do  not 
have  the  data  available  to  calculate  these  CDRs  and  suggest  an  alternative  method 
(Czech  National  Bank  2003). 
3.7.3  Comparison  of  agency  CDRs 
Using  Moody's  as  an  example  and  using  the  latest  published  cumulative  default 
figures  (Moody's  Investor  Service  2006)  the  ten  year  average  of  the  three-year  CDR 
and  two  most  recent  three-year  CDRs  would  be  calculated  as  follows: 
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Table  3.4:  Moody's  ten  year  average  of  the  three-year  CDRs 
10  year  average  of  the  3  year  CDRs 
2003  2002_ 
_2001 
2000 
Aaa  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Aa  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
A  0.00  0.32  0.66  0.35 
Baa  0.20  1.58  1.99  2.23 
Ba  1.82  3.89  4.89  4.64 
B  6.38  13.31  25.59  25.41 
Caa- 
10  yr 
1999  1998  1997  1996  1995  1994  Avg. 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
0.18  0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.16 
1.41  1.10  0.74  0.17  0.00  0.20  0.96 
6.60  6.02  5.28  2.34  2.04  2.05  3.96 
26.07  18.93  12.01  9.25  10.11  12.49  15.96 
C  37.06  51.85  57.68  54.40  52.96  41.32  40.29  27.85  21.04  24.31  40.88 
Table  3.5:  Comparison  of  Moody's  Long-run  "reference"  CDR  per  Annex  2  and 
ten-year  average  of  the  three-year  CDR 
Moody  s  ten  year  average 
%  Long-run  "reference"  CDR 
_ 
of  3-year  CDR____ 
AAA-AA  0.10  0.00 
A  0.25  0.16 
BBB  1.00  0.96 
BB  7.50  3.96 
B  20.00 
_15.96 
This  shows  that  the  long-run  "reference"  CDR  exceeds  Moody's  ten  year  average 
three-year  CDR  in  all  cases  so,  on  the  basis  of  this  first  test,  supervisors  would  be 
satisfied  with  risk  assessments  based  on  this  agency.  This  means  that  the  letter  scale 
as  used  by  Moody's  could  probably  map  straight  to  the  risk  assessments  used  in  the 
Standardised  approach  of  Basel  III. 
Table  3.6:  Comparison  of  three-year  CDR  benchmarks  and  Moody's  two  most 
recent  three-year  CDRs 




Trigger  level 
AAA  -  AA  0.8  1.2 
A  1.0  1.3 
BBB  2.4  3.0 
BB  11.0  12.4 
B- 
-  -28.6  -  -- 
35.0 
Moody's  two  most  recent  three- 
year  CDRs 
____2003  __ 
2002_ 
0.00  0.00 
0.00  0.32 
0.20  1.58 
1.82  3.89 
_6.38 
13.31 
As  you  would  expect,  Moody's  recent  three-year  CDRs  sit  comfortably  below  the 
monitoring  level.  This  is  no  surprise  as  figures  from  Moody's  would  have  formed  the 
averages  used  by  the  committee  to  set  the  reference  levels.  Chapter  six  shows  that 
Moody's  is  one  of  the  least  generous  agencies  and  rates  most  issuers  lower  than  other 
7  There  is  a  change  in  the  letter  scale  of  Moody's  needed  to  map  to  the  scale  as  shown  in  Basel  II,  this 
map  is  detailed  in  Appendix  II. 
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agencies,  on  average.  This  means  that  the  default  rates  at  each  grade  would  be 
expected  to  be  lower  than  for  other  agencies. 
A  more  interesting  test  would  be  to  review  the  published  CDRs  for  the  Japanese 
agency  Rating  and  Investment  Information  (Rating  and  Investment  Information  2005). 
Studies  are  included  in  chapters  six  and  seven  that  show  that  the  Japanese  credit 
rating  agencies  consistently  rate  more  generously  than  Moody's  and  S&P.  This,  and 
other  studies,  find  that  R&I  rates  companies,  on  average,  one  letter  grade  more 
generously  than  Moody's.  Consequently  for  a  given  credit  assessment  you  would 
expect  R&I  to  report  higher  default  rates  than  Moody's. 
10  year  cumulative  average  default  ratings  are  given  by  R&I  as  show  below: 
Table  3.7:  Comparison  of  long-run  "reference"  CDR  and  R&I  cumulative 
average  default  rates 
Long-run  "reference"  R&I's  10  year  average 
_CDR  _ 
of3yrCDR1993-2002 
AAA  -  AA  0.00  0.09 
A  0.25  0.43 
BBB  1.00  1.21 
BB  7.50  8.38 
B  20.00  35.37 
These  reference  CDRs  are  exactly  that,  reference  only  and  a  guideline  for  supervisors. 
This  would  indicate  that  default  rates  for  all  rating  grades  issued  by  R&I  have  a  higher 
default  rate  than  expected  but  it  is  down  to  the  local  supervisor  as  to  what  action  to 
take. 
Table  3.8:  Comparison  of  benchmark  CDRs  and  R&I  average  three-year  CDR 
1991-1997 
Three-year  CDR benchmarks  R&I's  most 
recent  three-year 
-  --  - 
Monitoring  level_ 
__ 
Trigger  level  Monitoring 
--  ---  -- 
CDR  2002  -_2001. 
--  ----  -  AAA  -  AA  0.8  1.2  0.00  0.00 
A  1.0  1.3  0.00  0.39 
BBB  2.4  3.0  0.00  1.16 
BB  11.0  12.4  11.32  11.67 
B  28.6 
__35.0 
41.67  37.50 
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All  the  CDRs  for  R&I  fall  comfortably  below  the  monitoring  level  except  for  BB  and  B 
grade.  BB  grade  issues  show  a  default  rate  of  below  the  trigger  level  so  this  would  not 
be  a  cause  for  immediate  concern  but  the  B  grade  shows  a  default  rate  above  the 
trigger  level  for  the  last  two  years  and  there  is  a  likelihood  that  this  would  be 
considered  seriously  by  supervisors.  Japan  Credit  Rating  Agency  also  publish  default 
ratings  (Japan  Credit  Rating  Agency  2005). 
3.8  Basel  Committee's  Market  Risk  Amendment  and  split  ratings 
Banks  already  have  experience  in  dealing  with  differing  credit  rating  scales  and  split 
ratings.  With  the  implementation  of  the  Basel  Committee's  Market  Risk  (BCMR) 
Amendment  (BCBS  1998)  to  the  Capital  Accord  in  1988  (BCBS  1988)  seven  out  of  the 
eleven  Basel  Committee  on  Banking  Supervision  members  already  use  agency  credit 
ratings  in  their  banking  supervision.  This  amendment  required  that  an  institution  with 
significant  trading  activity  must  now  calculate  a  capital  charge  for  market  risk  using 
either  its  own  internal  risk  measurement  model  (the  "internal  models  approach")  or  a 
"standardised"  process  developed  by  the  Committee. 
Estrella  et  al  (2000)  reports  that  a  variety  of  methods  are  used  to  deal  with  split  ratings 
in  relation  to  the  requirements  on  BCMR  Amendment.  The  US  follows  a  policy  similar 
to  that  now  specified  in  the  New  Accord,  others  follow  the  wording  of  the  BCBS  market 
risk  amendment  which  is  primarily  concerned  with  a  cut  off  to  find  the  minimum  level  of 
acceptable  ratings. 
One  interesting  case  is  Hong  Kong  Monetary  Authority  where  efforts  are  specifically 
made  to  discount  some  agencies'  ratings  relative  to  others.  They  map  the  different 
ratings  assigned  by  the  recognised  credit  rating  agencies  by  looking  at  the  definitions 
they  use  for  each  ratings  category  and  by  comparing  the  ratings  they  assign  to  some 
selected  corporations. 
To  give  a  minimum  acceptable  rating  for  the  purpose  of  the  liquidity  ratio  the 
comparable  ratings  are  as  follows: 
Credit  rating  agency 
__ 
Minimum  acceptable  Long  term 
_rating__  Moody's 
_  ___-______ 




Fitch  ----  -  --  ----  --  --------------------  -  --  --  ----  A- 
Thomso_n  Bank  Watch  A+ 
----  ----  ----------  ----  -------  -------------------  ------------------  R&I  A+ 
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This  approach  implies  a  belief  that  the  rating  scales  are  not  equivalent. 
3.8  Summary 
This  chapter  considers  banking  regulation  in  the  light  of  Basel  II.  The  Standardised 
approach  to  calculating  credit  risk  is  reviewed  in  detail  along  with  the  reliance  placed 
on  external  credit  assessments  and  procedures  to  be  followed  when  split  ratings  arise. 
The  results  of  Quantitative  Impact  Study  3  are  reviewed  which  assess  the  likely impact 
of  the  Basel  II  proposals  on  banks'  capital  requirements  and  comments  from  a  wide 
variety  of  respondents  to  the  Third  Consultative  Paper  are  summarised.  The  final  part 
of  this  chapter  provides  worked  examples  of  the  guidelines  given  to  supervisors  under 
Annex  2  of  the  Basel  II  which  suggest  how  mapping  of  agency  grades  to  risk 
assessments  under  the  Standardised  approach  should  take  place.  The  purpose  of 
these  guidelines  is  to  ensure  that  the  cumulative  default  probabilities  of  different 
agencies  are  equivalent  before  agency  grades  are  mapped  directly  to  risk 
assessments. 
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Literature  review:  Split  credit  ratings  and  bond  rating  prediction 
models 
Chapter  one  of  this  thesis  provided  a  introduction  to  the  credit  rating  industry  and 
chapter  two  discussed  Basel  II  and  the  place  of  credit  ratings  within  the  legislation. 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  review  previous  studies  that  directly  relate  to  the 
research  presented  the  next  six  chapters  of  this  thesis.  Two  areas  are  covered;  split 
credit  ratings  and  bond  rating  prediction  models. 
4.2  Split  credit  ratings 
4.1.1  What  is  a  split  credit  rating? 
A  split  credit  rating  arises  when  different  ratings  are  assigned  to  the  same  organisation 
or  issuer  by  different  credit  rating  agencies.  A  study  into  the  frequency  and  reasons 
for  split  ratings  is  of  interest  because  market  participants  generally  use  the  ratings  of 
the  major  agencies  as  if  they  are  equivalent  to  one  another.  Subject  to  Annex  2,  Basel 
II  recommends  the  use  of  external  ratings  in  such  a  way  that  implies  the  ratings  of 
agencies  approved  by  the  regulators  will  be  equivalent.  Regulations  also  use  credit 
ratings  to  determine  other  cut-off  points  for  investment  purposes  such  as  investment 
grade  and  sub-investment  grade  ratings. 
Neither  investors,  issuers  nor  agencies  would  expect  ratings  to  be  the  same  all  the 
time.  Griep  and  Stefano  (2001)  clarify  this  by  saying  "it  should  be  understood  that 
ratings  are  opinions  and  not  audits.  "  Each  agency  establishes  it  own  policies, 
methodologies,  ratings  scales  and  determines  the  mix  of  quantitative  and  qualitative 
inputs  so  it  is  to  be  expected  that  some  differences  will  arise.  However  a  study  of  the 
frequency  and  degree  of  split  ratings  is  relevant  in  the  light  of  the  Standardised 
approach  to  credit  risk  measurement  under  Basel  II.  The  studies  in  this  thesis  add  to 
the  findings  of  previous  research  by  extending  the  data  sample  to  over  51,000 
matched  pairs  of  ratings  for  ten  agencies  and  over  36  countries  for  the  period  May 
1999  -  March  2004. 
4.1.2  The  frequency  of  split  ratings 
One  of  the  first  studies  to  collate  data  on  rating  differences  between  a  number  of 
different  rating  agencies  was  Beattie  and  Searle  1992a  and  1992b.  Using  a  large 
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sample  of  long  term  credit  ratings  reported  by  twelve  of  the  leading  international  rating 
agencies  from  the  publication,  Financial  Times  Credit  Ratings  International,  they  found 
more  than  5,000  cases  when  two  or  more  agencies  rated  the  same  issue.  Less  than 
half  (44%)  of  these  pairs  of  ratings  agreed  precisely  and  more  than  20%  differed  by 
two  or  more  notches. 
Beattie  and  Searle  asked  whether  there  are  systematic  differences  in  the  rating  scales 
of  the  agencies.  They  addressed  this  question  by  computing  the  mean  rating 
differences  across  jointly  rating  companies  for  every  possible  pair  of  rating  agencies. 
The  two  agencies  with  the  largest  number  of  jointly  rated  companies  are  Moody's  and 
S&P.  The  average  difference  in  their  ratings  for  the  1,398  jointly  rated  companies 
was  only  0.05  of  a  notch  suggesting  that  these  agencies  assign  very  similar  average 
ratings.  The  equivalence  between  Moody's  and  S&P  ratings  has  also  been  identified 
by  Perry  1985,  Ederington  1986,  Ederington  and  Yawitz  1987,  Cantor  and  Packer 
1995,1996,1997,  Jewell  and  Livingston  1998. 
However  the  equivalence  in  rating  scales  does  not  necessarily  extend  to  other  rating 
agencies.  For  example,  when  the  ratings  of  eight  other  agencies  were  compared  to 
those  given  by  Moody's  to  the  same  borrowers,  the  ratings  of  five  of  them  were 
significantly  higher  than  Moody's.  The  ratings  of  the  third  and  fourth  largest  US 
agencies  (Fitch  and  Duff  and  Phelps)  each  rated  about  a  third  of  a  notch  higher  than 
Moody's  and  two  of  the  Japanese  rating  agencies  rated  on  average  between  one  to 
two  notches  higher  than  Moody's.  Ederington  1986,  Cantor  and  Packer  1995,  Jewell 
and  Livingston  1998  and  1999  have  also  identified  D&P  and  Fitch  as  consistently 
rating  higher  than  Moody's  and  S&P. 
Cantor  and  Packer  1995  made  a  comparison  between  the  senior  debt  ratings 
assigned  by  Moody's  and  S&P  and  found  64%  were  assigned  the  same  rating,  16% 
were  rated  higher  by  Moody's  and  20%  rated  higher  by  S&P.  They  used  1,398  bonds 
jointly  rated  by  Moody's  and  S&P,  524  bonds  jointly  rated  by  Moody's  and  D&P  and 
295  bonds  rated  jointly  by  Moody's  and  Fitch  from  the  end  of  1990.  They  also  used 
data  from  the  Financial  Times  quarterly  publication,  Credit  Ratings  International.  In 
1997  Cantor  and  Packer  updated  the  results  using  data  at  the  year-end  1993  (see 
Cantor  and  Packer  1997).  The  results  were  as  follows: 
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Table  4.1:  Comparison  of  split  ratings  between  Moody's,  S&P,  D&P  and  Fitch 
D&P  relative  to  Fitch  relative  to 
Moody's  S&P  Mood  's  S&P 
D&P/Fitch  1994  1997  1994  1997  1994  1997  1994  1997 
_  Rated  higher  (%o)  _  _  47.6  _  49.7  _  39.9  _  43.2  55.3  _  58.7  46.0  _  49.7 
_  Rated  same  (%)  42.3  39.6  46.5  44.0  37.9  35.5  43.5  43.2 
Rated  Tower  (%)  10.1  10.7-  0.7  13.5  13.5-  12.8  12.8-  6.8  5.8  9.9  7.1 
Mean  difference  in  0.57  0.6  0.16  _  0.46  0.74  0.74  0.56  0.56 
rating 
_(notches)  Cantor  and  Packer  1997 
The  table  shows  that  mean  ratings  of  D&P  and  Fitch  are  considerable  higher  than 
Moody's  and  S&P.  The  authors  interpret  these  differences  as  evidence  that  Fitch  and 
D&P  have  more  lenient  ratings  scales  than  Moody's  and  S&P. 
Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  also  compared  the  split  ratings  for  speculative  grade  (or 
"junk")  bonds.  They  found  the  ratings  of  Moody's  and  S&P  to  be  nearly  identical  on 
average.  However,  the  third  and  fourth  largest  agencies  disagree  with  Moody's  with 
greater  regularity  and  on  a  greater  scale  in  the  junk  bond  sample  than  in  the 
comparable  study  of  the  whole  spectrum  of  bond  ratings  by  Beattie  and  Searle.  The 
ratings  of  the  smaller  agencies  were  between  one  and  one  and  a  half  notches  higher 
than  those  of  Moody's  and  S&P. 
4.1.3  The  causes  of  split  ratings 
Split  credit  ratings  may  arise  for  a  variety  of  reasons: 
"  Individual  rating  scales  may  differ  meaning  that  the  default  risk  that  underlies 
each  rating  is  different  for  each  agency. 
"  Agencies  use  different  methodology  to  generate  ratings. 
"  There  is  a  random  judgement  element  in  the  selection  of  a  rating,  specified 
policies  may  not  be  applied  consistently  giving  rise  to  random  differences. 
"  There  is  a  rating  lag,  i.  e.  split  ratings  will  arise  as  there  are  timing  differences  in 
the  release  of  new  ratings  or response  to  new  information  by  different  agencies. 
"  Agencies  may  have  access  to  different  information.  Some  ratings  are 
unsolicited  and  based  only  on  publicly  available  information  while  others  have 
been  solicited  and  information  that  is  not  publicly  available  has  been  provided 
by  the  issuer. 
"  The  credit  risk  of  some  issuers  or  industries  is harder  to  assess  than  others  due 
to  their  opacity  or  due  to  poor  credit  quality. 
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Beattie  and  Searle  1992a  suggest  that  differences  in  rating  scales  are  the  primary 
cause  of  rating  differences.  Ederington  1986  argues  that  split  ratings  are  caused  by 
the  random  errors  of  the  two  ratings  agencies,  implying  that  issues  with  split  ratings 
are  likely  to  have  credit  risks  bordering  the  rating  cut-off  points.  Morgan  1997  and 
2002  finds  that  issuers  whose  assets  are  hard  to  judge  due  to  their  opacity  are  more 
likely  to  receive  split  ratings.  He  focuses  his  research  on  banks  as  he  finds  the  highest 
level  of  split  ratings  to  be  for  this  industry. 
Livingston,  Naranjo  and  Zhou  (2005)  present  a  diagrammatic  explanation  of  split 
ratings  in  terms  of  a  range  of  credit  risk  that  is  assessed  by  the  agencies.  They  argue 
that  the  hypotheses  of  Ederington  and  Morgan  are  not  necessarily  mutually  exclusive. 
Figure  4.1  shows  the  range  of  credit  risk  for  an  issuer  over  which  agencies  agree. 
Two  or  more  agencies  may  not  be  able  to  pin  point  the  exact  credit  risk  but  have 
confidence  that  the  risk  lies  within  the  boundary  as  shown  by  the  red  lozenge.  In 
figure  4.1  the  range  of  credit  risk  does  not  overlap  the  rating  scale  cut-off  point  and 
there  is  no  split  rating. 
Figure  4.1:  No  split  rating  -  the  credit  risk  range  for  an  issuer 
IIIIi 
AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B 
In  figure  4.2  the  range  of  credit  risk  overlaps  the  cut-off  point  between  AA  and  A  and  a 
split  rating  may  occur.  If  the  split  is  random  then  agency  A  is  just  as  likely  to  predict  a 
higher  rating  as  agency  B  which  is  consistent  with  Ederington's  hypothesis. 
Figure  4.2:  A  split  rating  -  the  credit  risk  range  for  an  issuer 
AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B 
Morgan  argues  that  with  more  opaque  assets  the  credit  risk  range  will  increase  as  in 
figure  4.3  as  it  is  more  difficult  for  agencies  to  estimate  the  precise  risk.  This  implies 
that  it  is  more  likely  for  two  agencies  to  select  a  different  credit  risk  within  this  range 
and  hence  a  split  rating  is  more  likely  to  arise. 
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Figure  4.3:  A  split  rating  -a  wide  credit  risk  range 
IiII 
AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B 
It  is  likely  that  a  variety  of  the  factors  listed  above  influence  the  ratings  of  individual 
agencies  and  therefore,  split  ratings.  The  diagrams  above  imply  an  equivalence  in 
rating  scales  but  chapter  five  and  six  and  Beattie  and  Searle  1992a  show  that  there  do 
appear  to  be  systematic  differences  in  the  rating  scales  of  different  agencies.  This 
could  add  to  the  likelihood  that  the  credit  risk  range  of  an  issuer  falls  over  a  cut-off 
point.  Ederington  argues  that  split  ratings  are  caused  by  random  errors  but  chapter 
five  shows  that  there  is  a  statistically  significant  ranking  of  the  agencies'  rating  scales 
and  the  tendency  for  some  agencies  to  be  more  or  less  lenient  than  others  does  not 
appear  to  be  random. 
The  diagrams  of  Livingston,  Naranjo  and  Zhou  (2005)  offer  clarity  in  explaining  two  of 
the  possible  causes  of  split  ratings  but  ignore  the  impact  of  differences  in  the  scales  of 
rating  agencies. 
Figure  4.4:  Split  ratings  and  differences  in  rating  scales 
Agency  1  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B 
Agency  2  AAA  AA  A  BBB  BB  B 
Agency  3  AAA  -;  AA;  A  BBB  BB  B 
Figure  4.4  shows  three  different  agencies  that  have  different  ratings  scales.  Agency  1 
and  2  have  different  cut-off  points  at  different  parts  of  the  ratings  scale,  i.  e.  agency  1  is 
sometimes  more  generous  and  sometime  less  generous  with  its  ratings.  The  rating 
scale  of  agency  3  is  entirely  skewed  above  that  of  the  other  agencies  so  at  all  points  it 
is  more  generous  in  its  ratings. 
The  dotted  red  lines  show  a  range  of  credit  risk  determined  by  the  agencies.  Split 
ratings  may  arise  because  the  agencies  allocate  a  different  risk  within  the  hypothetical 
credit  risk  band,  because  the  risk  is  the  same  but  the  rating  scale  is  different  or  a 
combination  of  both  causes. 
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4.1.4  Regional  differences  between  rating  agencies 
Most  studies  use  data  for  the  major  rating  agencies;  Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch  and  D&P 
(which  was  acquired  by  Fitch  in  2000).  Outside  of  the  US,  Japanese  rating  agencies 
are  among  the  oldest  and  most  active  and  have  attracted  the  interest  of  researchers. 
Beattie  and  Searle  1992b  have  found  that  Japanese  rating  agencies  consistently  give 
higher  ratings  to  the  same  bond  issues  than  Moody's  and  S&P.  On  average, 
Japanese  agencies  rate  between  one  to  three  notches  higher  than  Moody's  and  S&P. 
Japan  Centre  for  International  Finance  (JCIF1999)  finds  that  Moody's  ratings  of 
Japanese  firms  may  be  relatively  tough,  since  fewer  defaults  have  been  observed  over 
time  in  Japan  than  would  have  been  predicted  by  Moody's  ratings  in  conjunction  with 
US  default  rates. 
Japanese  entities  have  also  complained  that  US  rating  agencies  are  unduly  harsh 
towards  Japanese  firms  because  they  do  not  take  sufficient  account  of  the  Keiretsu 
form  of  organisation.  A  keiretsu  means  that  the  group  is  structured  with  cross-holdings 
of  shares  and  mutual  appointment  of  corporate  directors.  However,  Shin  and  Moore 
(2003)  used  a  ordered  probit  model  to  assess  the  impact  of  keiretsu  affiliation  on 
agency  ratings  and  found  that  the  affiliation  of  an  entity  was  not  the  cause  of  rating 
differences  between  Japanese  and  US  agencies.  Instead  they  argued  that  home  bias 
of  Japanese  agencies  causes  them  to  rate  Japanese  issuers  more  favourably. 
Shin  and  Moore  are  not  the  only  authors  to  have  cited  home  bias  as  the  main  driver  of 
differences  between  US  and  Japanese  rating  agencies.  Home  bias  means  that 
Japanese  rating  agencies  appear  to  rate  issuers  from  their  own  country  more  leniently 
than  issuers  from  overseas.  An  examination  of  split  ratings  by  Beattie  and  Searle 
(1992b)  suggests  that  agencies  judge  issuers  from  their  own  country  more  leniently. 
They  also  find  that  relative  consensus  is  greater  between  agencies  from  the  same 
country  than  between  agencies  from  different  countries.  Nevertheless,  Nickell, 
Perraudin,  and  Varotto  (2000)  find  that  higher  rated  Japanese  firms  are  more  likely  to 
be  downgraded  by  Moody's  and  that  Japanese  firms  with  low  ratings  were  less  likely 
to  be  upgraded.  Li,  Shin  and  Moore  (2006)  find  that  Japanese  bond  prices  are 
influenced  by  downgrades  by  global  agencies  more  than  by  local  Japanese  agencies. 
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However,  Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  find  that,  for  ratings  of  international  banks, 
observed  differences  between  home  and  foreign  ratings  principally  reflected 
differences  in  the  scales  of  individual  ratings  agencies,  rather  than  home-country  bias. 
4.1.5  Issuer  sectors  and  split  ratings 
Morgan  (1997  and  2002)  measured  the  frequency  of  credit  rating  agency 
disagreement  in  the  banking  versus  other  sectors.  Consistent  with  Cantor  and  Packer 
(1995)  he  finds  that  split  ratings  tend  to  be  more  frequent  in  banking  than  other 
sectors.  He  argues  that  the  risk  of  banks  is  hard  to  judge  because  the  risk  of  their 
financial  assets  is  hard  to  measure.  He  finds  that  bond  raters  disagree  more  over 
opaque  assets  like  loans  and  easily  substitutable  assets  like  cash  and  trading  assets. 
Ammer  and  Packer  (2000)  support  this  finding  and  note  that  ratings  are  not  always 
consistent  across  issuer  sectors.  They  find  that  US  banks  experienced  significantly 
more  defaults  than  US  industrial  firms  between  1983  -  1998.  Beattie  and  Searle 
(1992b)  found  that  ratings  in  the  banking  and  utilities  sectors  exhibit  a  lower  level  of 
absolute  agreement  than  those  in  other  sectors.  They  also  find  that  the  level  of 
agreement  for  supranationals  is  higher  than  for  any  specific  geographic  sector. 
Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  find  that  split  ratings  are  more  common  in  the  banking 
sector,  for  lower-rated  sovereigns  than  lower  rated  US  corporates  and  less  common 
for  higher  rated  (AAA/AA)  sovereigns  than  higher-rated  US  corporates.  These 
results  suggest  greater  opacity  in  the  measurement  of  credit  risk  for  banks  relative  to 
corporates,  for  lower-rated  sovereigns  relative  to  corporates  and  less  opacity  for 
higher  rated  sovereigns  relative  to  corporates. 
Nickell,  Perraudin  and  Varotto  (2000)  focus  on  rating  transitions  and  find  that  banks 
tend  to  have  less  stable  ratings  than  industrials.  Higher  rated  banks  have  more 
downgrades  but  lower  rated  banks  are  upgraded  more  often  than  lower-rated  industrial 
issuers.  Jackson  and  Perraudin  (1999)  report  that  over  one  year  horizons,  banks 
rated  B  suffer  fewer  bond  defaults  than  B-  rated  industrial  issuers,  although  the 
difference  was  not  statistically  significant. 
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4.1.6  Economic  rationale  for  using  different  rating  agencies 
One  possible  pitfall  of  simple  comparisons  of  average  rating  levels  (or  of  the  observed 
frequency  of  higher  or  lower  ratings)  arises  from  differences  in  ratings  policies  of  the 
rating  agencies.  Moody's  and  S&P  rate  all  taxable  corporate  bonds  publicly  issued  in 
the  United  States,  regardless  of  whether  a  rating  has  been  solicited  by  the  issuer.  Both 
Moody's  and  S&P  also  frequently  issue  unsolicited  ratings  to  issuers  from  outside  the 
United  States  as  well. 
Most  of  the  other  rating  agencies  in  the  United  States  have  a  longstanding  policy  of 
rating  bonds  only  on  the  request  of  the  issuer,  which  involves  a  fee  being  paid  for  the 
ratings  (solicited  ratings).  It  is  possible  that  the  smaller  agencies'  ratings  are  only 
purchased  (and  thus  reported)  when  there  is  a  strong  expectation  of  improvement 
upon  Moody's  and  S&P  ratings,  while  when  the  smaller  agencies  rate  lower,  their 
ratings  are  not  purchased.  This  implies  a  potential  bias  in  the  mean  rating  and  in  the 
frequency  comparisons,  which  is  known  in  the  econometric  literature  as  sample 
selection  bias. 
Cantor  and  Packer  have  contributed  a  number  of  studies  to  the  literature  on  the  theme 
of  the  economic  rationale  for  purchasing  an  additional  credit  rating.  The  authors 
attempt  to  find  out  what  types  of  firms  are  more  likely  to  seek  out  a  third  (or  fourth) 
bond  rating  (Cantor  and  Packer  1995).  They  find  that  46%  of  firms  in  their  sample  with 
one  investment  grade  rating  and  one  non-investment  grade  rating  from  the  two  major 
agencies  seek  a  third  rating.  Of  these  firms,  approximately  85%  (29  of  the  34)  receive 
an  investment  grade  rating  from  the  third  agency.  Firms  with  ratings  from  Moody's 
and  S&P  that  are  a  number  of  notches  away  from  the  investment  grade  cut-off  are  less 
likely  to  obtain  a  third  rating.  The  authors  conclude  that  third  ratings  are  more  likely  to 
be  purchased  if  the  firm  is  close  to  a  sub-investment  grade  rating.  Combined  with  the 
evidence  from  the  same  study  that  Fitch  and  D&P  have  more  lenient  ratings  scales 
than  Moody's  and  S&P,  this  was  very  suggestive  of  rating  shopping  on  the  part  of 
some  firms. 
Cantor  and  Packer  (1996)  revisited  the  issue  of  rating  shopping  by  firms.  The  authors 
test  two  theories  on  the  existence  of  third  ratings.  The  first  theory  is  that  third  ratings 
are  more  likely  to  be  obtained  when  there  is  great  uncertainly  about  the  default  risk  of 
the  firm.  Baker  and  Mansi  2002  support  the  view  that  issuers  obtain  multiple  ratings  to 
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increase  the  probability  of  a  true  credit  risk  evaluation  emerging.  If  this  is  the  case,  the 
third  rating  could  provide  valuable  additional  information  to  the  market  about  the 
default  risk.  There  are  several  factors  that  would  support  this  theory.  First,  third 
ratings  would  be  more  common  for  firms  that  have  split  ratings  from  Moody's  and  S&P. 
Second,  the  likelihood  of  a  third  rating  should  increase  as  the  difference  (in  rating 
notches)  between  Moody's  and  S&P  grows.  Finally,  the  authors  believe  that  default 
risk should  be  inherently  more  uncertain  for  small  firms  and  firms  with  high  leverage. 
However,  probit  regressions  revealed  that  none  of  the  above  factors  increased  the 
likelihood  of  a  third  rating. 
The  second  theory  the  authors  investigate  is  that  third  ratings  are  more  likely  when  the 
debt-issuing  firm  is  shopping  for  a  better  rating.  According  to  this  theory,  a  third  rating 
should  be  more  likely  when  the  existing  ratings  of  the  firm  are  close  to  important 
regulatory  cut-off  ratings,  such  as  the  investment  grade  cut-off.  However  Cantor  and 
Packer  used  regression  analysis  to  find  that  this  was  not  the  case.  Therefore,  rating 
shopping  does  not  appear  to  explain  the  existence  of  third  ratings. 
Cantor  and  Packer  (1997)  find,  once  again,  that  mean  ratings  for  D&P  and  Fitch  are 
consistently  higher  than  those  for  Moody's  and  S&P.  They  control  for  the  existence  of 
potential  sample  selection  bias  using  an  approach  pioneered  by  Heckman  (1979). 
The  authors  find  that  selection  bias  can  account  for  about  40%  -  50%  of  the  observed 
difference  in  ratings  between  the  major  agencies  and  the  third  agencies.  They  find 
limited  evidence  for  significant  sample  selection  bias  and  thus  much  stronger  evidence 
for  differences  in  ratings  scales.  While  sample  selection  bias  may  explain  some  pair- 
wise  ratings  differentials,  most  is  attributable  to  rating  scale  differentials. 
The  studies  by  Cantor  and  Packer  make  several  useful  contributions  to  the  literature 
on  rating  agencies.  They  document  the  higher  average  ratings  of  the  "third"  rating 
agencies  compared  to  the  two  major  agencies.  In  addition,  they  find  no  evidence  to 
support  the  theory  that  only  firms  with  greater  default  risk  engage  in  rating  shopping  to 
obtain  a  stronger  third  rating.  However  it  is  not  clear  from  this  research  what  the  major 
motivation  for  obtaining  third  ratings  may  be,  nor  is  the  study  extended  to  a  review  of 
other  rating  agencies. 
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Jewell  and  Livingston  (1998,2000)  focus  primarily  on  the  impact  of  ratings  on  bond 
yields  but  their  studies  make  an  interesting  addition  to  and  also  a  disagreement  with 
the  work  of  Cantor  and  Packer.  They  split  their  study  into  analysis  of  a  full  sample  of 
all  ratings  made  by  S&P,  Moody's  and  Fitch  and  a  3-rater  sample  which  contains  only 
those  bonds  rated  by  all  three  agencies.  In  the  full  sample  the  average  rating  for  Fitch 
is  considerably  higher  than  the  average  rating  for  Moody's  and  S&P.  In  the  3-rater 
sample  Fitch  is  only  marginally  higher  (0.3  rating  notches).  Their  results  show  that 
firms  with  publicly  available  Fitch  ratings  have  higher  ratings  from  Moody's  and  S&P 
than  firms  without  Fitch  ratings.  They  find  that  about  85%  of  the  difference  in  mean 
ratings  between  the  full  and  3-rater  sample  is  caused  by  this  selection  bias.  This 
finding  is  in  contrast  to  Cantor  and  Packer  who  find  limited  evidence  for  sample 
selection  bias.  The  typical  firm  releasing  a  Fitch  rating  has  a  lower  yield  (controlling  for 
Moody's  and  S&P  rating),  a  more  stable  rating  and  is  more  likely  to  receive  an 
upgrade.  They  find  that  Fitch  ratings  have  an  impact  on  yields  and  serve  as  a  tie 
breaker  when  Moody's  and  S&P  disagree  on  a  rating. 
Jewell  and  Livingston  repeat  their  study  in  2000  to  include  data  for  D&P  as  well  as 
Fitch.  Their  findings  are  consistent  with  their  earlier  paper. 
Poon  (2003)  studies  unsolicited  ratings  in  comparison  to  solicited  ratings.  Poon  finds 
that  S&P  ratings  are  lower  for  unsolicited  ratings  than  solicited  ratings.  This  is 
interesting  with  respect  to  the  observation  that  Japanese  credit  rating  agencies  rate 
higher  than  Moody's  and  S&P.  S&P  attempted  to  enter  the  Japanese  market  in  2000 
and  assigned  150  unsolicited  long-term  credit  ratings  to  Japanese  issuers,  this 
represented  63%  of  S&P  ratings  in  the  country  (Standard  and  Poor's  2000).  This 
could  have  had  the  effect  of  biasing  the  S&P  ratings  downwards  although  the  low  level 
of  S&P  and  Moody's  ratings  has  been  identified  in  research  prior  to  2000. 
Estrella  et  at  (2000)  find  that  banking  supervisors  do  not  distinguish  between  solicited 
and  unsolicited  ratings,  although  many  express  unease  about  unsolicited  ratings.  In 
practice  both  ratings  are  used  as  if  they  are  equivalent. 
Japan  Center  for  International  Finance  (2000)  publish  the  results  of  a  survey  of 
Japanese  financial  institutions  and  include  some  information  about  their  experience  of 
the  process  of  assigning  an  unsolicited  rating.  If  an  entity  requested  a  solicited  rating, 
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management  was  interviewed  by  the  agency  in  90%  of  cases  for  a  total  period  of  2-4 
days,  on  average.  The  comparable  percentage  of  entities  that  were  asked  for 
interviews  when  an  unsolicited  ratings  was  being  assigned  was  66%  taking  a  total  of 
half  a  day,  on  average.  When  a  rating  had  been  requested,  top  level  management 
was  involved  in  these  meetings  40%  of  the  time  compared  to  20%  of  the  time  for 
unsolicited  ratings.  Finally,  for  solicited  ratings  70%  of  respondents  said  that  they 
provide  internal  information  to  the  agency  not  available  to  investors  and  analysts,  this 
was  the  case  for  less  than  30%  of  unsolicited  ratings. 
4.1.7  Comparing  default  probabilities 
Tabakis  and  Vinci  (2002)  extend  their  review  of  split  ratings  to  a  comparison  of  default 
probabilities.  They  found  that  when  comparing  the  ratings,  (i.  e.  AAA,  AA  etc.  )  S&P 
ratings  were  lower  then  those  of  Moody's  and  Fitch.  When  comparing  the  same  split 
ratings  using  estimated  default  probabilities,  no  significant  differences  were  found. 
They  conclude  that  the  rating  scales  are  not  equivalent.  They  find  that,  when 
comparing  the  five-year  default  rates  in  S&P's  AAA  grade  with  those  of  Moody's  there 
is  a  significant  difference  which  implies  that  an  AAA  from  S&P  is  better  than  a  Aaa 
from  Moody's.  The  authors  argue  that  this  result  is  important  as  it  validates  the  use  of 
the  available  historical  estimates  of  default  probabilities  by  rating  grade  in  studies  of 
split  ratings,  instead  of  the  grades  themselves. 
4.2  Bond  rating  prediction  models 
The  second  area  of  literature  reviewed  in  this  chapter  covers  bond  rating  prediction 
models.  For  at  least  40  years  studies  have  been  published  attempting  to  model 
agency  credit  ratings  using.  financial  ratios,  non-financial  data  and  sometimes, 
qualitative  information.  A  wide  range  of  different  methodologies  have  been  used 
which  have  evolved  and  become  more  sophisticated  over  time. 
4.2.1  Choice  of  methodology 
Table  4.2  shows  a  summary  of  studies  predicting  bond  ratings  along  with  the 
methodology  used,  important  independent  variables  and  data  samples.  Horrigan 
(1966)  performed  the  first  study  to  estimate  and  predict  bond  ratings  based  on 
financial  ratios  of  the  rated  company  and  characteristics  of  the  bond.  Since  this  time 
scores  of  studies  have  extended  his  initial  research  using  more  sophisticated  statistical 
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techniques  and  a  wider  range  of  accounting  and  non-accounting  variables.  Horrigan 
used  ordinary  least-squares  (OLS)  regression  on  9  grades  of  bond  ratings  with  various 
combinations  of  variables.  West  (1970)  and  Ang  and  Patel  (1975)  also  used  OLS 
analysis  to  predict  corporate  bond  ratings.  The  models  estimated  in  these  studies 
predicted  the  correct  credit  rating  in  the  holdout  sample  for  55%  of  cases  for  Horrigan 
(1966)  and  62%  for  West  (1970).  Ang  and  Patel  reran  the  same  models  on  credit 
rating  data  from  an  early  period  and  the  zero  notch  classification  accuracy  was  lower 
at  30.1  %  and  34.8%  for  Horrigan  and  West  models  respectively. 
One  problem  with  these  early  studies  was  that  the  regression  analysis  was  attempting 
to  code  the  ordinal  bond  ratings  onto  an  even  interval  scale  but  different  rating  grades 
do  not  fall  at  equal  intervals  on  a  scale  from  a  low  to  high  probability  of  default.  To  try 
to  overcome  this  problem  Pogue  and  Soldofsky  (1969)  used  only  two  of  four  rating 
categories  at  a  time  using  a0-I  dummy  dependent  variable  for  the  two  categories 
considered.  However  this  study  was  based  on  small  sample  sizes  of  10  bonds  in  each 
rating  category. 
Subsequent  research  used  multiple  discriminant  analysis  (MDA)  to  classify  bonds  into 
rating  classes.  With  MDA  a  series  of  functions  are  computed  to  maximise  the  ratio  of 
between-group  deviation  sum  of  squares  to  within-group  deviation  sum  of  squares. 
Since  MDA  concentrates  on  differences  between  categories  of  variables,  an  interval 
scale  is  not  imposed  on  the  data  but  neither  is  the  ordinal  nature  of  the  bond  ratings 
reflected.  MDA  classifies  the  bond  ratings  into  different  categories  but  ignores  the  fact 
that  these  categories  are  partitions  of  the  total  probability  of  default,  divided  at  different 
intervals  (see  Kaplan  and  Urwitz  1979).  The  other  disadvantage  of  MDA  is  that  it 
requires  multivariate  normality  for  the  independent  variables. 
Throughout  the  late  1970's  and  1980's  a  variety  of  studies  used  MDA  to  predict  bond 
ratings.  The  first  was  Pinches  and  Mingo  (1973,1975).  Other  examples  include 
Altman  and  Katz  (1974),  Baran  et  at  (1980),  Belkaoui  (1980),  Peavy  and  Edgar  (1983, 
1984),  Perry,  Henderson  and  Cronan  (1982).  On  average  these  models  correctly 
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Co Chapter  Four  Literature  review 
Kaplan  and  Urwitz  (1979)  predicted  bond  ratings  with  an  ordered  probit  method  (N- 
chotomous  probit)  with  a  specialisation  of  the  categorical  dependent  variable  to  the 
case  where  it  is  ordinal  in  nature  (see  McKelvey  and  Zavoina  1975).  This  avoided  the 
problem  of  the  OLS  method  which  assumed  an  interval  scale  of  the  dependent 
variable  and  MDA  which  assumes  a  nominal  scale.  Interestingly,  although  the  N-probit 
technique  is  theoretically  more  appropriate,  the  results  were  not  significantly  better 
than  using  OLS.  Reiter  and  Emery  (1991)  and  Iskandar-Datta  and  Emery  (1994) 
supported  this  finding.  Jackson  and  Boyd  (1988)  modelled  bond  rating  behaviour 
using  probit  analysis  and  Gentry,  Whitford  and  Newbold  (1988)  also  used  probit 
analysis  to  estimate  a  model  with  a  high  classification  accuracy  using  ratios  and  cash 
flow  components.  These  models  generally  classify  55%  to  65%  of  the  holdout  sample 
correctly. 
Ederington  (1985)  used  an  unordered  multinomial  logit  model  in  his  comparison  of 
bond  rating  models  comparing  this  to  each  of  the  statistical  methods  discussed  so  far. 
An  unordered  model  allows  the  relative  importance  of  different  independent  variables 
to  vary  across  rating  classifications  but  does  not  make  use  of  the  a  priori  knowledge 
that  bond  ratings  are  ordered.  Ederington  found  that  the  ordered  probit  and  unordered 
logit  outperformed  the  models  estimated  using  OLS  and  MDA.  The  logit  model 
performed  best  in  the  estimation  sample  where  70%  of  ratings  were  correctly 
classified,  on  average  probit  and  logit  analysis  correctly  classified  about  14%  more  of 
the  ratings  than  OLS  or  MDA.  Gentry,  Newbold  and  Whitford  (1985)  also  compared 
these  three  methods  in  the  analysis  of  bankrupt  firms  using  cash  flow  data. 
Other  examples  of  studies  using  logistic  regression  are  Poon  et  al  (1999)  and  Laruccia 
and  Revoltella  (2000).  Results  show  classification  accuracy  of  between  50%  -  70% 
depending  on  the  study,  data  sizes  and  independent  variables  used.  Back  et  al  (1996) 
compared  MDA,  logistic  regression  and  neural  networks  and  note  that  the  amount  of 
variables  included  in  the  model  varies  with  methodology  used  and  logit  consistently 
chose  the  smallest  number  of  variables  in  that  study.  Kamstra  et  al  (2001)  used  an 
ordered-logit  regression  combining  method.  This  combines  together  the  results  of 
several  different  forecasting  methods. 
In  the  late  1980s  the  first  bond  rating  studies  using  Neural  Networks  were  published. 
Neural  networks  are  algorithms  that  are  patterned  after  the  structure  of  the  human 
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brain.  They  contain  a  series  of  mathematical  equations  that  are  used  to  simulate 
biological  processes  such  as  learning  and  memory.  In  a  neural  network,  one  has  the 
same  goal  as  in  logistic  regression  modelling,  predicting  an  outcome  based  on  the 
values  of  some  predictor  variables.  However,  the  approach  used  in  developing  the 
model  is  quite  different. 
Artificial  neural  networks  were  first  developed  several  decades  ago  but  it  was  only  in 
the  late  1980s  with  the  rediscovery  of  the  back-propagation  training  algorithm  did 
widespread  interest  in  this  technique  develop  within  the  scientific  community.  Neural 
networks  have  the  ability  to  "learn"  mathematical  relationships  between  a  series  of 
input  (independent,  predictor)  variables  and  the  corresponding  output  (dependent, 
outcome)  variables.  This  is  achieved  by  "training"  the  network  with  a  training  (or 
derivation)  data  set  consisting  of  predictor  variables  and  the  known  or  associated 
outcomes.  Networks  are  programmed  to  adjust  their  internal  weights  based  on  the 
mathematical  relationships  identified  between  the  inputs  and  outputs  in  a  data  set. 
Once  a  network  has  been  trained,  it  can  be  used  for  pattern  recognition  or 
classification  tasks  in  a  separate  test  (or  validation)  data  set. 
Dutta  and  Shekhar  (1988)  used  financial  ratios  and  a  qualitative  measure  to  model 
bond  ratings  and  compared  results  using  a  neural  network  and  linear  regression 
model.  They  estimated  a  model  to  distinguish  between  two  groups  of  bonds;  AA  and 
non-AA.  This  study  differed  from  most  earlier  research  as  other  studies  usually 
predicted  a  wide  range  of  rating  categories.  The  neural  network  classified  more  correct 
bond  ratings  than  the  linear  regression  model.  In  addition,  whenever  the  neural 
network  model  misclassified  a  bond,  it  was  off  by  at  most  one  rating  class  whereas  the 
regression  model  was  often  off  by  several  rating  classes. 
Singleton  and  Surkan  (1990)  compared  the  performance  of  a  neural  network  using  7 
financial  ratios  with  an  MDA  model.  As  above,  the  neural  network  outperformed  the 
MDA  model.  Maher  and  Sen  (1997)  compared  the  results  of  a  neural  network  with 
ordinal  logistic  regression  and  also  found  that  the  neural  network  outperformed  the 
logistic  model.  Other  examples  of  studies  using  neural  networks  include  Moody  and 
Utans  (1995)  and  Daniels  and  Kamp  (1999).  Many  of  these  studies  show  that  neural 
networks  can  classify  60%  -  70%  of  the  observations  correctly.  Where  the  same  data 
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has  also  been  used  to  estimate  models  using  logistic  regression  the  results  range  from 
60%-62% 
These  studies  generally  show  that  using  neural  networks  gives  some  improvement  in 
classification  accuracy.  An  exception  to  this  result  is  Chaveesuk  et  al  (1997).  The 
authors  argue  that  of  the  available  statistical  approaches  logistic  regression  is  best 
suited  to  modelling  bond  ratings.  They  compared  results  using  a  neural  network  with 
logistic  regression  and  found  that  there  is  not  much  difference  between  the  best  neural 
network  design  and  the  best  logistic  regression  model.  As  with  Dutta  and  Shekhar 
(1988)  they  show  that  a  neural  network  performs  slightly  better  than  the  logistic 
regression  in  terms  of  correct  classification.  When  the  methods  misclassify  a  bond,  the 
logistic  regression  misses  by  more  classes  slightly  more  often  than  the  network. 
Some  detailed  analysis  of  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  of  neural  networks  has 
been  carried  out  in  other  fields  such  as  Tu  (1996).  The  advantages  of  neural  networks 
are  that  they  can  detect  complex  nonlinear  relationships  between  independent  and 
dependent  variables  and  they  have  the  ability  to  detect  interactions  or  inter 
relationships  between  all  of  the  input  variables  by  using  the  hidden  layer.  They  also 
can  be  developed  using  multiple  different  training  algorithms  such  as  back  propagation 
or  radial  basis  function. 
However  neural  networks  do  have  some  significant  disadvantages  as  well.  Neural 
networks  are  a  "black  box"  and  have  limited  ability  to  explicitly  identify  possible  causal 
relationships.  In  logistic  regression  it  is  possible  to  determine  which  variables  are 
most  strongly  predictive  of  an  outcome  and  through  a  stepwise  selection  process  it  is 
possible  to  eliminate  a  number  of  independent  variables  that  are  not  related  to  a 
particular  outcome.  Within  a  neural  network  it  is  not  possible  to  determine  which 
variables  are  the  most  important  contributors  and  a  model  may  contain  a  number  of 
unimportant  variables.  This  is  a  significant  problem  with  relation  to  the  use  of  the 
neural  network  within  banks  as  data  is  expensive  and  time  consuming  to  collect. 
Neural  networks  are  more  difficult  to  use  in  the  field  as  specialist  software  must  be 
purchased,  staff  need  to  be  trained  and  greater  hardware  resources  are  required.  In 
contrast,  the  estimates  for  a  logistic  regression  model  can  be  entered  into  a  standard 
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spreadsheet  and  applied  to  the  relevant  independent  variables  to  generate 
probabilities  that  are  easy  to  interpret. 
Overfitting  is  also  a  problem  with  neural  networks.  The  network  is  trained  using  a  set 
of  training  examples  which  will  be  used  to  predict  the  correct  output  for  validation  data 
set.  However,  especially  in  cases  where  learning  was  performed  too  long  or  where 
training  examples  are  limited,  the  network  may  adjust  to  very  specific  random  features 
of  the  training  data.  In  this  process  of  overfitting,  the  performance  on  the  training 
examples  still  increases  while  the  performance  on  unseen  data  becomes  worse. 
Finally  as  neural  networks  are  a  relatively  new  technique  there  are  still  some  important 
methodological  issues  to  be  resolved.  For  example,  credit  ratings  are  not  allocated 
evenly  between  the  different  rating  classes  and  neural  networks  are  limited  in  dealing 
with  the  ordinal  nature  of  bond  ratings  (Kim  2005). 
Other  methodologies  have  also  been  used  in  recent  years  to  predict  bond  ratings. 
Examples  are  variable  precision  rough  sets  model  (Griffiths  and  Beynon  2005),  case 
based  reasoning  supported  by  genetic  algorithms  (Shin  and  Han  1999),  support  vector 
machines  and  artificial  intelligence  (Kim  2005),  expert  systems  (Kim  and  Lee  1995) 
and  neurofuzzy  systems  (Piramuthu  1999). 
4.2.2  Studies  of  bank  credit  ratings 
Only  a  small  amount  of  the  research  shown  in  table  4.2  focuses  on  bank  ratings. 
Several  studies  look  specifically  at  Moody's  Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings  (BFSR). 
Poon  et  al  (1999)  use  logistic  regression  to  model  the  determinants  of  BFSR.  They 
find  that  a  model  including  Moody's  traditional  long  term  ratings  as  one  of  the 
independent  variables  performs  much  better  than  a  model  built  from  ratios  alone.  The 
long  term  rating  is  the  most  significant  input  into  the  model.  This  is  an  interesting 
finding  as  it  suggests  that  BFSRs  may  not  be  adding  very  much  information  over  and 
above  the  traditional  debt  rating.  Although  Moody's  claim  that  BFSRs  are  independent 
from  traditional  ratings  it  appears  that  factors  that  go  into  BFSRs  are  similar  to  the 
factors  that  underlie  debt  ratings.  Variamax  rotation  factor  analysis  was  used  to 
reduce  the  number  of  independent  variables  and  three  factors  were  identified  which 
represented  risk,  loan  provision  ratios  and  profitability. 
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Laruccia  and  Revoltella  (2000)  also  model  Moody's  BFSR  in  developing  economies  in 
the  Far  East,  South  America  and  Eastern  Europe.  They  compare  results  using  linear 
regression,  logistic  regression  and  a  neural  network  and  use  independent  variables 
representing  country  risk,  bank  efficiency,  assets  quality,  liquidity  and  capitalisation 
(for  more  detail  see  table  4.2).  The  linear  regression  model  explains  73.5%  of  the 
variance  of  the  dependent  variable  and  the  equivalent  figure  for  the  logistic  model  is 
71%.  The  R-square  statistic  for  the  neural  network  is  76.7%.  It  is  interesting  that  this 
study  does  find  a  country  risk  measure  to  be  highly  significant  in  the  models  while 
Poon  et  al  (1999)  do  not  find  that  a  county  risk  proxy  is  significant. 
Molinero  et  al  (1996)  modelled  S&P  short  term  bond  ratings  for  Spanish  banks.  Using 
a  multidimensional  scaling  technique  (chosen  because  of  the  small  sample  size  of  10 
banks)  they  found  that  both  accounting  ratios  (bad  debts  and  profitability)  and  the  type 
of  ownership  were  significant  in  determining  the  short  term  bank  ratings  in  Spain. 
To  the  author's  knowledge  no  studies  have  been  made  into  the  prediction  of  long  term 
bank  ratings.  These  are  the  main  focus  of  this  study. 
4.2.3  Selection  of  independent  variables 
Table  4.2  shows  a  summary  of  important  independent  variables  and  data  samples. 
The  independent  variables  used  in  the  different  studies  are  shown.  Where  a  large 
number  of  variables  were  used,  only  the  ones  that  were  significant  to  the  prediction  of 
the  ratings  are  shown. 
The  majority  of  studies  use  financial  ratios  and  values  from  the  income  statement  or 
balance  sheet  as  independent  variables  but  there  are  examples  of  research  using  non- 
accounting  data  such  as  market  values,  risk  measures,  forecast  values,  subordination 
status,  industry  or  country  classifications  and  subjective  aspects  such  as  company 
prospects.  Although  credit  ratings  agencies  do  take  qualitative  and  non-accounting 
information  into  consideration  when  rating  bonds  it  is  not  dear  that  the  inclusion  of 
non-accounting  independent  variables  in  bond  rating  models  significantly  improves  the 
results. 
The  financial  ratios  that  appear  the  most  frequently  in  these  studies  of  industrial  bond 
ratings  are:  size  (measured  by  total  assets  or  debt)  e.  g.  Horrigan  (1966),  Kaplan  and 
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Urwitz  (1979),  Ederington  (1985),  Maher  and  Sen  (1997).  Profitability  (often  measured 
as  net  income/total  assets)  e.  g.  Pogue  and  Soldofsky  (1969),  Pinches  and  Mingo 
(1973,1975),  Kaplan  and  Urwitz  (1979),  Ederington  (1985).  Gearing  (long  term 
debt/total  assets)  e.  g.  Pinches  and  Mingo  (1973,1975),  Kaplan  and  Urwitz  (1979), 
Ederington  (1985),  Maher  and  Sen  1997.  Interest  coverage  e.  g.  Altman  and  Katz 
(1974),  Pogue  and  Soldofsky  (1969),  Pinches  and  Mingo  (1973,1975),  Kaplan  and 
Urwitz  (1979),  Maher  and  Sen  (1997),  Daniels  and  Kamp  (1999). 
Table  4.2  also  shows  that  the  majority  of  the  studies  focus  on  industrial  data  for  the 
USA  and  that  ratings  from  Moody's  are  the  most  commonly  used.  The  average 
sample  size  for  most  of  the  studies  is  about  260  companies.  In  the  study  in  chapter 
ten  most  models  are  estimated  based  on  more  than  1,000  observations. 
4.2.3.1  Independent  variables  for  banks  analysis 
The  range  of  independent  variables  that  have  been  used  in  models  predicting  credit 
ratings  are  discussed  above.  In  the  majority  of  cases  the  data  used  for  this  research  is 
taken  from  samples  of  US  industrial  bonds.  The  independent  variables  selected  are 
suitable  for  industrial  companies  but  not  for  banks.  The  following  section  considers 
ratios  traditionally  used  in  the  analysis  of  banks. 
Cole  (1972)  introduced  a  procedure  for  evaluating  bank  performance  by  ratio  analysis 
which  he  adapted  from  the  DuPont  system  of  financial  analysis  (see  Foster  1986  and 
Reid  and  Myddelton  1992  for  summary  of  traditional  financial  analysis  and  Koch  and 
MacDonald  2000  for  bank  analysis).  The  starting  point  of  the  analysis  is  return  on 
equity  (ROE)  which  is  the  multiple  of  return  on  total  assets  (ROA)  and  total 
assets/shareholders  equity.  The  ROE  measures  the  return  on  the  shareholder's 
investment  while  the  ROA  measures  the  return  on  the  total  assets  invested  so  gives 
an  indication  of  the  effectiveness  of  management  to  generate  income  from  the  assets 
under  their  control. 
Return  on  Equity  Return  on  Assets  Equity  multiplier 
Net  income 
_ 
Net  income  x  Total  assets 
Shareholder's  equity  -  Total  assets  Shareholder's  equity 
Total  assetstshareholders  equity  (also  called  the  equity  multiplier)  breaks  down  the 
relationship  between  the  bank's  assets  and  equity.  The  difference  between  these  two 
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items  will  be  the  sum  of  deposits  and  debt,  as  total  assets  equals  total  liabilities  which 
is  made  up  of  deposits,  debt  and  shareholders'  equity.  A  bank  with  a  high  level  of 
deposits  and  debt  relative  to  equity  will  have  a  high  equity  multiplier  so  this  is  a  useful 
ratio  to  compare  a  bank's  financial  structure.  This  ratio  will  also  give  an  indication  of 
risk  as  a  high  level  of  deposits  and  debt  will  increase  the  bank's  risk  of  illiquidity  and 
insolvency. 
Figure  4.1:  Assessing  bank  profitability 
Interest  expense 
Total  assets 
Expense  ratio  Noninterest  expense  Total  expenses  Total  assets  Total  assets 
Provision  for  Joan  losses 
Total  assets 
Income  taxes 
Return  on  Assets  Total  assets 
Nct  income 
Total  assets 
Interest  income 
total  assets 
Asset  utilisation 
Total  revenue 
Total  assets  Noninterest  income 
Total  assets 
The  return  on  assets  can  be  broken  down  in  turn  into  the  expense  ratio  (total 
expenses/total  assets,  asset  utilisation  (total  revenue/total  assets)  and  income  tax/total 
assets.  On  the  expense  side,  the  expense  ratio  can  be  broken  down  to  analyse 
interest  expense,  noninterest  expense  and  loan  loss  provisions.  The  asset  utilisation 
can  be  split  into  interest  income  and  non-interest  income.  Each  of  these  ratios  is 
important  in  the  analysis  of  profitability,  asset  utilisation  and  expenses  and  are  found  in 
Standard  and  Poor's  list  of  bank  ratios  used  for  the  assessment  of  credit  ratings 
(Standard  and  Poor's  2004). 
Several  other  profitability  measures  are  commonly  used  by  bank  analysts.  The  net 
interest  margin  (net  interest  income/earning  assets)  is  a  summary  measure  of  the  net 
interest  returns  on  income-producing  assets.  The  Burden  ratio,  (noninterest  expense 
-  noninterest  income)/total  assets,  shows  the  proportion  of  net  noninterest  expenses 
that  are  covered  by  fees,  service  charges,  securities  gains  and  other  income  as  a 
percentage  of  total  assets.  A  low  ratio  is  favourable  as  this  indicates  a  low  level  of 
noninterest  expense  relative  to  income.  The  efficiency  ratio,  noninterest  expense/(net 
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interest  income  -  noninterest  income),  measures  the  bank's  ability  to  control 
noninterest  expense  relative  to  net  operating  income.  It  shows  how  much  a  bank  pays 
in  noninterest  expense  for  each  unit  of  operating  income,  a  smaller  ratio  indicates  a 
more  profitable  bank. 
Asset  quality  is  another  essential  part  of  the  bank  analysis  process.  Raters  are 
interested  in  the  values  of  loan  loss  provisions,  loan  loss  reserves,  non-performing 
loans  and  net  charge-offs  relative  to  loans.  Ratios  have  also  been  included  which 
indicate  a  bank's  leverage  and  liquidity.  Unfortunately  much  of  this  data  was  poorly 
populated  in  the  database  used  for  the  study  in  chapter  ten  but  the  ratio  for  which 
there  was  good  coverage  was  loan  loss  reserves/loans.  Some  studies  such  as  Poon 
et  al  (1999)  have  included  ratios  incorporating  risk weighted  assets.  It  was  found  that 
this  data  was  available  for  a  very  small  number  of  banks  and  was  not  used  in  this 
study.  Restricting  the  sample  to  those  banks  for  which  risk  weighted  assets  were 
available  in  the  database  would  have  biased  the  sample  to  large  and  predominantly 
US  banks. 
Poon  et  at.  (1999)  provide  a  detailed  list  of  100  financial  variables  and  ratios  used  in 
their  study  of  Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings.  Three  factors  were  identified  from  this 
list  after  using  varimax  rotation  factor  analysis  which  represented  dimensions  of  risk, 
loan  provision  ratios  and  profitability.  Molinero,  Gomez  and  Cinca  (1996)  identified  24 
financial  ratios  to  be  included  in  their  study  of  short  term  Spanish  bond  ratings.  Most  of 
these  ratios  are  also  included  in  the  study  in  chapter  ten  with  the  exception  of  ratios 
based  on  the  number  of  employees  or  number  of  bank  branches  as  that  data  was  not 
available.  The  full  list  of  independent  variables  used  in  the  bank  rating  prediction 
models  in  this  thesis  are  shown  in  Appendix  5. 
A  strongly  performing  bank  will  obtain  higher  yields  than  its  competitors  by  taking  on 
increased  risk  or  lowering  operating  costs.  Increased  risk  can  be  measured  in  terms 
of  greater  volatility  of  net  income  or  market  value.  Independent  variables  reflecting 
volatility  of  earnings  and  variability  of  net  income/total  assets  were  used  by  West 
(1970)  and  Pogue  and  Soldofsky  (1969)  respectively.  Kaplan  and  Urwitz  (1979) 
included  two  measures  of  earnings  instability  in  their  research.  They  used  a 
systematic  risk  measure,  the  market  beta,  to  reflect  the  covariation  of  a  firm's  earnings 
with  a  market-wide  index  of  earnings  and  an  unsystematic  risk  measure  to  reflect  firm- 
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specific  random  phenomena.  Equivalent  measures  of  earnings  instability  have  not 
been  included  in  chapter  ten  as  the  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  review  the  importance  of 
financial  values  in  the  determination  of  bank  credit  ratings. 
4.3  Summary 
This  chapter  has  provided  an  extensive  literature  review  in  two  areas;  split  credit 
ratings  and  bond  rating  prediction  models. 
Previous  research  in  the  area  of  split  credit  ratings  has  established  that  the  rating 
scales  of  different  agencies  appear  to  differ  with  some  agencies  consistently  rating 
issuers  higher  than  others.  The  results  are  reasonably  consistent  between  different 
studies.  Agencies  also  appear  to  be  more  generous  on  issuers  from  their  home 
country  and  differences  arise  between  the  ratings  of  issuers  from  different  countries 
and  industries. 
Much  of  the  research  into  split  ratings  dates  from  the  1990s  so  this  thesis  updates 
earlier  findings  with  an  extensive  data  sample  including  over  51,000  split  rating 
observations.  It  also  looks  in  detail  at  ten  different  rating  agencies  rather  than  focusing 
on  ratings  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch. 
Modelling  bond  ratings  from  financial  ratios  and  other  variables  is  an  area  that  has 
attracted  numerous  studies  during  the  last  forty  years.  The  literature  review  analysed 
many  of  these  different  studies  in  detail  and  showed  how  the  methodologies  used 
have  become  more  complex  over  time  as  researchers  strived  to  achieve  higher 
classification  accuracy  for  corporate  bond  prediction.  The  study  in  chapter  ten  uses 
ordinal  logistic  regression  analysis  to  model  bank  bond  ratings.  The  number  of  studies 
which  have  covered  bank  ratings  is  small  compared  to  industrial  bonds  and  very  little 
work  has  been  performed  in  the  area  of  long  term  bank  bond  ratings. 
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Data  used  for  the  analysis  of  split  credit  ratings  and  bank 
credit  rating  models 
The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  to  describe  the  data  used  in  the  studies  which  are 
presented  in  the  following  chapters.  Chapters  six  to  nine  present  the  results  of 
research  looking  at  the  level  of  agreement  between  credit  rating  agencies  and  split 
credit  ratings.  The  results  of  a  study  modelling  bank  credit  ratings  are  presented  in 
chapter  ten. 
Three  different  databases  were  brought  together  in  order  to  provide  the  necessary 
data  for  these  studies; 
"  Credit  ratings  data  from  Financial  Times  Credit  Ratings  International  (FT-CRI) 
"  Fitch  Individual  Bank  ratings  from  Fitch  Ratings 
9  Bank  financial  accounting  data  from  Fitch  Ratings 
Credit  rating  data  used  for  the  split  credit  ratings  study  will  be  discussed  first,  followed 
by  the  bank  accounting  and  credit  rating  data  used  to  model  bank  credit  ratings. 
5.1  Credit  rating  data  from  Financial  Times  Credit  Ratings  International 
The  data  used  in  these  studies  was  kindly  provided  by  Financial  Times  Information 
from  the  Financial  Times  Credit  Ratings  International  (FT-CRI)  database  and  covers 
the  period  from  May  1999  to  March  2004  (Dale  and  Thomas  1999  -  2004).  This 
database  contains  over  15,000  credit  ratings  assigned  to  long-term  senior  unsecured 
or  senior  subordinated  debt  by  major  credit  rating  agencies.  These  ratings  are 
representative  of  the  issuer  rating  and  this  study  is  not  attempting  to  compare  the 
ratings  of  individual  bonds. 
Credit  ratings  for  companies  and  institutions  from  37  different  industries  are 
represented  in  the  data.  These  range  from  banks  and  financial  institutions  to 
sovereigns  and  industrial  companies.  Issuers  from  132  countries  are  included  in  the 
database.  The  database  compares  credit  ratings  from  ten  different  rating  agencies, 
seven  live  and  three  dead  agencies. 
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Table  5.1:  Credit  rating  agencies  included  in  the  FT-CRI  database 
Agency  name  Abbreviation  used 
throughout  this  study 
Live  ä  encies 
Capital  Intelligence___- 
------- 
CI 
-------  Dominion  Bond  Rating  Service  DBRS 
Fitch  Ratings  Fitch 
Japan  Credit  Rating  Agency_ 
__  __ 
JCR 
Moody's  Investors  Service  __  Moody's 
Rating  &  Investment  Information  R&I 
Standard  &  Poor's  S&P 
Moodv's  Bank  Financial  Strenath  BFSR 
Ratings 
Dead  agencies 
Canadian  Bond-Rating  Service  CBRS 
Duff  &  Phelps  D&P 
Thomson  BankWatch  TBW 
The  scope  of  the  FT-CRI  database  allows  this  study  to  be  the  largest  of  its  type 
undertaken  to  date.  It  uses  a  total  of  51,342  matched  pairs  of  agency  ratings.  This 
compares  to  5,284  matched  pairs  from  12  agencies  studied  by  Beattie  and  Searle 
(1992a),  2,217  matched  pairs  from  the  four  main  agencies  by  Cantor  and  Packer 
(1995)  and  1,766  from  Moody's  and  Standard  &  Poor  by  Jewell  and  Livingston  (1999). 
The  data  sample  covers  the  period  May  1999  to  March  2004.  This  data  contains  the 
issuer  name,  industry,  country,  agency  providing  a  rating,  the  initial  rating  in  1999  and 
any  subsequent  changes.  New  issuer  credit  ratings  and  changes  in  existing  ratings 
are  updated  in  the  database  on  a  monthly  basis.  All  database  changes  in  a  given 
month  relate  to  changes  made  by  the  agencies  in  the  previous  month,  e.  g.  all  changes 
recorded  in  the  database  during  May  are  to  bring  it  up  to  date  as  of  the  end  of  April. 
The  FT  CRI  database  does  not  include  Fitch  Individual  Bank  ratings.  These  were 
kindly  supplied  by  Fitch  Ratings  in  electronic  format. 
5.1.2  Rating  definitions  used  by  different  agencies 
All  agencies  have  a  system  of  letter  grades  to  represent  an  opinion  on  the  future  ability 
and  legal  obligation  of  an  issuer  to  make  timely  payment  of  principal  and  interest.  The 
definitions  of  rating  grades  and  the  letter  scales  that  are  used  to  represent  these 
grades  are  different  for  each  agency.  In  some  cases  the  differences  are  very  striking, 
for  example,  the  letter  scale  used  by  Moody's  is  different  to  that  used  by  all  other 
agencies.  In  other  cases,  such  as  Fitch  and  S&P,  the  letter  scales  appear  to  be 
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identical  but  there  are  more  subtle  differences  in  the  definition  of  each  category  once 
you  read  the  descriptions.  Full  rating  definitions  for  all  the  agencies  used  in  this  study 
are  included  in  Appendix  1. 
Investment  grade  rating  definitions  used  by  different  rating  agencies  are  remarkably 
similar  but  there  are  more  discrepancies  for  sub-investment  grade  debt.  For  example, 
Fitch  describes  the  rating  CCC  as  "high  default  risk.  Default  is  a  real  possibility".  JCR 
describes  the  same  rating  as  "there  are  factors  of  uncertainly  ....  and  a  possibility  of 
default.  "  Moody's  definition  is  "obligations  of  poor  standing.  Such  issues  may  be  in 
default...  ".  S&P's  definition  is  "a  currently  identifiable  vulnerability  to  default...  In  the 
event  of  adverse  business,  financial  or  economic  conditions,  it  is  not  likely  to  have  the 
capacity  to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal.  "  Although  S&P's  definition  effectively 
captures  the  flavour  of  the  CCC  rating,  in  that  the  issuer  is  unlikely  to  survive  an 
economic  downturn,  there  are  different  emphasises  in  each  of  the  definitions  that 
could  result  in  different  internal  interpretations  and  allocation  of  ratings. 
5.1.3  Mapping  agency  ratings  to  a  common  scale 
In  order  to  compare  the  ratings  of  one  agency  with  another  it  is  critical  to  be  able  to 
map  the  ratings  of  different  agencies  onto  a  common  scale.  In  this  study  a  number  of 
maps  are  used.  These  are  all  referred  to  as  rating  correspondences. 
5.1.3.1  Investment/sub-investment  grade  correspondence 
The  most  straightforward  way  to  map  agency  ratings  would  be  to  divide  ratings 
between  those  that  are  investment  grade  and  those  that  are  sub-investment  grade.  All 
agencies  have  a  clear  cut-off  between  these  grades.  This  map  is  referred  to  as 
investment/sub-investment  grade  correspondence.  Although  this  map  avoids  the 
problem  of  mapping  detailed  ratings  to  a  common  scale  it  ignores  a  huge  amount  of 
the  richness  available  within  the  database.  The  percentage  of  investment  grade  and 
sub-investment  grade  ratings  in  the  database  is  64%  and  36%  respectively. 
94 Chapter  Ave  Data  for  split  ratings  and  rating  models 
Table  5.2:  Investment/sub-investment  grade  correspondence 




JCR--  R&I 
'Investment  All  ratings  BBB-  and  above 
grade 
Sub-  All  ratings  BB+_  All 
investment  and  below  ratings 




All  ratings  BB+  and  below 
5.1.3.2  Letter  grade  correspondence 
Moody's  -S&P  T  TBW 
All  All  ratings 
ratings  BBB-  and 
Baa3  above 
and 
above 
All  __  All  ratings  from 
ratings  BB+  and 
from  Bat  below 
and 
below 
Another  method  of  mapping  agency  ratings  would  be  to  compare  agencies  at  the  level 
of  a  letter  grade  but  ignoring  the  +  or  -  suffixes.  This  is  called  the  'letter  grade 
correspondence'. 
Table  5.3:  Letter  grade  correspondence 
CBRS  .  CI  DBRS  D&P  Fitch 
Inve  stment  grade 
A  AÄ  -I  MA  A-  -V  -AAA  AAA 
_2 
AA  l  AA  AA  AA  AA 
3  -  -  A  -1A  A-  Ä  --  - 
4  BBB  ?  BBB  BBB  BBB  BBB 
Bub 
-investm-  -  ant  gra  -  ---  de  --  --  --  --- 
5  ý  BB  4LBB  BB  BB  BB 
6  6  1B  -  B  B  B 
7  --  -  CC  CCC  CCC  CCC 
8  DFD  CC/C/D  CC/DD  CC/C% 
.!  - 
DDD/DD/D-- 
5.1.3.3  11-notch  correspondence 
JCR  R&I  Moody's-'-S&P--  TBW 
-----  AAA  -  AAA  ----------  Aaa  -------------  --  AAA  --------  AAA 
AA-  Aa  AA  -  AA 
BBB  BBB  Baa  ----  -  BBB  BBB 
CCC  CCC  Caa  CCC  CCC 
CC/C/D  CC/C  Ca/C  CC/C/D  CC/C/D 
The  FT-CRI  database  compiles  ratings  and  generates  an  average  quarterly  rating  for 
each  issuer  called  the  FT  Composite  index.  To  do  this  the  editors  map  all  ratings  onto 
a  numerical  scale  of  one  to  ten  and  include  all  sub-investment  grade  ratings  in  a  single 
"speculative"  category.  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992a  and  1992b)  used  the  same  scale  in 
their  study  to  allow  comparison  of  ratings  in  order  to  assess  the  number  of  split  ratings. 
The  way  in  which  investment  grade  ratings  are  compared  between  agencies  has 
become  reasonably  accepted  and  the  rating  correspondence  set  out  below  is  used  in 
many  studies.  Tabakis  and  Vinci  (2002)  refer  to  this  way  of  mapping  ratings  as  "a  well 
established  and  agreed  upon  equivalence  between  rating  grades  of  different 
assessment  institutions.  " 
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Table  5.4:  11-notch  correspondence 
--  ----  --  - 
CBRS  CI  DBRS  TDBP  -  Fit  --ch-  JCR  -  R81-  -r  Moody's  '  S&P  '-TBW 
--  --  --  I  ---  ----  --  AAA  -  --  -----  AAA  --  -----  AAA  -  --  -  AAA  -----  --  --  AAA  --  -  --  --  AAA  -  ----  ------  AAA  ---  Aaa-  AAA-  AAA 
2  AA+-  -  --  AA+--  AA  H  -AA+  -AA+  AA+  -AA+  Aal  -  AA+-  -  A+ 
3  --  Al  ---  --  AA  ---  --  Al  ----  AA  -AA  ---  -AA  --  ---  AA  Aa2  AA  AA 
4 
-- 
AA-  AA-  AA  L  A-  AA------  AA-  --AA----  AA-  AA-  Aa3  AA-  AA- 
-  --  --  5  ----  A+  -  A+  -  -A  H  --  --  A+  ----  A+  --  ---  A+  --  --  A+  -  Al  A+  -  A+ 
6 
- 
A  A  A  A  A  A  A  A2  A  A 
7  --  A-  A-  AL  A-  A-  A-  A-  A3  A-  A- 
8 
-  - 
BBB+  BBB+  BBBH  -  --BBB+  BBB+  BBB+  -'  -BBB+  Baal  BBB+  BBB+ 
9  --  BBB  BBB  -  -BBB--  -  -BBB  -  BBB  -  BBB  BBB  -  --Baa2----  BBB  BBB 
10  BBB-  --  -  -BBB----  --BBB-  ---  --BBBL  BBB-  BBB-  BBB-  Baa3  BBB-  BBB- 
11  Sub-  All  ratings  from  All  All  ratings  from  BB+  and  below  All  All  ratings 
investment  BB+  and  below  ratings  ratings  from  B  B+  and 
grade  from  from  Bat  below 
BBH  and 
and  below 
below 
The  difference  between  two  adjacent  grades  such  as  AA  and  AA-  or  BBB+  and  BBB  is 
referred  to  as  a  'notch'. 
5.1.3.4  20-notch  correspondence 
In  table  5.4  all  issuers  rated  below  BBB-  have  been  mapped  into  one  category  called  a 
'sub-investment  grade'.  As  noted  above,  the  rating  definitions  of  sub-investment  grade 
debt  given  by  different  agencies  vary  more  widely  than  those  for  investment  grade 
ratings.  Ignoring  categories  of  sub-investment  ratings  has  the  advantage  of  reducing 
the  number  of  split  ratings  caused  by  this  wider  range  of  definitions.  The  distribution  of 
ratings  across  the  sub-investment  grades  was  reviewed  to  determine  whether  certain 
ratings  are  used  infrequently  and  can  be  combined  to  avoid  very  small  sample  sizes  at 
certain  rating  levels. 
As  the  ratings  CC/C  and  D  have  few  observations,  relative  to  the  average  for  sub- 
investment  grades,  they  are  combined  to  form  one  group.  Also  Moody's  does  not 
disclose  aD  grade,  the  equivalent  is  CC  or  C  so  it  is  useful  to  combine  this  group  so 
that  Moody's  and  S&P  ratings  can  still  be  compared  in  a  meaningful  way.  The 
resulting  '20-notch  correspondence'  is  shown  in  table  5.5.  The  use  of  this  scale  adds 
to  existing  literature  which  does  not  discuss  matched  pairs  of  sub-investment  grade 
issuers  in  detail. 
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Table  5.5:  20-notch  correspondence 
CBRS  CI  DBRS  D&P  Fitch  JCR  R&I  Mood  's  S&P  TBW 
1  ý  j  AAA  --AAA  -  AAA  AAA  AAA  ----  AA  -AAA----  -AAA-  AAA  Aaa  AAA  AAA 
-2  ± 
AA+  AA+  AA  H  AA+  AA+  AA+  AA+  Aa  1  AA+  AA+ 
ý3  AA  AA  -  ---  --  AA  --  --  AA  -  ---  ----  --------  AA  ---  --  --  AA  _  AA  Aa2  AA  AA 
-------  _  4  AA-  ----  AA-  ---------  AA  L  ---------  AA-  --  ------  AA-  --  --------  AA-  ---  ------  AA-  --  -  --------  Aa3  -----  --------  AA-  ---  ---  AA- 
5  r  1  A+  A+  AH  A+  A+  A+  A+  Al  A+  A+ 
_  _ L6  -------  A  ---------- A  -------  A  -  -  ---  A  -  -  --------- A  -----  -  A  -  -----  A  --  -  --  --------  --  A2  --  --  ----  -  A  A 
17  _  A-  _  A-  _  AL  _  A-  A-  A-  A-  A3  A-  A- 
8  BBB+  BBB+  BBBH  BBB+  BBB+  BBB+  BBB+  Baal  BBB+  BBB+ 
L9  BBB  --  -BBB  ---  -BBB  -  -  BBB  --BBB  _  BB-----  -  BBB  ---  --------  Baal  -  BBB  ---  _BBB_____ 
10  +  BBB-  BBB-  -  -BBB-  BBBL 
- 
BBB-  BBB-  BBB-  Baa3  BBB-  BBB- 
11  BB+  BB+  BB  H  BB+  BB+  BB+  BB+  Ba1  BB+  BB+ 
X12-}  -BB------  -gg  --  -  -gg-  --  --  -BB  ---  -g6  ------  -  gg  -  --  -gg  ---  --Ba2------  . -gg-  -----  -  gg  --- 
L13  BB-  BB-  BB  L  BB-  BB-  BB-  BB-  Ba3  BB-  BB- 
'14  _  B+  T  B+  BH  B+  B+  B+  B+  B1  B+  B+ 
15  B  B  B  B  B  B-  B  --------  62  --  -  B  --  ---  -  B 
6  --  ----  -  -  ---  --  - 
1T  C+  -  ----  -CCC+  -  --CCC+  -  -CCC+  Caä1------- 
- 
-CCC+ 
--  --  ---  ----  18  C  C  CCC  CCC  CCC  CCC  _  CCC  Caa2  CCC  C  CCC 
19  ------  --  -----  C  ---  CCC-  --  --  --  Caa3  -  ---  CCC-  --  --  - 
1I20T  D  D  CC/C/D  CC/DD  CC/C/  CC/C/D  CC/C  Ca/C  CC/C/D  CC/C/D 
-  -  - 
DDD/DD 
5.1.3.5  Watch  grade  correspondence 
A  more  detailed  rating  correspondence  could  potentially  be  used  to  incorporate  the 
watch  grades.  Watch  grades  provide  valuable  information  about  the  expected 
direction  of  the  agency's  next  rating  change.  A'u'  stands  for  'up'  so  the  next  change  is 
expected  to  be  an  improvement.  An  'e'  stands  for  emerging,  this  means  that  the 
agency  is  not  saying  which  way  the  rating  will  change  but  it  is  anticipated  that  there  will 
be  a  change  either  up  or  down.  A  'd'  watch  stands  for  down  so  these  ratings  can  be 
expected  to  fall.  This  rating  correspondence  is  very  detailed  and  has  been  included  in 
Appendix  2. 
5.1.3.6  Basel  II  correspondence 
For  Basel  II,  it  is  useful  to  understand  how  many  split  ratings  will  arise  under  the  risk 
weight  categories  specified  in  the  New  Basel  Capital  Accord.  A  correspondence 
based  on  these  risk  weights  has  been  designed  for  this  study.  This  allocates  risk 
weights  as  follows: 
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Table  5.6:  Basel  II  correspondence 
Corporates  Banks  Sovereigns 
-----------  ---  AAA  to  AA-  -  ---  ----  20%  --20%-  --  -  ------  20%  ---  --  -  ----  -----  0% 
A+  to  A-  50%  50%  20% 
BBB+  to  BBB-  100%  50%  50% 
BB+  to  BB-  100%  100%  100%  -- 
-  B+  to  B-  150%  ----  100%  ---  ---  ------------  ---  ---  100% 
C+  and  below  150%  150%  150% 
Unrated  100%  50%  100% 
Split  ratings  arise  where  the  ratings  given  to  an  issuer  by  different  agencies  do  not  fall 
into  the  same  category  and  would  be  given  a  different  risk  weight  under  the  Basel  II 
proposals. 
In  summary,  the  matched  pairs  of  agency  ratings  can  be  compared  based  on  the 
common  scales  of. 
(1)  Investment  grade/sub-investment  grade  correspondence 
(2)  Letter  grade  correspondence 
(3)  An  11-notch  correspondence 
(4) A  20-notch  correspondence 
(5)  A  watch  grade  correspondence 
(6)  Basel  II  correspondence 
5.1.4  Bank  credit  ratings 
The  individual  bank  ratings  provided  by  Moody's  and  Fitch  have  separate  rating  scales 
that  are  shown  in  detail  in  Appendix  1.  These  ratings  have  been  mapped  to  the  rating 
scales  of  the  long  term  credit  ratings  as  shown  in  Appendix  2. 
There  are  shortcomings  involved  in  mapping  long  term  or  individual  ratings  to  a 
common  scale.  Research  performed  by  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992),  Cantor  and  Packer 
(1997)  and  Tabakis  and  Vinci  (2002)  has  shown  that  rating  scales  of  different  agencies 
are  not  equivalent.  It  may  be  more  useful  to  map  the  scales  of  individual  agencies  to 
their  respective  probabilities  of  default  if  they  are  available.  Detailed  Statistics  for 
cumulative  average  default  rates  are  available  for  Moody's,  Standard  &  Poors  and 
Fitch  at  a  notch  level.  For  R&I  and  JCR  this  information  is  available  at  the  letter  grade 
level. 
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5.1.4.1  Correspondence  used  for  modelling  bank  ratings 
Chapter  ten  gives  details  of  a  study  modelling  bank  credit  ratings.  The  credit  rating  is 
the  dependent  variable  in  this  study  and  four  categories  of  ratings  were  chosen.  Table 
5.7  shows  the  mapping  of  agency  ratings  to  the  one  to  four  numeric  scale  used  for  this 
study.  The  table  includes  Moody's,  S&P,  Moody's  BFSR  and  Fitch  individual  ratings. 
Table  5.7:  Credit  ratings  categories  used  in  chapter  ten  models 
rDependent  Moody's  long  S&P  long  term  rating  Moody's  Fitch 
variable  term  rating  (and  all  other  BFSR  Individual 
agencies)  rating 
1  Aaa,  Aa1,  AAA,  AA+,  AA,  AA-  A,  A-  A,  A/B 
Aa2,  Aa3 
2  Al,  A2,  A3 
-  --- 
A+_,  A,  A- 
-----  Baal,  Baa2,  3  BBB+,  BBB,  BBB- 
Baa3 
i4  Sub-  Sub-investment 
investment  grade 
L-  ----grade  - 
B+,  B,  B-  B,  B/C 
C+,  C,  C-  C,  C/D 
Sub-  Sub- 
investment  investment 
___grade  ____  ____grade_______ 
Previous  studies  which  have  built  models  to  predict  bond  ratings  use  a  range  of 
categories  of  dependent  variables  from  four  to  ten  different  rating  categories.  Many 
studies  use  six  different  categories.  A  smaller  number  of  categories  were  used  in  this 
sample  because  the  data  sample  relates  to  banks  rather  than  industrial  companies 
and  these  ratings  incorporate  a  support  element  which  does  not  apply  to  industrial 
companies.  A  crucial  part  of  the  rater's  assessment  of  a  bank  consists  in  considering 
whether,  and  in  what  circumstances,  a  bank  in  trouble  would  be  rescued  and  by 
whom.  This  is  referred  to  as  the  support  element.  Consequently  bank  ratings  are 
more  difficult  to  model  accurately  than  industrial  ratings  and  a  smaller number  of  rating 
categories  were  modelled. 
5.1.5  Calculation  of  matched  pairs  of  agency  ratings 
To  assess  the  level  of  agreement  between  agencies,  the  credit  ratings  of  all  issuers 
rated  by  more  than  one  agency  must  be  compared.  For  example,  BAE  Systems  plc  is 
rated  by  Moody's,  Standard  and  Poor  (S&P)  and  Fitch.  Table  5.8  shows  the  credit 
rating  information  for  this  company  taken  from  the  FT-CRI  database. 
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Table  5.8:  Credit  rating  information  for  BAE  Systems  plc 
Agency  Ratings  Date  change  recorded  in  database 
Moody's 
_ 
A3  (-A) 
_ 
November  1999 
_  Moody's  A2  (-A)__ 
-December 
1999 
Moody's  A2  (-A)  January_2003 
S&P  A-  November  1999 
S&P  A  _  December  1999 
-  ---  -  ----  -  -  --  S&P  A-  -----  --  September  2002 
S&P  A-  Janua  2003 
Fitch  A-  November  1999 
Fitch  A-  February  2003 
Using  the  example  in  table  5.8,  at  the  end  of  February  2003  there  were  three  matched 
pairs  of  ratings: 
Table  5.9:  Matched  pairs  of  credit  ratings  for  BAE  Systems  plc:  February  2003 
--------  --  --  ----  Date  --  Agency  1  Agency  2  --  Rating  I  -  Rating  2  Difference 
February  2003  Moody's  _  S&P  A2  (-A  )_ 
__  _ 
A-_ 
_ 
One  notch 
February  2003_ 
_Moody's 
Fitch_  A2_(-A  )_ 
_ 
A-  One  notch 
_  _  February  2003 





Two  of  these  ratings  are  one  notch  apart  and  one  is  the  same. 
The  data  across  the  whole  available  history  is  now  considered  to  show  the  following 
matched  pairs: 
Table  5.10:  Matched  pairs  of  credit  ratings  for  BAE  Systems  plc:  Nov  1999  - 
March  2003 
LDäte  Agency  1 
Nov  1999 
_  k  Moody's 
Nov  1999  Moody's 
Nov  1999  S&P 
[Dec  1999 
D  19 
S&P_ 
_  Mo  d  '  ec  99  o  y  s 
____  1  Dec  1999  Moody's 
Sept  2002  L  _  S&P 
__  Sept  2002  ~S&P-- 
VI 
an2003  S&P 
_  an  2003  S&P 
Jan  2003----- 
- 
Moody's 
Jan  2003_ 
_ 
Moody's 
-  Feb  2003  Fitch  j  Feb  2003  Fitch 
Agency  2  -  Rating  1  Rating  2  -Difference 
---  -  ---  --  -- 
_ 
S&P  -  ---  ---  ------  A3  (-A-  )  ---------  -  ---  A-  -----  -----  --  ---  None 
Fitch  _  A31  -A7)_  __  A=  _  None 
-  -  Fitch  --  -  A-  _  A-  None 
Fitch  A  A-  One  notch 
S&P  A2  (-A)--- 
-  -A 
None 
_  Fitch  A2  A  A-  One  notch 
Moody's  A-  One  notch 
Fitch  __  A-  A-  _  None 
Moody's 
- 
A-  One  notch- 
Fitch Fitch  A-  A-  None 
-  S&P  A2  One  notch 
Fitch  _  A2  (-Aý  A-  One  notch- 
-  S&P  A-  A-  None 
--  ----  -  - 
-- 
Moody'  ----------- 
----A=- 
------  -------  --  --  One  notch 
I  Using  the  mapping  of  agency  ratings  shown  in  Appendix  2,  an  A3  in  Moody'  credit  rating  scale  is 
equivalent  to  an  A-  in  S&P  and  Fitch's  scale  and  an  A2  is  equivalent  to  an  A  in  S&P  and  Fitch's  scale. 
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In  this  example  for  BAE  Systems  plc  there  are  14  matched  pairs,  7  agree  and  7 
disagree  by  one  notch. 
If  watch  grades  are  appended  to  the  credit  ratings  the  process  of  comparing  pairs  of 
agency  ratings  would  be  exactly  the  same  but  would  be  more  complex  with  a  higher 
chance  of  split  ratings. 
5.1.6  Treatment  of  dates  on  which  ratings  are  updated  In  the  FT-CRI  database 
If  an  agency  has  made  several  rate  changes  in  one  month,  sometimes  all  the  changes 
may  be  recorded  in  the  FT-CRI  database  individually  but  at  other  times  they  may  be 
combined  into  just  one  change.  For  example,  if  in  June  2002  S&P  changed  a  rating 
from  AAA  to  AA+  and  then  to  AA,  both  changes  may  be  recorded  in  the  database  but  it 
is  also  possible  that  just  the  final  rating  of  AA  was  recorded.  The  month  end  ratings 
are'  always  correct  (as  determined  by  the  rating  with  the  latest  monthly  date  on  the 
database)  but  the  detail  of  movements  may  or  may  not  be  included.  If  the  full  detail  of 
multiple  changes  that  took  place  within  a  month  by  one  agency  were  included  in  data, 
this  would  introduce  bias  as  additional  matched  pairs  would  be  generated  in  some 
instances  but  not  in  others.  For  the  purposes  of  this  study  the  credit  rating  AA+,  in  the 
example  above,  would  have  been  deleted  and  only  the  move  from  AAA  to  AA 
considered  in  the  analysis  of  matched  pairs. 
From  time  to  time  an  issue  is  deleted  from  the  database.  Where  the  database  gives  a 
date  of  deletion  this  issue  is  excluded  from  the  sample  of  matched  pairs.  Sometimes 
an  issue  may  be  deleted  in  one  month  and  reinstated  a  few  months  later,  when  new 
debt  is  issued.  In  this  case  the  issue  would  not  be  included  in  any  matched  pairs 
during  the  period  between  its  deletion  and  reinstatement. 
5.1.7  Industry  and  country  categorisations 
The  FT-CRI  categorises  issuers  into  one  of  37  industry  categories.  These  were 
allocated  into  13  broader  categories  for  the  purpose  of  this  study.  Where  possible, 
these  categories  were  based  on  S&P's  groupings  as  disclosed  in  Standard  and  Poor's 
(2002a). 
Banks 
9  Finance  and  real  estate 
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"  Automotive  and  manufacturing 
"  Consumer 
"  Energy 
"  Forestry  and  building 
"  Technology  and  computers 
"  Leisure 
"  Transport 
"  Utilities 
"  Sovereigns 
"  Healthcare 
"  Insurance 
Several  other  studies  have  broken  down  split  ratings  by  industry.  The  banking 
industry  has  been  studied  by  Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  and  Morgan  (1997,2002). 
Beattie  and  Searle  (1992)  focused  on  a  wider  range  of  industries  and  split  the  FT-CRI 
categorisations  into  9  groups.  These  were  sovereigns,  banks  finance,  (including 
insurance  and  real  estate),  energy,  utilities,  transport  and  storage,  consumer 
goods/services,  capital  goods  and  basic  industries.  The  impact  of  the  industry  in 
which  an  issuer  operates  on  the  level  of  split  ratings  is  explored  in  detail  in  chapter 
seven. 
The  FT  CRI  contains  data  for  131  countries.  As  the  coverage  in  some  of  these 
countries  is  very  small,  the  data  was  split  into  nine  country  groups.  These  are: 
"  UK 
"  Europe 
"  USA 
"  Canada 
"  Japan 
"  Far  East 
"  South  America 
"  Middle  East  and  other 
"  Supranationals 
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The  Supranational  group  only  contains  104  matched  pairs  (the  next  smallest  country 
group  contains  2,762  matched  pairs)  so  this  group  is  included  within  Middle  East  and 
other  for  most  of  the  studies  performed.  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992b)  also  studied  the 
impact  of  geographic  sector  on  fixed  ratings. 
5.1.8  Software  designed  to  Interrogate  the  database 
Computer  software  was  used  to  integrate  the  FT-CRI  database  and  generate  matched 
pairs  as  illustrated  in  table  5.10  above.  The  software  allows  a  wide  range  of 
comparisons  to  be  made,  for  example: 
5.1.8.1  Comparing  all  matched  pairs  of  ratings  between  all  agencies 
The  software  allows  comparison  of  all  matched  pairs  of  ratings  for  all  agency  pairs  in 
comparison  with  each  other  on  an  overall  basis.  A  specific  time  period  can  be  chosen, 
such  as  the  most  recent  ratings  only  or  the  whole  period  of  the  database.  The  same 
analysis  is  possible  with  only  specified  agencies.  Industries  and  countries  can  also  be 
specified  to  restrict  the  analysis.  This  functionality  is  used  to  assess  the  overall  level 
of  inter-rater  agreement  (chapter  five)  and  industry  and  geographic  characteristics 
(chapter  seven). 
5.1.8.2  Comparing  matched  pairs  between  specified  agency's 
It  is  possible  to  compare  a  reference  agency  with  one  or  more  target  agencies.  For 
example  matched  pairs  can  be  calculated  between  Moody's  and  S&P  or  Moody's  and 
both  S&P  and  Fitch  etc.  where  Moody's  is  the  reference  agency  and  S&P  and  Fitch 
the  target  agencies. 
The  software  shows  the  number  or  percentage  consensus  between  the  agencies  for 
all  pairs  chosen  (e.  g.  Moody's  vs.  S&P  and  Moody's  vs.  Fitch)  as  well  as  the  count  and 
breakdown  of  the  level  of  split  ratings.  The  level  of  split  ratings  is  analysed  according 
to  the  correspondence  being  used,  for  example  if  a  letter  grade  correspondence  is 
used  the  split  ratings  would  be  shown  in  terms  of  the  size  of  the  difference  between 
ratings  in  terms  of  letter  grades.  The  combined  results  from  comparison  of  the 
agencies  are  also  show  in  an  overall  column.  This  analysis  is  used  in  the  second  part 
of  chapter  five  where  the  matched  pairs  from  individual  credit  rating  agencies  are 
compared. 
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This  comparison  can  also  be  broken  down  to  review  all  industry  or  country  groups  or 
individual  industries  or  countries  can  be  chosen  for  detailed  analysis  as  appropriate.  A 
breakdown  of  these  results  can  also  be  made  by  rating  category  so  the  relative 
consensus  and  split  ratings  at  each  rating  grade  can  be  analysed. 
5.1.8.3  Changes  in  matched  pairs  between  specified  agencies  over  time 
The  software  allows  the  results  of  the  comparison  of  matched  pairs  between  specific 
agencies  to  be  broken  down  over  specified  time  periods  so  that  the  movement  in  split 
ratings  over  time  can  be  observed.  This  is  used  wherever  an  analysis  is  performed  of 
changes  in  rating  consensus  over  the  period  of  the  database,  i.  e.  between  May  1999 
and  March  2004. 
5.1.8.4  Analysis  of  the  Basle  risk  weight  that  would  be  attributed  by  the  least 
and  most  generous  rating  agency 
The  findings  of  the  next  four  chapters  show  that  there  is  an  approximate  ranking  of 
credit  rating  agencies  due  to  differences  in  the  rating  scales  used  by  each  agency. 
These  differences  are  shown  to  be  statistically  significant.  Using  these  findings,  and 
refining  them  for  industry  and  geographic  sectors,  a  detailed  ranking  of  agencies  was 
generated  in  terms  of  those  that  are,  on  average,  the  most  generous  through  to  those 
that  are  the  least  generous. 
Using  these  findings  the  software  estimates  the  Basel  risk  weight  that  would  be 
attributed  to  the  issuer  if  the  credit  rating  of  the  most  and  least  generous  agency  was 
used  under  the  standardised  approach.  Only  issuers  rated  by  all  the  selected 
agencies  are  compared.  The  average  risk  weights  are  presented  by  industry  and 
sector.  This  functionality  is  used  in  chapter  nine. 
5.1.8.5  Correlation  matrix 
Correlation  co-efficient  can  be  calculated  for  any  combination  of  agency  pairs.  This 
functionality  is  used  in  chapter  five. 
5.1.8.6  The  distribution  of  ratings  grades  for  each  agency 
This  shows  the  distribution  of  rating  grades  for  each  of  the  agencies  selected  and 
allows  an  analysis  of  the  quality  of  the  issuers  rated  by  each  agency.  The  overall 
104 Chapter  Five  Data  for  split  ratings  and  rating  models 
column  combines  the  results  for  each  individual  agency  selected  and  summarises  the 
combined  results. 
5.1.8.7  Analysis  of  issuers  rated  by  more  than  one  agency 
A  body  of  the  literature  examines  the  issue  of  "window  shopping"  by  issuers  and  asks 
whether  issuers  choose  a  buy  a  rating  from  a  third  agency  (i.  e.  Fitch)  so  that  they  can 
obtain  a  better  rating  grade.  The  principle  is  based  on  that  fact  that  US  issuers  will  be 
rated  by  Moody's  and  S&P  automatically  if  they  are  listed  by  the  SEC.  Issuers  may 
also  choose  to  request  a  third  rating  from  Fitch  or  another  agency  but  only  pay  for  this 
rating  if  it  is  an  improvement  on  those  of  Moody's  and  S&P.  In  other  words  there  will 
be  a  selection  bias  as  only  the  higher  Fitch  ratings  will  be  purchased  and  enter  the 
public  domain.  Previous  work  by  Cantor  and  Packer  (1996  and  1997)  looks  into  this 
theory  in  detail  but  finds  no  evidence  for  window  shopping  by  issuers. 
The  software  allows  issuers  rated  by  specified  agencies  to  be  analysed.  The  rating 
level  for  these  jointly  rated  issuers  is  of  particular  interest  so  that  analysis  can  be 
performed  around  the  investment  grade/sub-investment  grade  cut-off  point.  For 
example  if  an  analysis  is  performed  for  Moody',  S&P  and  Fitch  the  software  will  show 
the  distribution  of  rating  grades  for  issuers  rated  by  all  three  agencies  for  each  of  the 
three  agencies.  This  would  show  whether  the  rating  grades  issued  by  Fitch,  for  the 
same  group  of  issuers,  are  higher  than  those  of  Moody's  and  S&P. 
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5.2  Database  biases  and  errors 
"The  presence  of  erroneous  data  can  destroy  a  research  effort  and  seriously 
damage  the  management  decisions  based  upon  research.  "  Rosenberg  and 
Houglet  (1974). 
Rosenberg  and  Houglet  conclude  in  their  study  of  CRSP  and  Compustat  data  that  it  is 
"difficult  to  escape  the  conclusion  that  data  error  will  be  a  problem  in  all  the  large 
databases  in  the  social  sciences  and,  in  particular,  in  the  several  large  machine 
readable  repositories  of  economic  and  financial  data.  " 
Although  nearly  30  years  has  passed  since  this  study  and  many  more  databases  are 
available  to  researchers,  there  is  still  a  risk  that  errors  in  the  data  contained  within 
large  databases  go  undetected  and  invalidate  research. 
To  check  the  accuracy  of  the  FT  CRI  data,  one  daily  electronic  feed  from  Fitch  was 
compared  to  the  database.  Unfortunately  the  two  database  are  not  truly  independent 
as  the  FT  CRI  data  ultimately  comes  from  the  same  source  as  the  electronic  feed  with 
which  it  was  being  compared.  However,  the  FT-CRI  is  not  fed  from  this  particular 
electronic  Fitch  feed  but  it  is  updated  manually  from  a  paper  copy  report  provided  by 
Fitch.  This  means  that  checking  against  an  electronic  Fitch  feed  was  a  good  way  to 
ensure  that  the  data  used  in  this  study  does  not  contain  a  large  number  of  errors  that 
could  invalidate  the  results. 
The  daily  Fitch  feed  contains  2,900  issuers  in  a  separate  issuer  file  (separate  to  the 
issues  file  which  contains  ratings  for  about  45,000  individual  issues).  It  was  taken  for 
30/4/2001  as  this  date  fell  in  the  middle  of  the  period  covered  by  the  FT  CRI  database 
used  in  this  study.  If  a  Fitch  feed  file  was  chosen  from  the  end  of  the  period  there 
would  be  a  risk  that  updates  would  not  yet  have  been  processed  and  a  large  number 
of  unexplained  differences  would  arise. 
Of  the  2,900  issuers  in  the  Fitch  feed,  only  1,949  contained  ratings  data  (i.  e.  951 
contained  blank  fields  and  were  ignored).  1,863  of  these  were  matched  with  names  in 
the  FT  CRI  database  and  86  (4%)  had  no  name  match.  Of  the  matched  names,  199 
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did  not  have  ratings  for  Fitch,  they  matched  with  the  FT-CRI  database  because  it 
contains  ratings  for  those  named  issuers  for  Moody's,  S&P  or another  agency. 
Checking  the  FT  CRI  database  for  issuers  not  contained  in  the  daily  Fitch  feed 
revealed  429  companies  in  FT  CRI  but  not  in  the  Fitch  feed.  A  random  sample  of  82  of 
these  429  companies  was  checked  to  understand  why  they  are  in  the  FT-CRI 
database  but  not  in  the  daily  Fitch  feed.  18  (21%)  has  either  been  missed  in  the 
matching  process  and  had  not  been  matched.  Name  matching  between  different 
rating  databases  is  not  straightforward.  Problems  are  caused  by  differences  in 
punctuation,  common  synonyms  such  as  'corp',  'co',  'comp',  'ltd'  etc.  and  qualifiers 
such  as  local,  forex  or  deposit. 
50  issuers  (62%  of  the  random  sample)  were  not  found  in  the  FT-CRI  database  up  to 
or  including  the  date  of  the  Fitch  feed  file  (31/4/2001)  so  it  was  concluded  that  they 
had  not  been  rated  at  that  time.  5  issuers  (6%)  had  ratings  in  FT-CRI  prior  to  the 
Fitch  feed  but  none  at  or  after  30/4/2001  so  it  appears  that  these  issuers  should  have 
been  deleted  from  the  FT-CRI. 
9  unmatched  issuers  (11%)  appeared  to  be  more  ambiguous.  There  were  ratings  in 
the  FT  CRI  both  before  and  after  30/4/2001  but  nothing  in  the  Fitch  feed.  The  possible 
explanations  for  this  are  that  the  ratings  should  have  been  deleted  from  the  FT-CRI  as 
they  were  no  longer  current.  Alternatively  they  may  have  been  missing  from  the  Fitch 
feed. 
In  summary,  valid  explanations  were  found  for  83%  of  the  sample  of  ratings  in  the  FT 
CRI  but  not  in  the  Fitch  feed,  other  problems  seem  likely  to  have  been  caused  by 
problems  in  the  Fitch  feed,  rather  than  the  FT-CRI  database. 
For  the  remaining  1,669  issues  that  match  with  the  FT  CRI  and  for  which  there  is 
credit  rating  data  available  for  Fitch,  the  issues  were  compared  to  check  that  the  credit 
ratings  are  consistent,  i.  e.  the  FT  CRI  has  been  updated  correctly.  The  FT  CRI  rating 
current  one  month  after  the  date  of  the  Fitch  feed  (May  2001)  was  used  for  the 
comparison.  This  was  because  updates  are  entered  into  the  FT-CRI  database 
approximately  one  month  after  they  are  issued  by  the  rating  agency. 
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Using  the  20-notch  correspondence,  95%  of  the  ratings  match  exactly.  In  other 
words,  at  the  end  of  May  2001  1,252  FT-CRI  ratings  matched  those  taken  from  the 
Fitch  feed  for  April  30.  Of  these  that  did  not  match,  36  (70%)  were  no  more  than  one 
notch  apart. 
The  time  taken  to  update  ratings  was  also  checked  by  comparison  to  the  date  at  which 
the  FT  CRI  ratings  were  changed  to  align  with  the  matched  ratings  from  the  Fitch  feed. 
The  majority  of  ratings  were  updated  within  4  weeks  which  is  consistent  with  our 
understanding  of  this  database. 
This  analysis  shows  that  in  general  the  consensus  between  the  FT  CRI  database  and 
a  daily  feed  from  Fitch  is  very  high.  This  gives  confidence  that  there  are  no  major 
errors  in  the  database  that  would  invalidate  the  results  of  this  study. 
5.3  Bank  financial  data 
Accounting  data  was  kindly  provided  by  Fitch  Ratings  for  the  years  1999  -  2003  for 
approximately  14,500  banks2.  Financial  information  is  collected  by  Fitch  Ratings  from 
the  annual  report  and  accounts  at  a  high  level  of  detail.  The  same  data  is  used  to 
generate  the  Bankscope  database  by  Bureau  Van  Dijk.  The  data  was  provided  in 
country  specific  templates  and  in  an  'as  reported'  format  so  that  the  data  closely 
resembled  the  original  annual  report  and  accounts. 
For  36  countries  the  country  specific  templates  were  mapped  into  a  standardised 
template.  The  full  list  of  countries  for  which  bank  financial  information  was  available  is 
included  in  Appendix  3  and  the  standardised  template  into  which  the  data  was  mapped 
is  shown  in  Appendix  4.  Standardisation  of  the  data  was  essential  as  the  raw  data  was 
very  rich  in  detail.  This  would  have  made  meaningful  comparison  between  the  banks 
from  different  regions  very  difficult  and  comparison  of  equivalent  ratios  would  not  have 
been  possible.  A  validation  system  of  cross  checks  was  designed  to  ensure  that  the 
mapped  data  summed  correctly  to  total  assets,  total  liabilities,  profit  before  tax  and  net 
income  as  disclosed  in  the  original  data.  Every  effort  was  taken  to  ensure  the 
accuracy  of  the  database  in  the  knowledge  that  erroneous  data  would  invalidate  the 
findings  (see  Rosenberg  and  Houglet  1974). 
2  The  author  is  very  grateful  to  the  London  office  of  Fitch  Ratings  for  providing  bank  financial  data  and 
individual  credit  ratings,  especially  Robin  Munro-Davies  and  David  Andrews. 
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Values  from  the  template  shown  in  Appendix  4  were  mapped  into  ratios  and  absolute 
values  to  be  used  as  independent  variables  in  the  credit  rating  models.  The  full  list  of 
ratios  and  variables  used  is  shown  in  Appendix  5.  Where  absolute  values  were  used, 
foreign  currencies  were  translated  into  sterling  at  the  rate  in  force  at  31.12.02.  One 
rate  was  used  to  avoid  distortions  from  foreign  currency  movements.  Standardised 
profit  and  loss  account,  asset  and  liability  data  (cash  flow  information  was  not 
available)  was  collected  for  10,273  companies  for  the  periods  1999  -  2003  (not  all 
periods  are  available  for  all  companies).  Missing  values  were  removed  from  the 
database  to  provide  a  total  sample  of  8,901  banks  for  which  complete  accounting  data 
was  available. 
5.4  Matching  accounting  and  credit  rating  data 
5.4.1  Long  term  credit  ratings 
Long  term  credit  ratings  were  provided  by  Financial  Times  Interactive  Data's  quarterly 
publication,  FT  Credit  Ratings  International.  Exactly  the  same  database  is  used  for  the 
study  of  inter-rater  agreement  and  split  credit  ratings. 
The  banks  rated  by  the  rating  agencies  for  which  data  is  available  from  FT  CRI  were 
matched  to  the  database  of  accounting  data.  After  the  combination  of  credit  rating  and 
accounting  data  the  final  data  samples  were  as  follows: 
Table  5.11:  Sample  sizes  of  matched  bank  financial  and  credit  rating  data  for 
long  term  ratings 
IFAgency 
i 
Live  agencies 
Moody's  Investor  Ser  vice 
Standard  and  Poops 
Rating  Group 
The  Fitch  Group 
____  Dominion  Bond  Rating 
Service  Ltd 
Capital  Intelligence  Ltd 
Japan  Credit  Rating 
Agency  Ltd 
Rating  and  Investment 
Information__ 
Dead  agencies_ 
Canadian  Bond  Rating 
Service 
Total  number  of  Total  number  of 
banks  financial  periods* 
---  --------  ------------------  ---  ----  1,159  3,165 
1,001-  -  -2,556  -  -- 
1,000  2,652 
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rDuff  and  Phelps  Credit  T  207  384 
`Rating  Co 
Thomson  Financial  565  1101 
Ba_nkWatchInc 
` This  is  the  total  number  of  observations,  one  bank  may  have  financial  data  for  up  to  5  years  so  it  would  be 
included  from  one  to  five  times  in  the  sample  depending  on  the  accounting  and  credit  rating  data  available. 
5.4.2  Individual  bank  ratings 
Individual  bank  ratings  from  Moody's  (Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings)  and  from  Fitch 
Ratings  were  also  matched  to  the  accounting  data  as  above.  Sample  sizes  were  as 
follows: 
Table  5.12:  Sample  sizes  of  matched  bank  financial  and  credit  rating  data  for 
bank  individual  ratings 
Cömbinätion  of  agencies  -Total  number  of  Total  number  of 
_  ' 
banks 
_  -  ----  - 
financial  periods* 
_  -  --  ---  ---  Moody  s  Bank  Financial  1,167  2,944  LStrength 
Ratings_ 
---  -  -------  L  Fitch  Individual  Ratings  914  2428 
_  _  ___  Moody's  BFSR  and  Fitch  ___  _  -  --  1,281  _  ----  -------  -  3,660 
Individual  Ratings 
__  __  _  *  This  is  the  total  number  of  observa  tions,  one  bank  may  have  financial  data  for  up  to  5  years  so  it  would  be 
included  from  one  to  five  times  in  the  sample  depending  on  the  accounting  and  credit  rating  data  available. 
5.5  Summary 
This  chapter  has  described  the  different  databases  used  for  the  studies  that  are 
presented  in  the  following  chapters.  Credit  ratings  data  is  taken  from  Financial  Times 
Credit  Ratings  International  (FT  CRI),  Fitch  Individual  bank  ratings  and  bank  financial 
accounting  data  were  supplied  by  Fitch  Ratings. 
As  this  study  compares  the  ratings  of  a  number  of  different  rating  agencies  it  is 
necessary  to  map  ratings  to  a  common  scale  for  comparison  purposes.  The  full  range 
of  credit  ratings  and  alternative  rating  correspondences  is  discussed  in  this  chapter. 
Sophisticated  software  has  been  designed  for  and  used  in  this  study  to  allow  a 
detailed  analysis  of  split  credit  ratings.  The  functionality  of  this  software  is  outlined  in 
this  chapter.  The  problems  of  database  biases  and  errors  are  also  considered  and  the 
database  is  tested  for  significant  errors. 
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The  process  of  standardising  the  detailed  bank  fundamental  data  provided  by  Fitch 
Ratings  is  explained  as  is  the  matching  of  accounting  and  credit  rating  data  for  use  in 
modelling  bank  credit  ratings. Chapter  Six  The  level  of  inter-rater  agreement 
The  level  of  inter-rater  agreement 
This  chapter  considers  the  level  of  agreement  and  split  ratings  between  different  credit 
rating  agencies  when  they  rate  the  same  issuer.  It  looks  at  tendencies  for  particular 
agencies  to  agree  or  disagree  over  ratings  and  considers  whether  these  trends 
change  over  time.  Finally,  the  distribution  of  the  level  of  credit  ratings  assigned  by 
different  agencies  is  considered  and  split  ratings  are  compared  for  investment  and 
sub-investment  grade  ratings. 
The  findings  of  previous  studies  into  split  ratings,  especially  Beattie  and  Searle 
(1992a)  and  Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  are  revisited.  This  study  adds  to  previous 
research  by  using  updated  data,  a  larger  sample  size  and  data  for  a  four  year  period. 
In  addition,  previous  studies  did  not  investigate  splits  between  the  sub-investment 
grade  ratings  in  detail. 
6.1  Overall  level  of  inter-rater  agreement 
The  overall  level  of  inter-rater  agreement  can  be  found  by  comparing  matched  pairs  of 
agency  ratings  across  the  available  history  of  the  FT  CRI  database.  Table  6.1  shows 
the  overall  level  of  agreement  and  disagreement  for  May  1999  -  March  2004.  The 
final  column  reproduces  the  results  of  the  same  study  performed  by  Beattie  and  Searle 
in  1992,  based  on  FT-CRI  data  from  1990. 
Table  6.1:  Overall  levels  of  rating  agreement  and  split  ratings  between 
agencies  (based  on  the  11-notch  correspondence) 
FT-CRI  database 
All  periods 
May  1999  - 
March  2004 
FT-CRI 
database 
6  months 




6  months 




6  months 
ending  Dec 
1999 
Beattie  and 
Searle  results 
(1992) 
FT-CRI  1990 
Numbers  of 
matched  pairs  26,568  (51.7%)  8,327  (51.5%)  7,971  (52%)  7,362  (48.1%)  2,315  (44%) 
Agreement  - 
rating  at 
same  notch 
One  notch  15,786  (30.7%)  5,066  (31.3%)  4,719  (30.8%)  5,117  (32.6%)  1,905(36%) 
apart 
Two  notches  5,500  (10.7%)  1,753  (10.8%)  1,634  (10.7%)  1,711  (11.6%)  746(14%) 
apart 
Three  2,137  (4.2%)  610(3.8%)  598(3.9%)  685(4.6%)  228(4%) 
notches  apart 
Four  notches  818  (1.6%)  249(1.5%)  251  (1.6%)  266  (1.9%)  90  (2%) 
apart 
Five  or  more  533  (1.0%)  168  (1%)  163(1.1%)  186(l.  2%)  Not  reported 
notches  apart 
Sample  size  51,342  16,173  15,336  15,327  5,284 
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In  total  there  are  51,342  matched  pairs  of  credit  ratings  over  the  whole  period.  Using 
the  11-notch  correspondence,  51.7%  of  the  matched  pairs  agree  completely,  30.7% 
disagree  by  one  notch  and  10.7%  by  two  notches,  as  shown  in  table  6.1. 
Overall  consensus  has  increased  since  1990  from  44%  to  51.5%  in  the  latest  period. 
There  is  a  corresponding  fall  in  split  ratings,  especially  one  and  two  notches  apart.  The 
number  of  differences  of  three  or  more  notches  is  relatively  small  and  has  remained  at 
similar  levels  across  the  whole  period.  However,  only  half  of  all  pairs  of  credit  ratings 
actually  agree  to  within  a  notch.  For  the  period  May  1999  to  March  2004  credit  rating 
agencies  appear  to  assign  different  ratings  to  the  same  issuer  approximately  half  of 
the  time. 
A  review  of  the  results  for  the  6  months  ended  31/12/99,31/12/01  and  31/12/02  shows 
the  same  trends  as  discussed  above.  Overall  consensus  has  increased  above  the 
1990  level  and  one  and  two  notch  differences  have  reduced.  On  average  ratings  that 
were  split  by  one  or  two  notches  in  1990  tend  to  show  more  consensus  over  time. 
As  you  would  expect,  there  is  a  higher  level  of  consensus  when  comparing  ratings  by 
the  letter  grade  correspondence,  rather  than  the  11-notch  correspondence  used  in 
table  6.1.  Table  6.2  shows  that  63.2%  of  credit  ratings  agree  to  within  one  letter 
grade.  Only  3.3%  of  matched  pairs  differ  by  two  or  more  letter  grades. 
Table  6.2:  Overall  levels  of  rating  agreement  and  split  ratings  between 
agencies 
FT-CRI  database  -all  periods  Letter-grade  %  20-notch  %  Watch  grades 
Agreement  -  rating  at  same 
notch/letter  grade  or  "score"  63.2  32.9  31.5 
One  apart  32.9  38.7  11.2 
Two  apart  3.3  16.1  7.5 
Three  apart  0.5  6.9  24.9 
Four  apart  0.1  2.8  3.2 
Five  apart  1.3  3.0 
Six  apart  0.6  8.7 
Seven  apart  0.3  1.2 
Eight  apart  0.2  1.2 
Nine  apart  0.1  3.3 
Ten  apart  0.1  4.3 
1  See  Chapter  five  for  detailed  descriptions  of  'rating  correspondences'. 
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As  the  20-notch  correspondence  is  considerably  more  detailed  than  the  11-notch  the 
level  of  consensus  has  dropped  to  32.9%.  The  comparable  figure  was  51.7%  on  the 
11-notch  scale.  The  difference  of  18.8%  (a fall  of  57%)  between  the  11-notch  and  20- 
notch  correspondence  is  entirely  due  to  the  lack  of  consensus  between  sub- 
investment  grades  as  this  is  the  only  difference  between  these  scales.  The  watch 
grade  correspondence  is  extremely  detailed  as  it  takes  into  account,  not  only  the  '+' 
and  -'  identifiers  but  also  the  watch  grades,  u,  d,  and  e.  31.5%  of  ratings  agree  to  the 
same  watch  grade,  the  peaks  at  three  and  six  notch  differences  arise  because  many 
ratings  do  not  have  a  watch  grade  so,  on  this  scale,  they  would  frequently  be  three 
notches  apart.  The  distribution  of  ratings  is  examined  later  in  this  chapter  to  see  if 
there  is  relatively  more  agreement  between  investment  grade  ratings  than  there  is 
between  sub-investment  grade  ratings. 
6.2  Comparison  of  matched  pairs  from  individual  credit  rating  agencies 
So  far,  the  results  discussed  in  this  chapter  have  been  shown  on  an  overall  basis  and 
matched  pairs  between  each  of  the  different  agencies  have  not  been  compared.  This 
section  will  consider  which  rating  agencies  show  the  most  and  least  consensus, 
whether  these  results  are  consistent  over  time  and  if  the  mean  differences  between 
the  agencies  are  statistically  significant. 
6.2.1  Which  rating  agencies  show  the  most  and  least  consensus? 
To  assess  the  level  of  agreement  between  each  of  the  rating  agencies,  matched  pairs 
for  each  pair  of  agencies  were  compared.  The  mean  difference  between  each  pair  of 
agencies  was  calculated  and  tested  for  significance.  If  the  agency  ratings  are  the 
same  the  mean  level  of  split  ratings  between  two  agencies  will  not  be  significantly 
different  from  zero. 
Table  6.3  shows  the  results  of  this  comparison.  The  pairs  of  agencies  shown  in  table 
6.3  are  listed  in  order  of  consensus  with  the  highest  level  of  agreement  at  the  top  of 
the  table.  As  noted  in  the  literature  review,  the  high  level  of  agreement  between 
Moody's  and  S&P  has  been  well  documented  in  other  studies.  This  study  shows  that 
S&P  and  Moody's  agree  60%  of  the  time  out  of  a  sample  of  22,752  matched  pairs. 
Beattie  and  Searle  (1992a)  found  that  the  level  of  consensus  between  Moody's  and 
S&P  was  64%  out  of  a  sample  of  1,398  matched  pairs. 
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Where  the  mean  is  positive  this  indicates  that  the  average  rating  for  agency  2  is  higher 
than  for  agency  1.  If  the  mean  is  negative  then  the  mean  rating  of  agency  1  is  higher 
than  agency  2.  Table  6.3  shows  that  S&P  tends  to  rate  a  little  higher  than  Moody's, 
this  finding  is  consistent  and  highly  statistically  significant.  On  average,  S&P  rates 
0.07  of  a  notch  higher  than  Moody's.  This  result  is  very  similar  to  a  mean  difference 
identified  by  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992a)  of  0.06  of  a  notch  and  they  also  found  that 
S&P  rates  a  little  higher  than  Moody's  on  average. 
Table  6.3:  Consensus  between  pairs  of  agencies  (11-notch  correspondence) 
Consensus  Matched  Mean  Standard  Correlation 
Agency  l  Agency  2  %  pairs  difference  deviation  coefficient 
Fitch  D&P  67.5  797  0.12*'  0.84  0.961 
S&P  Cl  63.7  292  -0.06  0.89  0.909 
Cl  D&P  63.3  30  0.13  0.92  0.928 
Fitch  TBW  61.5  620  0.2**  0.82  0.980 
DBRS  D&P  61.1  36  0.14  0.82  0.983 
Moody  S&P  60.0  22752  0.07**  1.04  0.940 
Moody  Cl  57.4  479  -0.46*'  1.25  0.841 
Cl  TBW  55.5  128  0.39**  1.19  0.827 
Fitch  Cl  55.0  569  -0.10  1.46  0.687 
S&P  Fitch  51.8  5630  0.31**  1.02  0.936 
TBW  D&P  51.4  175  -0.37**  1.06  0.963 
Moody  Fitch  50.3  5837  0.21**  1.16  0.921 
S&P  DBRS  49.6  977  0.29**  0.97  0.945 
S&P  D&P  48.9  1812  0.42**  1.06  0.933 
R&I  D&P  48.8  43  -0.72**  0.92  0.977 
Moody  TBW  48.3  631  0.5**  1.26  0.934 
Fitch  DBRS  46.3  203  -0.13  0.97  0.898 
Moody  DBRS  46.0  790  0.25**  0.99  0.946 
Moody  D&P  44.5  1695  0.55**  1.13  0.919 
CBRS  D&P  43.9  41  -0.88*  1.61  0.904 
Cl  JCR  41.9  43  1.09**  1.05  0.883 
R&I  JCR  41.8  1188  0.68**  1.03  0.932 
CBRS  DBRS  39.8  623  -0.61**  1.28  0.895 
JCR  TBW  39.1  46  -1.11'*  1.09  0.965 
JCR  D&P  38.5  26  -0.96**  0.94  0.968 
R&I  TBW  38.2  89  -0.67**  1.13  0.959 
S&P  TBW  38.2  519  0.76**  1.21  0.942 
S&P  CBRS  34.9  504  0.83**  1.43  0.871 
Moody  CBRS  32.1  396  0.81**  1.39  0.899 
Fitch  JCR  32.0  197  1.34**  1.43  0.912 
Fitch  R&I  31.4  325  0.92**  1.22  0.909 
Fitch  CBRS  26.4  53  0.92**  1.43  0.792 
S&P  JCR  26.2  416  1.9**  1.86  0.895 
Cl  R&I  25.5  51  1.35**  1.22  0.886 
S&P  R&I  24.4  745  1.72**  1.57  0.900 
Moody  R&I  19.2  1593  1.78**  1.69  0.844 
DBRS  R&I  16.7  30  1.37**  1.30  0.879 
Moody  JCR  12.3  913  2.62**  1.88  0.778 
a  Results  for  pairs  of  agencies  with  less  than  25  observations  were  excluded  from  the  results. 
*  significant  at  0.05  level  (two  tailed  test),  '*  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (two  tailed  test) 
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Fitch  and  D&P  is  another  pair  of  agencies  that  show  a  consistently  high  level  of 
agreement.  The  overall  level  of  agreement  is  67.5%  out  of  797  matched  pairs.  On 
average  D&P  rates  higher  than  Fitch  by  0.12  of  a  notch.  Beattie  and  Searle  1992a 
also  found  that  D&P  rates  a  little  higher  than  Fitch  on  average  but  found  a  lower  mean 
and  consensus  of  0.03  notches  and  43%  respectively.  Fitch  acquired  D&P  in  June 
2000,  it  was  excluded  from  the  database  from  15/8/2000. 
Table  6.4:  Summary  of  relationship  between  pairs  of  agencies 
Agency  2 
Moody  S&P  Fitch  DBRS  Cl  JCR  R&I  D&P  CBRS  TBW 
Moody  -  <11%  <11%  </1%  >11%  <11%  <11%  <11%  <11%  <11% 
S&P  -  <11%  </1%  _  </1%  <11%  </1%  <11%  </1% 
Fitch  -  <11%  </1%  <11%  </1%  </1% 
"-  DBRS  -  No  data  No  data  <11%  =  <  11%  No  data 
Cl  -  <11%  <11%  =  No  data  <11% 
ö,  JCR  -  >11%  >11%  No  data  >/I% 
a  R&I  -  >11%  No  data  >11% 
D&P  -  </5%  <11% 
CBRS  -  No  data 
TBW  - 
<  Mean  rating  of  agency  I  is  less  than  agency  2 
>  Mean  rating  of  agency  2  is  less  than  agency  1 
1%  Statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level  (two  tailed  test) 
5%  Statistically  significant  at  the  5%  level  (two  tailed  test) 
=  No  statistically  significant  difference  between  the  means  of  the  agencies 
No  data  Less  than  25  observations  for  this  pair  of  agencies 
Table  6.4  summarises  the  relationship  between  the  mean  ratings  of  the  pairs  of 
agencies  and  shows  the  results  of  significance  testing.  The  table  effectively  shows  a 
rank  of  the  mean  difference  between  pairs  of  agency  ratings  starting  with  Moody's  as 
the  least  generous  agency  and  showing  the  Japanese  agencies  as  the  most  generous. 
84%  of  the  matched  pairs  have  means  that  are  significantly  different  from  one  another 
at  the  1%  level.  One  pair  is  significantly  different  at  the  5%  level  (D&P  and  CBDR) 
and  a  further  five  pairs  show  no  significant  difference  between  means. 
The  null  hypothesis  could  not  be  rejected  for  five  pairs  of  agencies:  Fitch  and  Cl,  S&P 
and  Cl,  Fitch  and  DBRS,  DBRS  and  D&P  and  Cl  and  D&P.  This  finding  is  generally 
consistent  with  Beattie  and  Searle  1992a  as  they  found  that  in  17  out  of  25  cases 
there  was  a  significant  difference  between  the  means  at  a  1%  level.  None  of  the  five 
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pairs  identified  above  were  included  in  their  study.  Pairs  which  showed  no  significant 
difference  between  means  in  Beattie  and  Searle's  study,  and  are  also  included  in  my 
study,  were  Fitch  and  D&P,  Moody's  and  DBRS,  S&P  and  DBRS. 
Particular  pairs  of  credit  rating  agencies  show  the  lowest  level  of  consensus,  this  holds 
true  whether  the  comparisons  are  made  using  data  from  the  whole  database  or  for 
specific  six  month  periods  between  May  1999  -  March  2003.  These  are: 
"  Moody's  and  JCR 
"  S&P  and  JCR 
"  Moody's  and  R&I 
"  S&P  and  R&I 
Table  6.5:  Mean  differences  in  notches  between  Moody's,  S&P,  JCR  and  R&I 
Agencies  6  months  to  Dec  1999 
-  mean  difference 
notches 
6  months  to  Dec 
2001  -  mean 
difference  (notches) 
6  months  to  Dec 
2002  -  mean 
difference  notches 
11-notch  20-notch  11-notch  20-notch  11-notch  20-notch 
Mood  's  &  JCR  2.79"  3.25"  2.56"  3.00"  2.41"  2.83" 
S&P  &  JCR  1.77"  2.02"  1.76"  1.94"  1.84"  2.06** 
Mood  's  &  R&I  2.00"  2.32"  1.84"  2.10"  1.63"  1.97" 
S&P  &  R&I  1.7"  1.87"  1.55"  1.64"  1.45"  1.68" 
**  significant  at  the  0.01  level  (two  tailed  test) 
These  four  pairs  of  agencies  consistently  show  the  lowest  levels  of  overall  consensus 
of  any  combinations  of  rating  agencies.  Moody's  and  JCR  shows  the  lowest  level  of 
consensus  for  all  periods;  there  is  an  average  difference  of  2.6  notches  using  the  11 
notch  correspondences  and  3  notches  using  the  20  notch  correspondence. 
The  literature  covering  Japanese  rating  agencies  finds  that,  on  average,  they  rate 
between  one  to  two  notches  higher  than  Moody's  and  Standard  &  Poor's.  Beattie  and 
Searle  find  that  the  mean  differences  in  notches  between  S&P  and  R&I  and  Moody's 
and  R&I  are  1.18  and  1.75  respectively  where  the  Japanese  agencies  rating  higher 
than  US  agencies.  This  study  uses  an  equivalent  rating  correspondence  and  shows 
higher  mean  notch  differences  between  these  agencies  than  in  1990. 
6.2.2  Does  the  level  of  consensus  change  over  time? 
Figure  6.1  shows  the  consensus  between  matched  pairs  of  agencies  for  the  6  months 
ended  December  1999  to  2003.  Only  pairs  of  agencies  that  feature  throughout  the 
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history  of  the  database  have  been  included  so  any  combination  that  includes  DAP, 
TBW  and  CRBS  is  not  shown. 
Figure  6.1:  Change  in  consensus  over  time  -  20  notch  correspondence 
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The  level  of  consensus  has  fluctuated  over  time  but  the  overall  trend  appears  to  be  an 
increase  in  consensus. 
6.3  Distribution  of  rating  grades  and  rating  consensus 
The  final  section  of  this  chapter  examines  the  relative  levels  of  consensus  for 
investment  grade  and  sub-investment  grade  issuers.  Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  found 
that  there  is  generally  less  consensus  between  agencies  for  sub-investment  grade 
ratings  than  for  investment  grade. 
118 Chapter  Six  The  level  of  inter-rater  agreement 
Figure  6.2:  Quality  distribution  of  major  rating  agencies 













-  Fitch 
-Cl 





Figure  6.2  compares  the  quality  distribution  of  the  FT-CRI  database  for  the  seven 
major  agencies  reviewed  in  this  chapter.  The  ratings  of  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch 
appear  have  a  similar  distribution,  with  a  peak  in  investment  grade  ratings  at  the  A 
grade  and  for  sub-investment  grade  ratings  at  B  grades.  DBRS,  R&I  and  JCR  show  a 
similar  peak  at  around  A-  and  each  agency  has  a  higher  proportion  of  AAA  grades 
than  the  three  largest  agencies.  The  number  of  AAA  grades  is  not  higher  in  absolute 
terms  but  does  appear  to  be  relatively  high  as  the  smaller  agencies  have  a  smaller 
population  of  sub-investment  grade  ratings. 
In  general,  figure  6.2  shows  that  the  quality  distribution  of  DBRS,  R&I  and  JCR 
appears  to  be  higher,  on  average,  than  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch.  They  have  far  fewer 
rated  issuers  than  the  three  larger  agencies2  but  we  also  know  from  this  research  that 
they  each  appear  to  rate  a  little  higher  than  Moody's  and  S&P  so  this  will  impact  the 
quality  distribution. 
2  DBRS,  R&I  and  JCR  have  1,115,2,424  and  1,526  ratings  in  FT-CRI  respectively.  This  compares  to  23,810  ratings  for  Moody's 
and  25,821  for  S&P) 
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Figure  6.3:  Distribution  of  investment  grade  vs.  sub-investment  grade  ratings 
Data  for  1999  -  2004 
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Figure  6.3  shows  that  there  are  fewer  rating  observations  for  sub-investment  grade 
issuers  than  for  investment  grade  issuers.  However  the  average  number  of 
observations  for  each  category  of  sub-investment  grade  ratings  is  approximately  300. 
Only  for  the  grade  CCC-  does  the  number  of  observations  fall  below  100. 
Figure  6.4:  Average  number  of  ratings  of  each  grade  -  last  six  months  of  1999 
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Data  for  the  last  six  months  of  1999  shows  that  for  the  early  periods  of  the  database 
there  are  fewer  observations  of  sub-investment  grade  ratings,  especially  for  B-  where 
observations  fall  to  below  35  on  average. 
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Figure  6.5:  Average  number  of  ratings  of  each  grade  -  last  six  months  of  2002 
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A  comparison  of  figures  6.4  and  6.5  shows  that  the  number  of  sub-investment  grade 
ratings  in  the  database  has  increased  over  time.  The  majority  of  sub-investment  grade 
ratings  in  this  sample  are  issued  by  the  three  larger  agencies.  These  agencies  use 
the  full  range  of  available  ratings  while  the  smaller  agencies  do  not  use  the  grades 
CCC+  and  CCC-.  This  means  that  there  will  inevitably  be  more  split  ratings  around 
these  grades  when  the  smaller  agencies  are  compared  to  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch. 
6.4  Split  credit  ratings  and  changes  In  the  credit  risk  of  the  Issuer 
Figure  6.6  shows  the  level  of  consensus  for  each  rating  grade,  this  data  is  calculated 
from  the  average  of  the  seven  live  agencies  in  the  data  sample.  The  average  level  of 
consensus  drops  as  the  perceived  credit  risk  of  the  issuer  increases.  The  level  of 
consensus  over  the  rating  of  AAA  grade  bonds  is  very  high  at  71  %  but  this  falls  to  16% 
on  average  for  sub-investment  grade  issuers  that  have  not  yet  defaulted.  This  graph 
clearly  demonstrates  that  credit  rating  agencies  disagree  over  ratings  far  more 
frequently  as  the  quality  of  the  issuer  falls  and  the  probability  of  default  increases. 
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Figure  6.6:  Average  consensus  by  rating  notch 
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6.5  Summary 
The  overall  level  of  consensus  between  the  rating  agencies  is  approximately  50%. 
This  result  treats  sub-investment  grade  ratings  as  one  band  and  the  consensus  is 
considerably  lower  (33%)  when  split  ratings  between  sub-investment  grades  are  also 
taken  into  account.  The  level  of  consensus  appears  to  have  increased  over  time. 
There  are  statistically  significant  differences  between  most  pairs  of  agency  ratings  and 
mean  differences  show  that  a  ranking  exists  between  the  agencies  where  some  tend 
to  rate  more  or  less  generously  than  others.  The  results  are  consistent  for  the  period 
1999  -  2004.  Consistent  with  previous  research,  Japanese  agencies  are  shown  to 
have  the  widest  split  ratings  when  compared  to  the  major  US  credit  rating  agencies. 
The  final  section  of  this  chapter  presents  the  level  of  consensus  for  each  rating  grade 
and  shows  that  as  the  credit  quality  decreases  so  the  level  of  split  ratings  increases. 
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Differences  between  agency  ratings  scales  and  home  country 
bias 
Chapter  six  presented  evidence  to  support  the  view  that  rating  scales  used  by  different 
agencies  are  not  equivalent.  Statistically  significant  mean  differences  between  ratings 
for  the  same  issuer  indicate  that  either  the  cut-off  points  between  rating  grades  are 
systematically  different  between  agencies  or  the  whole  rating  scale  is  skewed  up  or 
down  for  some  agencies  in  comparison  to  others.  The  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to 
examine  this  question  in  more  detail  and  to  understand  the  rating  characteristics  of  the 
major  rating  agencies. 
Previous  studies  have  shown  that  agencies  show  home  country  bias  in  that  they  are 
more  lenient  on  issuers  from  their  own  country  and  also  that  they  are  more  likely  to 
agree  with  rating  agencies  based  in  the  same  country.  The  second  part  of  this  chapter 
investigates  these  issues. 
7.1  Differences  between  agency  rating  scales 
Appendix  6  shows  results  for  matched  pairs  for  the  live  agencies  in  the  data  sample. 
These  are  Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch,  DBRS,  Cl,  JCR  and  R&I.  The  level  of  consensus  and 
split  ratings  for  all  agency  combinations  are  shown  as  well  as  a  comparison  of  each 
agency  with  the  combined  data  of  all  the  other  agencies. 
7.1.2  Mean  rating  difference  between  agencies 
The  mean  level  of  split  ratings  between  agencies,  in  notches,  is  shown  graphically  in 
figure  7.1.  The  data  for  this  graph  is  taken  from  Appendix  6,  section  D. 
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Figure  7.1:  Mean  rating  difference  between  agencies  (20-notch 
correspondence) 
Notches  D  Mean 
rating 
difference 
in  notches 
The  mean  differences  are  negative  for  Moody's  and  Cl  which  indicates  that  their 
ratings,  on  average,  are  lower  than  those  of  other  agencies  by  0.5  and  0.1  of  a  notch 
respectively.  For  S&P  the  mean  lies  close  to  zero  while  the  other  four  agencies  have 
a  positive  mean  with  the  highest  being  for  JCR.  As  discussed  in  chapter  six,  the 
average  rating  from  JCR  is  higher  than  for  any  of  the  other  six  agencies  included  in 
these  results.  It  is  interesting  to  note  the  ranking  of  the  agencies.  The  results  indicate 
that  Moody's  gives  the  toughest  ratings  and  JCR  the  most  lenient.  DBRS  and  Fitch 
have  very  similar  means  and  are  in  a  position  in  the  middle  of  the  other  agencies.  The 
mean  difference  between  the  named  agency  and  the  other  agencies  with  which  ratings 
are  matched  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%  level  in  all  cases  except  Cl. 
Significance  tests  can  also  be  used  to  compare  the  results  for  each  agency  (i.  e. 
comparing  the  blocks  on  the  graph  with  each  other,  for  example  the  mean  of  Moody's 
vs.  all  other  agencies  and  Cl  vs.  all  other  agencies).  This  shows  that  three  agencies 
are  significantly  different  from  all  the  others  at  the  1%  level.  These  are  Moody's,  R&I 
and  JCR.  Cl  and  S&P  are  not  significantly  different  from  each  other  at  the  1%  level  but 
are  at  the  5%  level.  DBRS  and  Fitch  are  not  significantly  different  from  each  other  at 
either  level. 
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7.1.3  Changes  in  agency  ranking  due  to  issuer  credit  quality 
Figure  7.2  shows  the  ranking  of  agencies  when  only  investment  grade  ratings  are 
taking  into  account.  The  ranking  is  the  same  as  figure  7.1  above  except  that  S&P  is 
now  shown  to  be  rating  slightly  lower  than  the  other  agencies. 
Figure  7.2:  Mean  rating  difference  between  agencies:  investment  grade 
ratings  only 
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When  only  sub-investment  grade  ratings  are  taken  into  account  there  are  some 
changes  in  the  rankings  observed  in  figures  7.1  and  7.2.  Figure  7.3  shows  that  Fitch 
and  S&P  have  changed  places  in  the  ranking  so  that,  after  Moody's  and  Cl,  Fitch  is 
the  least  generous  agency. 
Figure  7.3:  Mean  rating  difference  between  agencies:  sub-investment  grade 
ratings  only 
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In  place  of  Fitch,  S&P  is  the  most  generous  before  R&I.  These  changes  in  the 
rankings  of  agencies,  depending  on  the  quality  of  the  issuers  under  review,  suggest 
that  for  some  agencies  the  cut-off  points  between  rating  grades  differ.  For  example 
Moody's  is  tougher  on  lower  quality  issuers  while  S&P  is  more  generous,  Fitch  is 
considerably  less  generous  with  sub-investment  grade  issuers  than  investment  grade. 
In  contrast,  for  R&I  and  JCR  the  whole  scale  appears  to  be  skewed  upwards  and  is 
above  the  other  agencies  for  all  rating  grades. 
The  mean  difference  between  the  named  agency  and  the  other  agencies  with  which 
ratings  are  matched  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%  level  in  all  cases 
except  S&P  which  is  different  at  the  5%  level  and  CI  which  is  not  significant.  When  the 
means  of  the  different  agency  comparisons  are  compared  with  one  another 
significance  tests  show  that  Moody's,  Cl,  S&P,  DBRS  and  Fitch  are  all  significantly 
different  from  all  other  agencies  at  the  1%  level  but  that  R&I  and  JCR  are  not  different 
from  one  another  at  the  1%  or  5%  level. 
The  analysis  so  far  has  been  based  on  the  whole  FT  CRI  database  from  1999  to  2004. 
Figure  7.4  shows  the  mean  rating  difference  between  each  of  the  six agencies  for  four 
6  month  periods  ended  1999  through  to  2002.  Apart  from  slight  changes  in  the 
position  of  DBRS  the  relative  positions  of  the  credit  rating  agencies  is  consistent  over 
time.  The  mean  difference  between  the  named  agency  and  the  other  agencies  with 
which  ratings  are  matched  is  significantly  different  from  zero  at  the  1%  level  in  all 
cases  except  DBRS  and  R&I  which  are  not  significant. 
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Figure  7.4:  Mean  rating  difference  between  major  agencies  (20-notch 
correspondence  over  four  different  6  month  periods  ending  31  Dec) 
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7.2  Comparison  of  the  dispersion  ratings  by  different  agencies 
The  focus  of  the  analyses  above  has  been  on  the  mean  rating  differences  rather  than 
on  the  level  of  split  ratings.  Another  way  of  looking  at  the  differences  in  rating  scales 
and  consensus  between  agencies  is  to  plot  the  percentages  of  rating  differences  for 
the  agencies.  This  combines  an  understanding  of  the  mean  as  well  as  the  relative 
dispersion  of  split  ratings  from  different  agencies. 
Figure  7.5  plots  data  from  section  D  of  Appendix  6.  The  graph  clearly  shows  the 
distribution  of  each  agency.  R&I  and  JCR  are  skewed  to  the  right  indicating  that,  on 
average,  if  there  is  a  split  rating  the  issuer  is  rated  higher  by  those  agencies.  The  line 
for  JCR  lies  furthest  to  the  right  which  is  consistent  with  the  graphs  presented  above. 
The  navy  blue  line  for  Cl  lies  furthest  to  the  left.  All  agencies,  apart  from  the  Japanese 
ones,  have  similar  levels  of  agreement  and  dispersion.  The  coloured  lines  broadly  run 
in  the  order  blue  (CI),  purple  (Moody's),  green  (S&P),  yellow  (Fitch),  pink  (DBRS), 
brown  (R&I)  and  light  blue  (JCR).  This  ranking  is  consistent  with  Figure  7.1. 
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Cl,  R&I  and  JCR  clearly  show  lower  levels  of  agreement  than  other  agencies.  The 
distribution  is  not  symmetrical  due  to  the  differences  in  rating  scales  and  the 
distributions  are  more  widely  spread  due  to  higher  levels  of  disagreement. 
A  review  of  just  one  agency  in  comparison  with  the  others  reveals  a  consistent  picture. 
Figure  7.6  plots  data  from  section  C  of  Appendix  6  and  shows  Moody's  in  comparison 
with  each  of  the  other  six  agencies  used  in  this  study.  This  time  the  results  are 
presented  as  the  ratings  of  the  other  agency  in  comparison  to  Moody's.  The  lines 
skewed  to  the  left  show  that  the  ratings  of  the  alternative  agency  are  higher  than  those 
for  Moody's.  This  is  the  case  for  R&I  and  JCR.  The  lines  skewed  to  the  right  (Cl)  show 
that  the  ratings  of  the  second  agency  are  lower  than  those  for  Moody's. 
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It  has  been  the  aim  of  this  section  to  clearly  demonstrate  that  a  ranking  exists  between 
the  major  rating  agencies.  This  arises  because  the  cut-off  points  between  rating 
grades  are  systematically  different  and,  in  the  cases  of  R&I  and  JCR,  the  whole  rating 
scale  is  skewed  upwards  in  comparison  to  other  agencies. 
7.3  Agency  characteristics 
Previous  studies  have  found  that  rating  agencies  are  more  generous  on  issuers  from 
their  own  country  and  that  there  is  more  consensus  between  agencies  from  the  same 
country.  Using  the  data  available  in  the  FT-CRI  this  section  will  re-examine  these 
findings  and  compare  results  with  the  earlier  study. 
7.3.1  Distribution  of  agency  ratings  between  home  and  foreign  issuers 
The  population  of  issuers  rated  by  each  agency  is  dominated  by  issuers  from  the 
agency's  home  country.  Figure  7.7  shows  the  breakdown  of  each  agencies'  issues  by 
country.  For  example  DBRS  is  a  Canadian  agency  and  79%  of  the  issuers  it  rates  are 
from  Canada,  the  remaining  21%  is  split  between  the  USA,  Europe  and  Japan.  On 
average  59%  of  issuers  rated  by  Moody's  and  S&P  are  from  the  USA  and  76%  of 
issuers  rated  by  the  Japanese  agencies  are  from  Japan.  The  figure  for  US  coverage 
by  Fitch  is  a  little  lower  at  45%.  This  is  may  be  because  this  agency  was  formed  from 
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a  merger  with  UK  based  IBCA  so  the  percentage  of  UK  and  European  issuers  covered 
is  higher  than  for  Moody's  and  S&P. 
Figure  7.7:  Country  distribution  of  issuers  rated  by  different  agencies 
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7.3.2  Agency  consensus  and  issuers  from  the  home  country 
Beattie  and  Searle  (1992b)  found  that  agencies  are  more  generous  to  home  country 
issuers  than  those  from  foreign  countries.  This  suggests  that  when  you  compare 
matched  pairs  of  ratings  where  the  issuer  is  domestic  to  the  agency  to  matched  pairs 
where  the  issuer  is  foreign  to  the  agency  different  levels  of  consensus  and  split  ratings 
may  arise. 
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Table  7.1:  Comparison  of  average  level  of  split  ratings  where  issuer  is  from  the 
agency's  home  country  vs.  issuer  is  from  foreign  countries  (1  1  notch 
correspondence) 
vs.  All  other  agencies 
Mean  difference  in  notches 
(2)  (3) 
(1)  Home  Non-home 
All  country  country 
issuers  issuers  issuers 
Moody's  <  0.23**  <  0.15**  <  0.33** 
S&P  <  0.11**  >  0.04**  <  0.33** 
Fitch  >  0.18**  >  0.2**  >  0.16** 
DBRS  >  0.21**  >  0.29**  >  0.09** 
Cl  <  0.32**  <  0.15**  <  0.86** 
R&I  >  0.97**  >  0.81**  >  1.28** 
JCR  >  1.63**  >  1.72**  >  1.45** 
>  Named  agency  rates  higher  than  other  agencies,  on  average 
Names  agency  rates  lower  than  other  agencies,  on  average 
Mean  significantly  different  from  zero  at  1%  level  (two  tailed  test) 
Means  of  home  country  issuers  and  non-home  country  issuers  are  significantly  different  from  each  other  at 
the  1%  level  (two  tailed  test) 
Table  7.1  shows  the  results  of  a  comparison  of  split  ratings  between  home  country 
issuers  and  non-home  country  issuers.  Split  ratings  for  each  of  the  live  agencies  were 
compared  with  all  the  other  agencies.  Columns  1,2  and  3  show  the  mean  difference 
in  notches  for  all  issuers,  home  country  issuers  and  non-home  country  issuers 
respectively. 
The  data  for  Moody's  shows  that  overall  Moody's  rates  issuers  less  generously  than 
the  other  agencies  by  0.23  of  a  notch,  on  average.  However  when  only  issuers  based 
in  the  US  are  considered  Moody's  is  still  less  generous  than  other  agencies  but  by 
0.15  of  a  notch.  The  average  difference  for  non-US  issuers  goes  up  to  0.33  of  a 
notch.  In  other  words,  although  Moody's  still  appears  to  rate  less  generously  than 
other  agencies,  this  effect  is  less  for  US  issuers  than  for  non-US  issuers.  The  results 
for  S&P  are  particularly  interesting.  Overall  S&P  is  more  generous  than  other 
agencies  for  US  issuers  but  less  generous  for  non-US  issuers. 
Where  an  agency  is  more  generous  than  other  agencies  the  interpretation  of  table  7.1 
is  a  little  different.  Fitch  is  more  generous  than  other  agencies,  on  average,  but  this 
factor  is  greater  for  US  issuers  than  for  non-US  issuers  implying  that  Fitch  rates  more 
generously  in  the  US  than  in  other  countries. 
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The  results  are  consistent  for  all  the  agencies  with  the  exception  of  R&I.  For  this 
agency  the  mean  difference  between  ratings  where  a  split  occurs  is  0.81  of  a  notch  for 
Japanese  issuers  and  1.28  of  a  notch  for  non-Japanese  issuers.  This  implies  that  this 
agency  is  less  generous  with  the  ratings  of  Japanese  firms.  This  finding  is  interesting 
as  previous  research  such  as  Shin  and  Moore  (2003)  has  found  that  the  differences 
between  US  and  Japanese  agencies  are  due  to  home-country  bias.  The  finding  for 
R&I  in  table  7.1  questions  this  conclusion. 
The  mean  difference  between  the  ratings  of  the  named  agencies  and  the  other 
agencies  is  significant  at  the  1%  level  for  all  observations.  In  addition  the  difference 
between  the  population  of  home  country  issuers  and  non-home  country  issuers  is 
significantly  different  at  the  1%  level  for  all  observations  except  Fitch  ratings.  This 
result  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  the  mix  of  Fitch  issuers  between  the  US  and  other 
countries  is  much  more  evenly  distributed  than  for  other  agencies. 
The  conclusion  drawn  from  table  7.1  is  that  all  agencies  do  show  home  country  bias 
except  R&I  which  appears  to  be  more  generous  to  issuers  from  abroad. 
7.3.3  Agency  consensus  and  agencies  from  the  some  country 
Figure  7.8  compares  mean  notch  differences  and  levels  of  consensus  for  different 
matched  pairs  of  agency  ratings.  Different  colours  represent  agencies  from  different 
geographic  areas.  The  highest  level  of  consensus  is  observed  between  the  NRSROs 
(navy  blue)  and  the  two  Japanese  agencies  and  the  lowest  between  the  US  and 
Japanese  agencies  (yellow).  Other  clusters  can  be  identified  for  Fitch  and  DBRS 
when  compared  to  the  Japanese  agencies  and  Cl  when  compared  to  other  agencies. 
Figure  7.8  suggests  that  consensus  is  greater  between  agencies  from  the  same 
country 
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Figure  7.8:  Consensus  between  agencies  from  the  same  country  is  greater  than 
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In  their  study  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992b)  used  a  sample  of  25  rater  pairs,  13  intra- 
country  pairs  and  12  inter-country  pairs.  The  mean  pairwise  correlations  for  these 
sub-groupings  were  0.91  and  0.754  respectively.  Due  to  consolidation  in  the  rating 
industry,  this  study  uses  19  agency  pairs  with  7  intra-country  pairs  and  12  inter- 
country  pairs.  The  mean  pairwise  correlations  for  these  groupings  are  0.931  and 
0.852  respectively. 
Beattie  and  Searle  also  found  mean  absolute  differences  of  0.94  and  1.25  for  the  two 
sub-groupings.  The  differences  are  in  the  expected  direction  but  a  t-test  was  not 
significant.  The  mean  differences  between  the  pairs  in  this  study  are  0.37  and  1.42 
respectively,  they  are  significantly  different  at  the  1%  level. 
7.4  Summary 
This  chapter  has  shown  that  a  ranking  exists  between  the  rating  agencies  meaning 
that  some  agencies  appear  to  rate  more  generously  than  others.  Previous  research 
has  not  make  it  clear  whether  these  differences  arise  due  to  systematic  differences 
across  the  whole  rating  scale  which  cause  the  scale  of  one  agency  to  be  skewed 
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above  or  below  that  of  another  or  whether  there  are  different  cut  off  points  between  the 
grades. 
This  chapter  has  shown  that  for  some  agencies  the  whole  scale  is  skewed  upwards. 
JCR  and  R&I  are  consistently  generous  in  their  ratings  across  the  whole  rating  scale. 
For  other  agencies  the  ranking  does  alter  depending  on  the  quality  of  the  issuers 
under  review.  The  ranking  for  sub-investment  grades  is  significantly  different  to  that 
for  investment  grade  issuers.  This  suggests  that  there  are  differences  around  cut  off 
points  so  that  different  agencies  are  relatively  more  or  less  generous  depending  on  the 
quality  of  the  issuers  under  review. 
The  chapter  also  confirms  the  findings  of  previous  research  in  that  the  majority  of 
rating  agencies  are  more  generous  to  issuers  from  their  own  country  and  relative 
consensus  is  greater  between  agencies  from  the  same  country  than  between  agencies 
from  different  countries. 
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Industry  and  geographic  characteristics 
This  chapter  looks  in  detail  at  issuer  and  agency  characteristics.  Issuers  are  divided 
into  different  industries  to  see  if  there  are  systematic  differences  in  average  levels  of 
consensus,  mean  split  ratings  and  credit  quality.  Previous  research  has  found  that  the 
country  and  industry  characteristics  of  an  issuer  have  an  impact  on  the  level  of  split 
ratings.  This  chapter  adds  to  those  studies  with  more  recent  data,  a  larger  sample 
size,  more  detailed  industry  and  country  breakdowns  and  richer  sub-investment  grade 
data. 
8.1  Industry  characteristics 
8.1.1  Breakdown  of  the  data  sample  by  industry 
Many  of  the  analyses  in  this  study  are  based  on  the  whole  FT-CRI  database  but  the 
data  is  dominated  by  the  two  largest  agencies,  Moody's  and  S&P1  and  also  by  two 
industries;  Finance  and  Banking.  Together  these  industries  represent  34%  of  the  total 
sample.  Figure  8.1  shows  the  13  different  industry  groupings  that  have  been  used, 
based  on  the  37  categories  provided  by  the  FT-CRI.  The  largest  sample  size  is  for 
banks  with  12,196  matched  pairs  and,  moving  anti-clockwise  around  the  pie  chart,  the 
smallest  for  forestry  and  building  with  1,346  matched  pairs. 
78%  of  issuers  included  in  the  FT-CRI  database  are  rated  by  Moody's  or  S&P. 
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8.1.2  Levels  of  consensus  for  different  industries 
Matched  pairs  for  all  agencies  across  all  industries  were  analysed  in  chapter  six. 
Table  6.1  on  page  112  shows  an  analysis  of  the  51,342  matched  pairs  split  between 
those  that  agree  and  a  breakdown  of  the  level  of  disagreement  by  notch.  Figure  8.2 
below  is  based  on  the  same  sample  of  51,342  matched  pairs  for  May  1999  to  March 
2004  but  broken  down  between  the  13  industry  categories  shown  above.  The 
percentage  consensus  is  based  on  the  20-notch  correspondence  with  the  highest  level 
of  consensus  shown  on  the  left. 
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Sovereigns  show  the  highest  level  of  consensus  (35.9%)  and  transport  industry  the 
lowest  (25.6%).  Banks  have  the  fourth  lowest  level  of  consensus  at  30.7%.  In 
previous  studies,  banks  have  featured  as  the  industry  with  the  lowest  level  of 
consensus  (Beattie  and  Searle  1992b,  Cantor  and  Packer  1995  and  Morgan  1997). 
As  researchers  had  much  smaller  data  samples  available  to  them  14  years  ago  they 
used  wider  industry  categorisations.  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992)  used  9  industry 
groups.  Transport  was  a  group  in  its  own  right  but  automotive  and  manufacturing  and 
forestry  and  building  were  subsumed  into  larger  groups.  Transport  did  not  appear  to 
be  an  industry  over  which  there  was  a  high  level  of  disagreement  in  1990  but  a  full 
order  of  the  differing  levels  of  consensus  is  not  published  in  that  study. 
8.1.3  Changes  in  rating  agency  consensus  over  time 
Figure  8.3  shows  the  percentage  consensus  for  four  separate  time  periods  between 
1999  and  2004. 
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Figure  8.3:  Comparison  of  level  of  consensus  by  industry  over  the  four  years  of 
this  study 
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The  consensus  between  agencies  rating  issuers  in  certain  industries,  such  as 
sovereigns,  banks,  utilities  and  healthcare  have  the  lowest  standard  deviations  and 
have  been  relatively  stable  over  the  four  year  period.  Other  industries  show  marked 
changes.  For  example,  the  consensus  between  agencies  rating  insurance  companies 
has  risen  by  10%  and  technology  by  7%.  Consensus  for  forestry  and  building 
companies  has  fluctuated  during  the  period.  The  consensus  on  the  rating  of  transport 
companies  appears  to  have  fallen  during  the  period,  apart  from  1999/2000  this  has 
always  been  the  industry  with  the  lowest  level  of  consensus. 
8.1.4  Disagreement  between  agencies  about  bank  ratings 
Beattie  and  Searle  (1992b)  found  a  low  level  of  agreement  between  ratings  of  banks 
and  suggested  that  this  is  due  to  the  regulated  nature  of  banks  meaning  that 
regulators,  rather  than  the  market,  dictate  banking  norms  and  this  renders  comparison 
between  banks  more  difficult  than  other  industries.  Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  reported 
the  same  finding  and  explained  this  by  national  differences  in  methodology  and 
approach.  Morgan  (1997,2002)  suggests  that  the  high  level  of  split  ratings  over  banks 
is  caused  by  the  opacity  of  bank  assets,  especially  loans  and  trading  assets,  which  are 
hard  to  observe  and  make  it  hard  for  agencies  to  judge  the  risk  of  banks. 
Beattie  and  Searle  (1992b)  stated  that  they  found  banks  to  have  the  lowest  level  of 
consensus  but  did  not  provide  figures  for  the  number  or  percentage  of  ratings  that 
agreed  and  disagreed  between  agencies  so  a  comparison  of  their  findings  is  not 
possible.  Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  show  the  levels  of  bank  consensus  for  each  pair 
of  agencies  rather  than  on  an  overall  basis,  as  is  shown  in  this  section,  but  the 
equivalent  average  consensus  is  24%  which  is  much  lower  than  the  level  identified  in 
this  study. 
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Another  reason  why  differences  may  arise  between  the  ratings  of  banks  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  long  term  bank  ratings  are  a  combination  of  individual  ratings  and  support 
ratings.  Agencies  may  disagree  with  one  another  about  the  underlying  risk 
characteristics  of  a  bank  due  to  the  opacity  of  its  assets  but  additionally  they  may 
disagree  over  the  level  of  support  that  would  be  offered  in  the  event  that  the  bank  ran 
into  financial  difficulties. 
Although  this  study  does  show  a  relatively  high  level  of  disagreement  over  bank 
ratings,  it  is  not  clear  that  this  is  the  industry  over  which  there  is  the  highest  level  of 
disagreement,  as  was  the  case  in  previous  studies.  To  test  whether  there  has  been  a 
change  in  the  level  of  disagreement  over  banks  since  1999,  results  for  split  ratings 
over  banks  for  Moody's  and  S&P  were  compared  over  time. 
The  level  of  agreement  between  Moody's  and  S&P  over  banks  has  not  altered  greatly 
over  the  period  of  this  study,  if  anything  it  has  decreased  slightly.  Figure  8.4  shows  an 
analysis  of  the  agreement  between  Moody's  and  S&P  over  bank  issuers  in  3  monthly 
increments  since  May  1999.  The  trend  does  fluctuate  but  there  is  no  observable 
increase  in  the  level  of  agreement. 
Figure  8.4:  Level  of  agreement  between  Moody's  and  S&P  over  bank  issuers 
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These  findings  do  not  entirely  support  the  conclusions  of  previous  studies  which 
argued  that  banks  have  a  higher  incidence  of  split  ratings  than  other  industries  due  to 
the  influence  of  regulation,  accounting  practices  or  difficultly  in  recording  the  value  of 
assets.  While  banks  do  show  a  high  level  of  split  ratings  this  is  no  more  than  some 
other  industries  which  do  not  have  the  same  constraints  of  regulation,  opacity  of 
assets  and  the  complication  of  determining  a  support  rating. 
8.1.5  Industry  groups  established  by  significance  testing 
Figure  8.5  shows  the  levels  of  consensus  for  the  different  industries  and  the  results  of 
pairwise  two  tail  significance  tests.  The  red  column  on  the  graph  shows  which  industry 
results  are  used  for  the  comparison  (the  principle  industry).  Blue  columns  show  that 
there  are  significant  differences  between  the  industry  in  red  and  those  shown  in  blue  at 
the  1%  level,  green  columns  that  there  are  significant  differences  at  the  5%  level  and 
yellow  columns  indicates  that  there  are  no  significant  differences  between  the  industry 
means  and  the  principle  industry. 
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Sovereigns  clearly  stand  alone  as  a  group  distinct  from  any  other  industry.  There  are 
significant  differences  between  sovereigns  and  all  other  industry  groups  at  the  1% 
level. 
The  next  six  graphs  show  that  there  are  no  significant  differences  (at  the  1%  level) 
between  a  group  of  six  industries;  utilities,  leisure,  finance,  insurance,  banks  and 
energy.  This  is  interesting  as  there  is  much  examination  of  the  banking  industry  in  the 
literature,  as  discussed  above,  and  the  general  conclusion  is  that  there  are  differences 
between  banking  and  other  sectors.  However  in  terms  of  significance,  even  in  a 





ýF  ý Chapter  Eight  Issuer  and  agency  characteristics 
these  five  other  industries.  Beattie  and  Searle  (1992b)  found  banks  to  be  significantly 
different  from  the  energy  industry  which  is  inconsistent  with  the  findings  of  this  chapter. 
Beattie  and  Searle  also  found  other  significantly  different  industry  groups  which  are 
consistent  with  the  results  of  this  thesis.  Finance  (which  includes  insurance)  is 
significantly  different  from  consumer  goods  and  utilities  are  significantly  different  from 
consumer  goods. 
Figure  8.5  distinguishes  a  third  industry  group  which  is  made  up  of  the  healthcare, 
consumer  goods,  technology,  automotive  and  forestry  industries.  All  these  industries 
are  significantly  different  from  the  banking/finance/utilities/energy/leisure  group  at  the 
I%  level. 
The  mean  level  of  split  ratings  in  the  transport  industry  is  significantly  different  from  all 
other  groups  at  the  1%  level  except  forestry  and  building.  This  industry  consistently 
shows  the  lowest  level  of  consensus  when  compared  to  the  other  industries. 
8.1.6  What  causes  a  higher  level  of  consensus  in  some  industries? 
The  graphs  in  figure  8.5  show  that  industries  in  the  FT-CRI  can  be  broken  into  three 
groups.  The  industries  within  these  groups  do  not  have  significantly  different  levels  of 
split  ratings.  The  group  with  the  highest  level  of  consensus  is  sovereigns,  the  middle 
group  consists  of  financial  institutions  (insurance,  banking  and  finance)  as  well  as 
energy,  utilities  and  leisure.  The  group  with  the  lowest  level  of  consensus  is  the 
manufacturing  group  which  consists  of  technology,  consumer  goods,  healthcare, 
forestry  and  building,  automotive  and  manufacturing  and  transport. 
The  emergence  of  these  groups  is  not  consistent  with  previous  studies  with  respect  to 
the  level  of  split  ratings  over  banks.  This  study  finds  that  manufacturing  industries 
have  lower  levels  of  consensus  despite  the  fact  that  their  accounts  are  generally 
easier  to  interpret  than  banks,  insurance  companies  and  other  financial  institutions. 
Contrary  to  the  findings  of  Morgan  1997  and  2002  this  suggests  that  the  opacity,  or 
otherwise,  of  accounting  information  is  not  the  primary  cause  of  split  ratings. 
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easier  to  interpret  than  banks,  insurance  companies  and  other  financial  institutions. 
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The  average  level  of  credit  ratings  within  each  group  may  explain  the  differences  in 
split  ratings.  Cantor  and  Packer  (1995)  find  that  for  sub-investment  grade  bonds  the 
regularity  and  scale  of  split  ratings  increases.  This  finding  is  supported  in  chapter  six. 
Figure  8.6  shows  the  rating  distribution  for  the  industry  groups  discussed  above. 








These  results  are  averaged  from  the  results  of  the  live  agencies  (Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch, 
DRBS,  Cl,  JCR  and  R&I).  Figure  8.6  shows  that  the  consumer  group  (shown  in  green) 
appears  to  have  a  lower  average  credit  rating  than  the  banking  and  finance  group. 
The  average  credit  rating  for  the  consumer  group  is  BB  which  is  sub-investment  grade. 
The  average  rating  for  the  finance,  utilities,  leisure  and  energy  group  is  BBB-  which  is 
an  investment  grade  rating.  Sovereigns  are  a  separate  industry  group  with  an  average 
rating  of  BBB-.  The  differences  between  the  means  of  these  three  groups  are 
significant  at  the  1  %a  level.  This  suggests  that  the  reason  for  the  difference  in  the  level 
of  split  ratings  between  sovereigns  and  other  industries  is  due  to  the  average  credit 
quality  of  the  particular  industry  group. 
Figure  8.7  shows  that  for  the  banking  industry,  as  the  credit  quality  falls  so  does  the 
level  of  consensus  between  agencies.  Peaks  at  the  letter  grade  B  may  be  caused  by 
the  fact  that  the  smaller  credit  rating  agencies  do  not  use  the  full  range  of  letter  grades 
for  sub-investment  grade  ratings  so  there  will  be  a  higher  level  of  agreement  at  B  than 
at  B+  or  B-. 
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Figure  8.7:  Changes  in  consensus  at  different  ratings  grades 








This  section  has  considered  the  relationship  between  split  ratings  and  issuers  from 
different  industries.  It  has  shown  that  there  are  three  broad  groups  of  industries  which 
have  significantly  different  levels  of  split  ratings.  This  has  been  linked  to  the  average 
credit  quality  to  show  that  the  level  of  split  ratings  increases  (consensus  decreases)  as 
credit  quality  falls. 
8.2  Country  characteristics 
8.2.1  Breakdown  of  the  data  sample  by  country 
Analysis  of  the  country  in  which  the  issuer  is  based  also  shows  significant  differences 
in  the  level  of  split  ratings  between  agencies. 
51.2%  of  the  matched  pairs  identified  in  the  database  relate  to  issuers  from  the  USA. 
This  is  not  surprising  as  the  three  largest  agencies,  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  are  all 
based  in  the  US.  Of  the  51,342  matched  pairs  identified  across  the  whole  database, 
45%  relate  to  either  Moody's  or  S&P  ratings.  Out  of  Moody's  and  S&P  ratings,  65% 
relate  to  issuers  based  in  the  USA.  Europe  is  the  next  largest  region,  12%  of  matched 
pairs  from  the  whole  sample  relate  to  European  issuers.  The  distribution  of  issuers  by 
country  is  shown  in  figure  8.8. 
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8.2.2  Levels  of  consensus  for  different  countries 
The  consensus  in  ratings  between  different  countries  is  measured  in  exactly  the  same 
way  as  for  industries.  The  matched  pairs  for  all  agencies  are  pooled  and  split 
according  to  the  country  of  the  issuer.  The  relative  percentage  consensus  of  the 
different  regions  are  show  in  figure  8.9. 
Figure  8.9:  Percentage  consensus  by  country  for  the  whole  database  1999  - 
2004 
Mid-East  &  other 
C-  C-4 
The  UK  and  Europe  have  the  highest  level  of  consensus  at  39.5%  and  38% 
respectively  and  Japan  has  the  lowest  at  17%.  The  results  for  Japan  will  be 
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influenced  by  the  high  level  of  disagreement  between  the  Japanese  and  US  rating 
agencies  which  has  already  been  discussed. 
Analysis  of  the  level  of  consensus  over  time  shows  that  the  relative  order  of  countries 
with  the  most  and  least  consensus  has  changed  little  during  the  four  years  considered 
in  this  study. 
Figure  8.10:  Percentage  consensus  by  country  over  the  period  of  the  database 
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UK  and  Europe  show  the  highest  levels  of  consensus  (these  two  countries  trade 
positions  in  2001  and  2002).  Agencies  show  the  lowest  level  of  agreement  over 
Japanese  issuers. 
8.2.3  County  groups  established  by  significance  testing 
As  with  the  industry  groups,  significance  testing  reveals  groups  of  countries  which  are 
different  from  one  another.  In  Figure  8.11,  the  red  bar  shows  which  country  is  used  for 
the  comparison  (the  principle  country),  blue  bars  show  a  significant  difference  between 
the  principle  country  and  the  other  country  at  the  1%  level  and  green  bars  show  a 
significant  difference  at  the  5%  level.  Whereas,  yellow  bars  show  no  significant 
difference. 
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Figure  8.11:  Results  of  significance  tests  for  all  countries 
o  10  20 
Significance  testing  shows  that  5  different  groups  emerge.  UK  and  Europe  are  not 
significantly  different  from  each  other.  USA  and  Canada  are  not  different  from  each 
other.  The  Far  East  is  not  significantly  different  from  the  USA  and  Canada  at  the  5% 
level.  South  America  and  the  Middle  East  (this  country  group  includes  other  countries 
that  do  not  fall  into  any  other  group)  are  not  different  from  one  another.  Japan  is  a 
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separate  group  that  is  significantly  different  from  all  other  groups  (this  result  is 
significant  at  the  1%  level). 
8.2.4  Split  ratings  based  on  country  groupings 
The  consensus,  means,  standard  deviations  and  counts  of  matched  pairs  were 
recalculated  on  the  basis  of  the  country  groupings  identified  above. 
Table  8.1:  Percentage  consensus  &  mean  split  ratings  for  country  groups 
Consensus  Average  Std.  Dev.  Number 
split  of 
rating  matched 
pairs 
UK  and  Europe  38.7  1.00**  1.20  10,969 
USA  and  Canada  33.5  1.12"  1.23  36,544 
Far  East  29.2  1.17"*  1.13  3,791 
S  America  and  Middle  East  30.9  1.37"  1.54  5,705 
Japan  16.6  2.06"  1.68  5,537 
USA,  Canada  &  Far  East  33.1  1.12"  1.23  40,335 
Mean  significantly  different  from  zero  at  1%  level  (tw  o  tailed  test) 
Figure  8.12:  Comparison  of  mean  split  rating  and  consensus  between  issuers 
from  the  five  geographic  regions  identified 
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The  results  for  UK  and  Europe  are  consistent  with  figure  8.9,  it  is  expected  that  they 
have  the  highest  level  of  consensus  and  the  lowest  mean  difference  between  split 
ratings.  The  star  representing  Japan  has  a  much  lower  percentage  consensus  and 
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the  mean  split  rating  is  greater  than  2  notches.  The  mean  of  each  region  is 
significantly  different  from  all  the  others  at  the  1%  level  except  for  the  USA,  Canada 
and  the  Far  East 
These  results  are  calculated  using  the  whole  database  from  1999  -  2004.  If  the 
results  are  broken  down  and  reviewed  again  for  each  year  of  the  database  the  findings 
remain  consistent.  UK  and  Europe  are  significantly  different  from  all  other  regions  in 
all  periods  at  the  1%  level.  USA  and  Canada  show  no  significant  difference  from  the 
Far  East  at  the  1%  level  in  2001  and  2003.  There  is  no  significant  difference  at  the  5% 
level  in  2002.  There  is  a  significant  difference  at  the  1%  level  in  1999/2000. 
The  Middle  East  and  South  America  show  differences  from  all  other  regions  in  all 
periods  except  for  the  Far  East  in  1999/2000.  Japan  shows  significant  differences  at 
the  1%  level  to  all  other  regions  in  all  periods. 
8.2.5  Quality  distribution  of  issuers  in  different  countries 
This  chapter  has  presented  evidence  to  suggest  that  industry  groups  with  a  higher 
average  credit  rating  have  a  higher  level  of  consensus  and  those  with  a  lower  average 
credit  rating  have  a  lower  level  of  consensus.  Country  groupings  are  analysed  in  the 
same  way  below. 
It  has  already  been  shown,  in  this  study  as  well  as  others,  that  Japanese  agencies 
rate,  on  average,  1.5  to  2.5  notches  higher  than  other  agencies.  As  most  Japanese 
issuers  are  rated  by  either  RAI  or  JCR  you  would  expect  the  average  credit  rating  of 
Japanese  issuers  to  be  higher  than  for  other  regions  because  of  the  influence  of 
generous  ratings. 
There  are  more  US  issuers  with  credit  ratings  than  any  other  region.  In  all  regions  the 
largest  companies  who  are  most  active  in  the  bond  market  will  be  rated  by  the  major 
credit  ratings  agencies.  In  the  USA  a  larger  cross  section  of  issuers  have  credit 
ratings  because  all  SEC  registered  corporate  bonds  have  a  rating  from  Moody's  and 
S&P.  Because  the  US  rating  coverage  is  higher  than  in  other  regions  the  average 
credit  rating  for  the  USA  may  be  biased  downwards  in  comparison  with  other  countries 
and  have  a  higher  proportion  of  sub-investment  grade  debt. 
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Figure  8.13:  Average  credit  rating  by  country 
The  results  show  that  the  highest  average  credit  ratings  are  for  Europe  and  the  UK, 
the  average  rating  for  both  countries  is  BBB+.  Figure  8.9  also  shows  that  these 
regions  have  the  highest  level  of  consensus  between  agencies.  This  finding  supports 
the  hypothesis  that  there  is  less  disagreement  over  higher  quality  issuers. 
As  expected,  the  results  for  Japan  show  that  there  is  a  high  average  credit  rating  in 
comparison  to  other  countries,  the  average  rating  is  BBB.  The  USA,  Canada  and  the 
Far  East  have  a  similar  level  of  average  credit  ratings  at  BBB-,  BBB  and  BBB- 
respectively.  The  average  rating  for  the  USA  is  likely  to  be  lower  because  a  large 
number  of  sub-investment  grade  issuers  are  rated  in  the  US  by  Moody's  and  S&P  and 
equivalent  ratings  are  not  included  for  other  countries  in  this  sample.  The  average 
credit  ratings  for  South  America  and  the  Middle  East  are  lower  than  for  any  other 
region.  These  are  B  and  BB-  respectively. 
8.3  Summary 
Now  that  the  major  industrial  nations  are  reaching  agreement  over  Basel  II,  external 
credit  ratings  are  becoming  increasing  important  as  part  of  the  bank  regulatory 
process.  The  last  two  chapters  have  established  that  there  is  a  high  level  of 
disagreement  over  credit  ratings,  even  by  the  major  players  in  the  industry.  This 
chapter  has  looked  in  more  detail  at  the  reasons  why  some  of  these  disagreements 
arise. 
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The  industry  and  domicile  of  the  issuer  does  influence  the  likelihood  that  there  will  be 
split  rating  between  agencies.  There  is  also  more  disagreement  over  lower  quality 
issuers. 
Three  statistically  significant  industry  groups  appear  from  this  research.  Sovereigns, 
Finance/Energy/Leisure  group  (including  Banks,  Finance,  Insurance,  Energy,  Utilities 
and  Leisure)  and  a  Consumer  group  (including  Manufacturing,  Transport,  Healthcare, 
Hi-tech  and  Forestry).  There  are  no  significant  differences  between  individual 
industries  apart  from  Sovereigns  and  transport.  In  contrast  to  previous  research  this 
study  does  not  find  the  highest  level  of  split  ratings  to  be  for  banks. 
Five  significantly  different  regional  groups  are  identified:  UK  &  Europe,  USA  & 
Canada,  Far  East,  South  America  &  Middle  East  and  Japan.  The  highest  level  of 
consensus  exists  for  UK  and  Europe,  this  region  also  has  the  highest  average  level  of 
credit  ratings.  Japan  shows  the  lowest  level  of  consensus  which  is  consistent  with  the 
findings  of  earlier  chapters. 
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Do  split  ratings  have  an  impact  on  Basel  II  risk  assessments? 
The  previous  three  chapters  have  looked  in  detail  at  split  ratings  and  shown 
differences  between  overall  rating  levels  and  between  particular  pair  of  agencies. 
There  appears  to  be  a  ranking  of  the  agencies  from  the  most  to  the  least  generous 
due  to  differences  in  rating  scales.  Agencies  rate  issuers  from  their  home  country 
more  favourably  then  foreign  issues  and  the  ratings  of  agencies  from  the  same  country 
show  a  higher  level  of  consensus  than  those  from  different  countries.  There  is 
generally  a  lower  level  of  consensus  between  manufacturing-type  companies  than 
between  sovereigns  and  finance,  utility  and  energy-type  companies  which  appears  to 
be  due  to  the  lower  average  credit  quality  of  manufacturing  entities  in  the  data  sample 
used. 
These  observed  differences  in  the  credit  ratings  assigned  by  different  agencies 
become  much  more  important  when  Basel  II  is  adopted  into  European  law. 
Depending  on  the  extent  to  which  regulators  use  Annex  2  of  Basel  II  to  smooth  out 
differences  between  agencies,  the  different  rating  scales  of  the  agencies  could 
influence  the  risk  weighted  capital  of  a  bank.  The  implication  of  split  ratings  on  Basel  II 
is  examined  and  quantified  in  this  chapter  to  assess  whether  the  problem  is  significant. 
9.1  Overall  level  of  inter-rater  agreement:  Basel  II  risk  weights 
Credit  ratings  in  the  FT  CRI  database  have  been  mapped  to  the  Basel  II  risk  weights 
as  specified  in  the  Capital  Accord.  A  Basel  II  correspondence  was  designed  and  is 
described  in  chapter  five  (see  page  97).  Table  9.1  shows  that  the  overall  level  of 
agreement  between  the  live  agencies,  (Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch,  DBRS,  Cl,  JCR  and  R&l) 
is  76.5%  using  the  Basel  II  correspondence  but  this  varies  between  sector  with  banks 
showing  less  agreement  than  corporates  or  sovereigns.  Where  split  ratings  occur  they 
most  frequently  give  rise  to  a  50%  difference  in  risk  weight,  except  for  banks  where  the 
difference  is  most  frequently  30%.  Clear  guidelines  exist  within  Basel  II  to  determine 
the  treatment  of  split  ratings  and  generally  the  highest  risk  weighting  should  be  used  in 
the  case  of  a  split,  these  details  are  outlined  in  full  in  chapter  three. 
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Table  9.1:  Summary  of  split  ratings  and  consensus  between  agencies  when 
applying  Basel  II  risk  weights 
---  -  --  --  -----  -  ---All 
issues  Corporates  Banks  Sovereigns 
Split  rating  of:  %  %  %  % 
130%  0.02  0.03  0  0 
100%  0.13  0.13  0.19  0 
80%  0.52  0.51  0.7  0.26 
50%  14.51  15.86  9.14  14.51 
30%  6.3  5.36  11.15  4.14 
20%  2.04  0  11.22  0 
In  agreement%  76.47  78.11  67.58  81.09 
Sample  size- 
_  __  ___54,31_6__  ____ 
39,381  9,890  5,045 
9.2  Mapping  external  credit  ratings  to  risk  assessments  under  the 
Standardised  approach 
Each  of  the  live  agencies  included  in  the  database  used  for  this  thesis  would  almost 
certainly  qualify  for  recognition  by  local  supervisors  for  the  purposes  of  the 
Standardised  approach  of  Basel  II.  A  study  in  chapter  three  reviewed  relative  agency 
probabilities  of  default  and  shows  how  supervisors  would  consider  relative  agency 
scales.  Annex  2  only  provides  guidelines  so  it  is  unclear  how  agencies  would  treat  the 
differences  between  Moody's  and  JCR,  for  example. 
In  the  example  given  in  chapter  three,  R&I's  most  recent  3  year  cumulative  default 
rates  are  within  the  trigger  levels  for  all  but  the  B  grade  assessments  so  it  is  likely  that 
some,  if  not  all,  supervisors  will  map  R&I's  rating  scale  directly  to  the  risk  assessment 
in  Basel  II.  For  example,  an  AA  grade  allocated  by  JCR  may  be  mapped  to  an  AA  risk 
assessment  under  the  standardised  approach  of  Basel  II  and  the  risk  weight  would  be 
determined  accordingly.  An  AA  from  Moody's  would  also  map  to  an  AA  risk 
assessment  and  the  same  risk  weight  would  be  allocated.  However,  it  is  clear  from  a 
detailed  analysis  of  the  matched  pairs  available  for  the  agencies  that  there  are 
consistent  differences  in  the  rankings  that  will  inevitably  impact  the  capital  adequacy 
requirements  determined  from  use  of  these  credit  ratings. 
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9.2.1  Corporate  claims 
The  risk  weights  for  corporate  claims  are  determined  as  follows: 
Credit 
Assessment 
AAA  to 
AA- 
A+  to  A-  BBB+  to 
BB- 
Below  BB-  Unrated 
I  Risk  Weight  20%  50%  100%  150%  100% 
The  split  ratings  for  corporate  claims  are  determined  according  to  this  scale: 
AAA  to  A+  to  BBB+  to  Below 
AA-  A-  BB-  BB- 
20%  50%  100%  150% 




These  bands  are  fairly  wide  compared  to  the  11  notch  correspondence  that  has  been 
used  for  many  of  the  studies  in  this  thesis.  The  largest  number  of  split  ratings  will  be 
between  the  risk  weight  bands  20%  to  50%,  50%  to  100%  and  100%  to  150%  as 
these  represent  split  ratings  of  anything  from  one  to  four  notches.  Table  9.1  above 
shows  that  less  than  1%  of  the  population  has  a  split  rating  of  80%  or  more.  A  50% 
difference  in  risk  weight  is  caused  by  a  split  rating  between  A+/A-  and  BBB+/BB-  as 
well  as  BBB+/BB-  and  Below  BB-.  Consequently  there  are  a  large  number  of  split 
ratings  showing  a  difference  of  50%  between  risk  weights.  A  discussion  of  these 
bandings  is  important  in  relation  to  Figure  9.1. 
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Figure  9.1:  Differences  in  risk  weights  between  matched  pairs  of  agencies  - 
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Figure  9.1  plots  the  percentage  of  matched  pairs  that  are  in  agreement  and  the 
percentage  and  size  of  split  ratings  in  terms  of  Basel  II  risk  weights.  The  level  of 
consensus  shown  by  these  6  individual  agencies'  is  consistent  with  an  overall  level  of 
agreement  of  78%,  as  shows  in  table  9.1.  As  discussed  above  there  are  more 
differences  of  50%  than  any  other  split  rating  and  this  can  be  seen  on  the  graph. 
Higher  percentages  of  split  ratings  to  the  right  of  the  graph  indicate  that  the  named 
agency  on  the  key  has  a  higher  credit  rating  than  the  other  agencies.  For  example, 
the  purple  and  brown  lines  on  the  right  of  the  graph  show  that  R&I  and  JCR  have  a 
high  level  of  split  ratings  at  the  50%  level  in  comparison  with  the  other  agencies.  The 
purple  and  brown  lines  on  the  left  of  the  graph  show  a  very  low  level  of  split  ratings 
where  R&I  or  JCR  have  the  higher  risk  assessment  than  other  agencies.  This  finding 
is  entirely  consistent  with  earlier  chapters  of  this  thesis.  As  you  would  expect  the  plot 
for  Moody's,  in  dark  blue,  shows  a  higher  incidence  of  split  ratings  where  Moody's  has 
the  lower  risk  assessment  and  a  low  number  of  splits  where  Moody's  has  the  higher 
1  CI  does  not  rate  corporate  claims 
Moody's/all 
other  agencies 
S&P/alI  other 
agencies 
Fitch/all  other 
agencies 
DBRS/all  other 
agencies 
R&I/all  other 
agencies 
JCR/aII  other 
agencies 
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risk  assessment.  Again,  this  finding  is  entirely  consistent  with  expectations.  S&P, 
Fitch  and  DBRS  appear  to  have  fairly  symmetrical  distributions. 
Figure  9.2  shows  the  mean  differences  in  split  ratings  between  each  of  the  major 
agencies  and  ratings  from  all  other  agencies.  For  corporate  claims  this  graph  shows 
that  the  ranking  of  claims  is  similar  to  that  shown  in  chapter  seven  using  the  20  notch 
correspondence.  This  ranking  is  almost  consistent  with  figure  7.1  on  page124  except 
that  Fitch  appears  less  generous  than  DBRS  for  corporate  risk  assessments.  On 
average  the  rating  of  Moody's  would  be  attributed  a  risk  weighting  of  6.5%  more  than 
the  other  agencies  and  JCR  a  risk  weighting  of  18%  less. 
Figure  9.2:  Mean  difference  in  ratings  between  major  agencies  under  Basel  II 
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The  quality  distribution  of  the  ratings  in  the  FT-CRI  database  for  the  live  agencies 
matched  to  Basel  II  risk  weights  are  as  follows: 
Table  9.2:  Quality  distribution  of  ratings  in  Basel  II  corporate  `buckets' 
Band  of  rating 
grades 
Risk  weight  %  of  distribution  in 
each  category 
AAA  to  AA-  20%  14.5% 
A+  to  A-  50%  25.9% 
BBB+  to  BB-  100%  37.0% 
Below  BB-  150%  22.6% 
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The  lowest  percentage  of  ratings  are  included  in  the  highest  quality  band.  This 
explains  the  dip  shown  at  the  30%  difference  and  increase  for  50%  difference  shown 
in  Figure  9.1. 
In  summary,  the  findings  for  corporate  claims  using  the  Basel  II  risk  weights  are 
consistent  with  those  presented  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  chapter.  There  appears  to 
be  an  ordered  ranking  of  agencies  which  suggests  that  the  choice  of  agency  could 
have  an  influence  on  capital  requirements  under  the  standardised  approach. 
9.2.2  Bank  Claims 
Risk  weights  for  banks  are  discussed  in  chapter  three.  For  this  thesis  option  2  for 
claims  on  banks  has  been  used2.  This  option  includes  lower  risk  weights  for  short 
term  claims  but  the  FT-CRI  is  an  issuer  database  and  the  age  of  a  claim  is  issue 
specific.  Therefore  all  claims  have  been  treated  as  having  a  maturity  of  more  than 
three  months. 
AAA  to  A+  to  BB+  to  Below 
AA-  BBB-  B-  B- 
20%  50%  100%  150% 




The  50%  risk  weight  band  is  much  wider  for  bank  claims  that  corporates  and  the 
higher  weights  are  allocated  to  lower  credit  ratings. 
2  See  chapter  three,  page  45. 
157 Chapter  Nine  Split  ratings  and  Basel  II 
Table  9.3:  Quality  distribution  of  ratings  in  Basel  II  bank  'buckets' 
Band  of  rating 
grades 
Risk  weight  %  of  distribution  in 
each  category 
AAA  to  AA-  20%  23% 
A+  to  BBB-  50%  30% 
BB+  to  B-  100%  43.2% 
Below  B-  150%  3.8% 
The  quality  distribution  in  the  FT-CRI  database  is  more  evenly  spread  for  banks  than 
corporates  and  few  banks  have  a  rating  below  B-  compared  to  sub-investment  grade 
corporates.  Given  this  distribution  the  majority  of  split  ratings  would  be  expected  to  fall 
into  the  30%  and  50%  band. 
Figure  9.3:  Differences  in  risk  weights  between  matched  pairs  of  agencies  - 
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The  average  level  of  agreement  is  slightly  lower  for  banks  at  67%.  The  blue  lines 
shows  that  JCR  is  markedly  more  generous  than  other  agencies.  The  line  for  R&I  is 
also  higher  on  the  right  than  on  the  left  which  means  that  lower  risk  weights  would  also 
be  attributed  to  R&I  ratings. 
The  yellow  line  for  S&P  shows  that  this  agency  is  less  generous  for  banks  than  other 
agencies.  DBRS  also  shows  a  high  level  of  split  ratings  where  it  is  the  least  generous 
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Figure  9.4  shows  analysis  of  Basel  II  risk  weights  for  banks.  For  the  first  time,  there  is 
a  significant  departure  from  the  ranking  of  the  agencies  that  is  shown  above  and  in 
chapter  seven. 
Figure  9.4:  Mean  difference  in  ratings  between  major  agencies  under  Basel  II  - 
bank  claims 









For  bank  claims,  S&P  now  appears  to  be  the  agency  that  gives  the  lowest  ratings, 
followed  by  DBRS,  Cl  then  Moody's  and  Fitch.  The  Japanese  agencies  still  hold  their 
place  as  the  most  generous  agencies  for  banks  as  well  as  corporate  claims. 
9.2.3  Sovereign  claims 
Calculating  split  ratings  for  sovereigns  is  more  complex  than  for  corporates  or  banks. 
There  are  5  different  risk  weightings  available  which  increases  the  number  of 
differences  between  risk  weights  that  are  possible  when  there  are  split  ratings. 
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AAA  to  A+  to  BBB+  to  BB+  to  Below 
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There  are  five  percentage  differences  between  risk  weightings  that  can  arise;  20%, 
30%,  50%,  80%,  100%  and  130%. 
The  level  of  consensus  for  sovereign  claims  is  higher  than  for  corporates  and  banks  at 
81%.  Figure  9.5  shows  that  JCR  and  R&I  are  more  generous  if  there  is  a  split  rating 
and  Moody's  and  Cl  are  less  generous.  The  purple  line  on  the  left  of  the  graph  shows 
that  20%  of  all  ratings  by  Cl  have  risk  weights  that  are  either  30%  or  50%  higher  than 
those  from  other  agencies. 
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Figure  9.5:  Differences  in  risk  weights  between  matched  pairs  of  agencies  - 
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The  average  difference  in  risk  weight  based  on  split  ratings  for  sovereign  claims 
largely  returns  to  the  familiar  pattern  of  agency  rankings.  S&P  is  again  the  agency  that 
appears  to  deviate  from  its  position  in  the  corporate  agency  rankings.  Another 
interesting  finding  is  that  JCR  and  R&I  swap  their  well  established  places  for  sovereign 
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Figure  9.6:  Mean  difference  in  ratings  between  major  agencies  under  Basel  II  - 
sovereign  claims 
Sovereign  claims  -  Average  difference  in  risk  weight  based  on  split  ratings 
9.3  Does  is  matter  which  agency  is  used  to  determine  Basel  II 
Standardised  risk  weights? 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  ask  whether  the  split  ratings  identified  actually  make  a 
significant  difference  to  the  level  of  Basle  II  risk  weights  and  whether  this  would  matter 
to  banks.  Clearly  the  importance  of  the  split  ratings  identified  in  this  thesis  is  entirely 
dependant  on  the  mapping  process  chosen  by  each  supervisor  in  individual  countries. 
The  next  section  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  for  the  seven  agencies  under  review 
(Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch,  DBRS,  Cl,  R&I  and  JCR)  their  present  rating  scales  would  be 
used  to  map  to  risk  assessments  without  adjustment.  There  is  no  obligation  under 
Basel  II  for  a  bank  to  use  more  than  one  approved  rating  agency  for  external 
assessments  if  it  does  not  wish  to. 
9.3.1  Most  and  least  generous  agencies  for  Basel  II 
The  first  analysis  of  most  and  least  generous  agencies  for  the  purposes  of  Basel  II  risk 
weights  compares  issuers  rated  by  two  agencies.  For  example,  table  9.4  shows  that 
for  all  issuers  rated  by  both  Moody's  and  S&P  the  average  risk  assessment  is  lower  for 
Moody's  than  S&P.  In  this  case  Moody's  ratings  are  slightly  more  generous  than  S&P 
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and  the  difference  is  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  The  difference  is  2.2%  in 
terms  of  risk  weights. 
Table  9.4:  Most  and  least  generous  agencies  for  the  purpose  of  Basel  II  risk 
weights 
--  --  -------------  Agency  2  -----  ---  ---  --  - 
Moodys  S&P  Fitch  Cl  DBRS  R&I  JCR 
Moodys  -<><<  >> 
c  S&P  -  >**  >>  >**  >** 
Fitch  -><  >> 
Cl  -  No  data  >> 
DBRS  -  >> 
R&I  -> 
JCR  - 
Agency  1  has  higher  risk  weights  that  agency  2  (agencies  with  higher  risk  weights  are  less  generous  with  their 
credit  ratings) 
<  Agency  1  has  lower  risk  weights  that  agency  2  (agencies  with  lower  risk  weights  are  more generous  with  their 
credit  ratings) 
--  agency  means  are  different  from  each  other  at  the  1%  level 
agency  means  are  different  from  each  other  at  the  5%  level 
The  table  clearly  shows  that  using  credit  assessments  from  R&I  and  JCR  will  give  rise 
to  lower  risk  assessments.  This  is  entirely  consistent  with  earlier  findings  of  this  study. 
For  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  differences  between  the  US  agencies  and  Japanese 
agency  risk  weightings  are  statistically  significant  at  the  1%  level.  Moody's,  S&P, 
Fitch,  Cl  and  DBRS  do  not  show  consistent  significant  differences  between  each 
other.  The  relationship  between  Fitch  and  the  other  agencies  is  as  expected  but  some 
of  the  results  for  DBRS  are  not  in  the  expected  direction  but  are  not  statistically 
significant.  Most  of  the  levels  of  risk  weights  between  S&P  and  the  other  agencies  are 
as  expected  apart  from  Moody's.  Given  the  ranking  of  agencies  identified  in  this  study 
Moody's  would  have  been  expected  to  give  higher  risk  weights  than  S&P. 
Given  the  findings  presented  in  table  9.4  it  appears  that  R&I  and  JCR  should  be 
rescaled  before  the  rating  assessments  are  mapped  to  risk  assessments  to  make  the 
ratings  more  equivalent  to  the  other  agencies.  For  Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch,  DBRS  and  Cl 
it  seems  appropriate  that  their  ratings  could  be  mapped  directly  to  the  risk 
assessments  as  in  Basel  II. 
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9.3.2  Which  US  agency  is  it  most  beneficial  to  use  for  risk  weight  assessments? 
The  population  of  issuers  rated  by  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  is  faf  greater  than  for  any 
other  agency.  This  means  that,  in  reality,  banks  may  need  to  use  the  ratings  of  one  of 
the  major  agencies  for  the  Standardised  approach.  The  next  section  considers  the 
difference  in  risk  assessments  between  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  to  answer  the 
question  as  to  whether  there  are  any  advantages  in  using  the  ratings  of  one  agency 
rather  than  another. 
Table  9.4  shows  that  there  are  significant  differences  between  two  of  the  three 
agencies.  S&P's  ratings  gave  a  significantly  higher  risk  assessment  than  Moody's  or 
Fitch's  ratings.  Comparisons  for  each  pair  of  agencies  were  broken  down  into  the 
following  groups  to  see  if  any  significant  differences  arose.  Significant  differences  in 
the  risk  weights  assigned  to  different  agencies  would  suggest  that  there  is  an 
advantage  in  using  one  agency  over  another  for  issuers  in  a  particular  industry  group 
or  located  in  a  particular  region. 
"  Consumer  group  made  up  from  healthcare,  consumer  goods,  technology, 
automotive,  building  and  transport 
"  Finance  and  Utilities  group  made  up  from  utilities,  energy,  banks,  insurance, 
finance  and  leisure 
"  Sovereigns 
And  into  country  groups: 
"  UK  and  Europe 
"  USA  and  Canada 
"  Far  East 
"  Japan 
These  industry  and  country  groups  were  determined  from  results  of  studies  in  chapter 
eight. 
The  average  risk  weight,  standard  deviation  and  number  of  observations  were 
calculated  for  all  combinations  of  agencies  between  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  for  each 
industry  and  country.  There  were  no  significant  differences  between  any  of  these 
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pairings.  As  the  results  were  not  significant  they  have  not  been  replicated  here.  This 
finding  suggests  that  the  choice  of  US  rating  agency  will  not  make  a  significant 
difference  to  the  allocation  of  Basel  II  risk  weights  under  the  Standardised  approach. 
9.4  Summary 
Throughout  this  study  of  split  ratings  a  statistically  significant  ranking  of  rating 
agencies  has  been  found  to  exist.  Based  on  these  findings  the  question  was  asked  as 
to  whether  significant  differences  also  arose  between  the  risk  assessments 
determined  from  different  agencies  under  the  Basel  II  rules  for  the  standardised 
approach.  Such  systematic  differences  could  lead  to  selection  of  particular  rating 
agencies  for  the  purposes  of  achieving  the  most  favourable  risk  assessments. 
This  chapter  has  shown  that,  apart  from  the  Japanese  agencies,  no  such  systematic 
differences  exist  when  Basel  II  risk  weights  are  applied  to  the  rating  grades  of 
Moody's,  S&P,  Fitch,  DBRS  and  Cl.  These  findings  apply  across  industry  and  country 
sectors.  Significant  differences  do  arise  between  the  Japanese  agencies  and  all  other 
agencies.  This  suggests  that  supervisors  should  exercise  their  options  under  Annex  2 
of  Basel  2  to  realign  the  rating  scales  of  the  Japanese  agencies  downwards  to  bring 
them  into  line  with  those  of  other  regions. 
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Predicting  bank  bond  ratings  from  financial  data 
There  have  been  a  large  number  of  studies  over  the  last  40  years  attempting  to 
build  models  that  accurately  predict  agency  bond  ratings.  These  models  take  on 
additional  importance  with  the  implementation  of  Basel  II  and  the  advantages,  in 
terms  of  minimum  capital  requirements,  that  will  be  offered  by  adopting  Internal 
ratings-based  (IRB)  Foundation  Approach  or  IRB  Advanced  Approach.  These 
methods  both  require  banks  to  be  able  to  calculate  the  probability  of  default  on 
assets  so  they  need  to  have  internal  credit  rating  models  in  place  to  the 
satisfaction  of  regulators. 
Chapter  four  of  this  thesis  has  already  reviewed  the  previous  studies  performed  in 
the  area  of  credit  rating  prediction  and  highlighted  the  wide  range  of  different 
methodologies  that  have  been  used.  These  studies  show  that  financial  variables 
can  be  used  to  estimate  between  55%  -  70%  of  corporate  bonds  accurately. 
Chapter  four  also  discussed  the  selection  of  independent  variables  for  bank 
analysis. 
The  majority  of  the  'literature  uses  samples  from  industrial  enterprises  rather  than 
banks.  This  thesis  extends  previous  studies  by  focusing  on  banks  and  reviews 
both  individual  ratings  and  long  term  credit  ratings.  The  data  sample  consists  of 
8,901  worldwide  banks,  for  which  accounting  data  was  available,  matched  to  credit 
ratings  from  Financial  Times  Credit  Ratings  International.  Details  of  these 
databases  and  the  process  of  matching  these  two  different  datasets  is  discussed 
in  chapter  five.  Appendix  4  shows  the  standardised  template  into  which 
accounting  data  from  '  many  different  countries  was  mapped.  The  full  list  of 
countries  for  which  bank  financial  information  was  available  is  included  in 
Appendix  3.  The  final  list  of  financial  ratios  and  variables  used  as  independent 
variables  is  shown  in  Appendix  5. 
10.1  Methodology 
In  this  section,  the  main  modeling  technique  used  to  develop  the  bank  rating 
models  is  described.  For  binary  classification  problems  like  bankruptcy  prediction, 
ordinary  least  squares  (Altman,  1968)  and  logistic  regression  (Ohlson,  1980)  are 
key  techniques  to  build  a  discriminant  function  between  two  classes:  e.  g.  class  1 
(defaults)  and  class  2  (non-defaults). 
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Logistic  regression  is  typically  preferred  because:  its  model  formulation  is  specific 
to  a  binary  classification  problem  (defaults/non-defaults);  it  is  known  to  exhibit 
better  generalization  behaviour  than  least  squares  regression,  as  is  observed 
empirically  (Baesens,  2003;  Lim  et  al.,  2000;  Van  Gestel  et  al.,  2004);  and  it  is 
theoretically  proven  to  be  more  robust  to  deviations  from  multivariate  Gaussian 
distributed  classes  (Efron,  1975). 
The  ordinal  logistic  regression  (OLR)  model  (Johnson  and  Albert,  1999; 
McCullagh,  1980;  McCullagh  and  Neider,  1989)  is  an  extension  of  the  binary 
logistic  regression  model  for  ordinal  multi-class  categorization  problems,  like  e.  g., 
class  1  (very  good),  class  2  (good),  class  3  (medium),  class  4  (bad)  and  class  5 
(very  bad).  Hence,  it  is  obvious  that  ordinal  logistic  regression  is  an  interesting 
technique  to  model  bank  credit  ratings. 
In  the  cumulative  ordinal  logistic  regression  formulation,  the  cumulative  probability 
of  the  rating  y  is  given  by: 
P(y5i)= 
1 
i=1,...,  m, 
l+  exp(-Q  +  flix,  +  j32x2  +  ...  +  8nXn) 
with  the  vector  X=  [XI,  X2,  ...,  xnj  of  n  explanatory  variables  XI,  X2,  ...,  xn  and  the 
corresponding  coefficient  vector  /3  = 
[ßi,  ß2,...,  fl}.  Because  P(y  5  m)  =1, 
the  parameter  &  is  equal  to  00  . 
The  latent  variable  z  is  the  linear  combination  of 
the  explanatory  variables  xi,  (i  =1,  ...  ,  n)  : 
Z=  -ßixt  -  ß2x2  -  ...  -  ßX»  =  -ßrx, 
and  summarizes  the  financial  information  of  the  risk  entity.  Essentially,  the 
cumulative  probability  P(y  S  i)  is  linked  to  the  latent  variable  (plus  a  category 
dependent  constant  0)  via  the  logistic  link  function.  Given  the  cumulative 
probabilities  P(y  <  i),  with  i  =1,  ...,  m,  one  obtains  the  probabilities  P(y  =  i)  as 
follows: 




Given  a  training  data  set  D  ={x;,  yi}"1  of  N  data  points,  the  parameters 
0402,...,  &  and  61,62, 
..., 
P,  are  estimated  using  a  maximum  likelihood 
procedure  to  minimize  the  negative  log  likelihood  (NLL): 
nnAnnn 
(9 
,B2,  ..., 
6m,  ß,,  ßz, 
...  , 
ý3.  )  =  arg  min  NNL(O,  ß)  =  -I:  log(P(Y  =yi)), 
,  _º 
With  9m  =  oo  and  yi  E{  1, 
...,  m)The  maximum  likelihood  estimate  is  obtained  via 
iteratively  re-weighted  least  squares  using  Levenberg-Marquardt  optimization. 
As  a  result  of  the  optimization,  not  only  the  optimal  parameters  are  obtained,  but 
also  the  standard  errors  (square  roots  of  the  diagonal  elements  of  the  inverse 
Hessian)  and  the  corresponding  p-values  (z-test,  Friedl  and  Tilg,  1994).  The  model 
deviance  is  equal  to  twice  the  negative  log  likelihood  in  the  optimum  and  can  be 
used  for  model  comparison,  e.  g.,  using  an  appropriate  information  criterion 
(Agresti,  2002). 
10.2  Results 
The  ordinal  logistic  regression  results  are  shown  in  tables  10.1  to  10.11.  A  variety 
of  different  models  were  estimated  and  the  results  are  organised  as  follows: 
Table  10.1  compares  the  results  of  models  using  financial  ratios  to  estimate: 
Moody's  long  term  ratings  (Moody's  LTR),  Moody's  BFSR  (BSFR)  and  BFSR 
using  financial  ratios  and  Moody's  long  term  ratings  (BFSR  with  LTR).  The  same 
comparison  is  made  for  Fitch  ratings;  Fitch  long  term  ratings  (Fitch  LTR),  Fitch 
individual  ratings  (Fitch  Individual)  and  Fitch  Individual  ratings  estimated  using 
financial  ratios  and  Fitch  long  term  ratings  (Fitch  individual  with  LTR). 
Table  10.2  compares  results  from  10  different  rating  agencies,  7  live  and  3  dead 
agencies. 
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Tables  10.3  to  10.5  compare  the  results  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  when  the 
rated  banks  are  split  into  country  regions. 
Tables  10.7  to  10.9  show  results  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  when  the  banks  are 
split  into  size  bandings  based  on  the  banks'  total  assets. 
The  final  set  of  tables,  10.10  to  10.12,  compare  the  results  for  Moody's,  S&P  and 
Fitch  when  the  banks  are  split  between  bank  holding  companies,  subsidiaries  and 
thrifts. 
Two  measures  of  performance  are  used  to  summarise  the  explanatory  power  of 
the  models.  The  significance  of  the  model  based  on  the  chi-square  wald,  chi- 
square  score,  log  likelihood  is  shown  for  each  model.  The  classification  accuracy 
of  the  model  is  also  tested  using  a  holdout  sample  of  one  third  of  the  total  data 
sample.  For  each  model  the  results  are  shown  at  the  zero  notch  (complete 
agreement),  one  notch  (agreement  to  within  one  category  etc.  ),  two  notch  and 
three  notch  levels.  These  results  refer  to  the  holdout  sample  in  all  cases.  An 
explanation  of  the  categories  of  ratings  used  for  this  study  is  given  in  chapter  five, 
page  99. 
10.2.1  Modeling  individual  bank  ratings  and  long  term  ratings 
Table  10.1  shows  a  comparison  of  results  for  models  based  on  long  term  ratings 
and  BFSRs  or  individual  ratings  for  Moody's  and  Fitch  respectively.  Models 
estimated  from  BSFRs,  or  Fitch  individual  ratings,  have  a  higher  classification 
accuracy  at  zero  notch  and  one  notch  than  either  model  based  on  long  term 
ratings.  For  Moody's,  the  model  with  the  best  zero  notch  (64.6%)  and  one  notch 
(98.3%)  classification  accuracy  is  estimated  when  long  term  ratings  are  included 
as  one  of  the  independent  variables.  This  finding  is  consistent  with  Poon,  Firth 
and  Fung  (1999)  as  they  also  found  that  a  model  of  BFSRs  estimated  on  financial 
ratios  does  not  perform  as  well  as  a  model  including  Moody's  long  term  ratings. 
Zero  notch  classification  accuracy  for  Moody's  long  term  ratings  and  the  BFSR 
model  are  47.4%  and  51.6%  respectively. 
For  Fitch,  the  model  with  the  best  zero  notch  (68.5%)  and  one  notch  (93%) 
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10 Chapter  Ten  Predicting  bank  bond  ratings 
model  of  individual  ratings  without  long  term  ratings  as  one  of  the  independent 
variables  performs  slightly  better  than  the  model  including  long  term  ratings.  The 
model  for  Fitch  long  term  ratings  performs  poorly  with  42.3%  classification  at  zero 
notch  and  90.2%  at  one  notch. 
These  findings  are  not  consistent  with  the  Moody's  models.  Whereas  the 
classification  accuracy  of  the  Moody's  BFSR  model  improved  with  the  addition  of 
long  term  ratings,  the  classification  model  of  Fitch  individual  ratings  is  worse  when 
long  term  ratings  are  included  (although  long  term  ratings  are  a  highly  significant 
input  to  the  model).  The  classification  of  Fitch  long  term  ratings  is  markedly  worse 
than  Fitch  individual  ratings.  The  Fitch  results  support  the  hypothesis  that  financial 
ratios  can  be  used  to  model  individual  ratings  as  these  are  primarily  driven  by 
bank-specific  factors.  Models  are  less  successful  in  correctly  classifying  long  term 
ratings  because  financial  ratios  are  not  significant  determinants  of  support  ratings 
which  are  likely  to  be  determined  by  macro-economic  variables.  The  chi-square 
values  were  highly  significant  in  all  models. 
Table  10.1  shows  the  ratios  that  were  selected  in  the  stepwise  model  building 
process.  There  are  very  few  ratios  that  are  common  to  the  long  term  rating 
models  for  Moody's  and  Fitch.  Only  interest  expense/total  assets,  net  interest 
income/total  assets  and  common  equity  are  common  to  both  models.  For 
individual  rating  models  there  are  more  similarities.  BFSR  and  Fitch  individual 
rating  models  have  the  ratios  tax  expense/total  assets,  noninterest  expense/total 
revenue,  loan  loss  reserves/loans,  net  income  and  common  equity  common  to 
both  models.  The  models  of  individual  ratings  which  include  long  term  ratings  as 
one  of  the  independent  variables  also  share  loan  loss  reserves/loans,  net  income 
and  common  equity  with  the  addition  of  noninterest  income/total  revenue.  Long 
term  ratings  are  highly  significant  for  both  models  which  would  be  expected  as  the 
individual  rating  is  a  component  of  the  long  term  rating. 
Many  banks  use  external  ratings  as  part  of  the  process  of  determining  internal 
ratings,  either  as  a  reference  point  or  as  an  input  to  the  model.  This  study  finds 
that  long  term  ratings  can  be  an  effective  input  when  modeling  unsupported 
ratings,  even  though  the  long  term  rating  does  include  a  support  element. 
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10.2.2  Comparison  of  bank  bond  rating  models  for  different  agencies 
Table  10.2  shows  the  results  of  long  term  rating  models  estimated  for  10  different 
rating  agencies.  The  classification  accuracy  for  the  holdout  samples  at  the  zero 
notch  level  ranges  from  42.15%  for  Duff  and  Phelps  to  70.75%  for  DCRS.  The 
classification  accuracy  to  one  notch  ranges  from  83%  for  Capital  Intelligence  to 
100%  for  JCR  and  CBRS.  The  Japanese  agency,  JCR  shows  a  classification 
accuracy  of  67%  (zero  notch  difference)  and  100%  (one  notch).  The  worst 
performing  models  for  the  live  agencies  are  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch.  The  chi- 
square  results  are  highly  significant  for  all  of  the  models. 
Different  independent  variables  are  significant  for  different  agency  models.  Table 
10.2  shows  that  there  are  similarities  in  the  variables  selected  by  the  stepwise 
logistic  regression  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch.  The  variables  common  equity, 
shareholders'  funds,  loans/total  assets  and  net  interest  income/total  revenue  are 
highly  significant  for  all  three  agencies.  A  number  of  other  variables  are  highly 
significant  (at  the  1%  level)  for  two  out  of  three  of  these  agencies;  non-interest 
expense/total  revenue,  loan  loss  reserve/loans  and  loans  and  significant  (at  the 
5%  level);  net  income/shareholders'  funds,  total  deposits/total  liabilities,  operating 
profit  after  loan  loss  provisions  and  loan  loss  provisions. 
There  is  a  high  classification  accuracy  for  the  holdout  sample  for  DBRS  of  70.75%. 
The  logistic  regression  model  generated  a  relatively  simple  model  for  this  agency 
showing  the  variables  loan  loss  provisions  and  net  income  to  be  highly  significant 
and  loans/total  assets  to  be  significant. 
The  Japanese  agencies  are  the  only  agencies  for  which  only  ratios  are  chosen  in 
the  stepwise  selection  process'  and  none  of  the  absolute  values.  Japanese 
agencies  generally  rate  higher  than  the  other  agencies  in  the  study  so  there  are 
many  more  ratings  grouped  in  the  first  and  second  of  the  four  categories  of 
dependent  variables. 
10.2.3  Comparison  of  bank  bond  rating  models  for  different  regions 
The  models  for  long  term  ratings  of  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  classified  less  than 
half  of  the  holdout  sample  correctly  (on  average  45.1  %  of  the  holdout  sample  was 
correctly  classified  at  the  zero  notch  level).  To  understand  if  there  are  certain 
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regions  for  which  bank  bond  rating  models  perform  better  than  others  the  sample 
was  split  into  5  regions;  North  America,  Europe,  Asia  Pacific  (excluding  Japan), 
Japan  and  South  America  and  other  (the  constituent  countries  are  shown  in 
Appendix  3). 
Tables  10.3  to  10.5  show  that  for  all  three  rating  agencies  the  model  for  the  USA  is 
one  of  the  most  poorly  performing  models  (in  terms  of  correct  classification  of  the 
holdout  sample).  The  data  for  the  USA  is  further  analysed  in  the  sections  below  to 
try  explain  this  result.  For  all  agencies,  Europe  is  either  the  best  or  second  best 
performing  model.  Tables  10.3  to  10.5  show  consistently  high  levels  of  correct 
classification  at  zero  and  one  notch  levels  for  European  models.  Correct  zero 
notch  classification  accuracy  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  respectively  in  Europe 
where  63%,  56%  and  65%  respectively  which  compares  favourably  with  the  41.5% 
average  for  the  USA. 
Models  for  the  Asia  Pacific  region  have  been  estimated  both  including  and 
excluding  Japan.  The  results  for  the  whole  of  Asia  Pacific  show  poor  results, 
especially  for  Moody's  and  S&P  samples.  When  the  sample  is  split  between  Japan 
and  other  Asia  Pacific  banks  the  classification  accuracy  increases  substantially  for 
Japan  and  increases  in  some  cases  for  the  rest  of  the  region.  This  suggests  that 
the  characteristics  and  accounting  practices  of  Japanese  banks  are  different  to 
other  banks  in  the  Asia  Pacific  region  and  should  be  modelled  separately.  The 
conflicting  results  for  Asia  Pacific  excluding  Japan  may  be  due  to  the  mix  of 
different  countries  with  varying  accounting  and  banking  practices  included  in  the 
sample  (see  Appendix  3  for  constituent  countries). 
The  most  interesting  finding  from  this  breakdown  of  the  sample  by  region  is  that 
individual  country  models  appear  to  outperform  the  model  estimated  from  the 
whole  sample.  For  S&P  each  of  the  regional  models  gives  a  higher  classification 
accuracy  than  the  full  model,  for  Fitch  this  is  true  with  the  exception  of  the  USA 
and  for  S&P  with  the  exception  of  Asia  Pacific.  This  result  suggests  that  banks 
should  be  modelling  internal  credit  ratings  on  a  country  basis  rather  than  using  a 
global  model. 
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For  some  regions  there  are  certain  ratios  or  variables  that  are  used  in  the  regional 
model  estimated  for  all  three  agencies.  The  models  for  Japan  show  a  high  level  of 
consensus  but  the  agencies  do  not  appear  to  use  the  same  inputs  to  determine 
the  ratings.  None  of  the  ratios  selected  by  the  stepwise  process  for  the  models  for 
South  America  and  other  regions  agree.  This  could  be  due  to  small  sample  sizes 
or  disparate  countries  included  in  this  data. 
A  summary  of  different  variables  selected  by  the  stepwise  process  of  different 
models  is  shown  in  table  10.6. 
Table  10.6:  Ratios  and  variables  used  in  regional  models  estimated  for  all 
three  US  agencies 
---------------  -U--SA 
Europe 
All  Asia  Pacific 
Japan  ---- 
Net  interest  incomettotal 
revenue 
Loan-loss-reserves/loans 
Interest  expensestinterest 
bearing  liabilities 
Loan  loss  reserves/loans 
No  variables 
Asia  Pacific  (excl  Loan  loss  reserves/loans 
Japan)  Net  income 
Other  No  variables 
Used  in  2  out  of  3  of  the 
models 
Noninterest  expense/total 
revenue 
Loan  loss  reserves/loans 
Log  loans 
Common  equity_______ 
Log  revenue 
Net  income 
Loan  loss  provisions 
Interest  expenses/total 
assets 
Noninterest  expense/total 
_ 
revenue 




No  variables 
10.2.4  Comparison  of  bank  bond  rating  models  for  banks  of  different  size 
and  type 
The  estimation  of  bank  rating  models  by  region  raises  the  question  as  to  why  the 
models  for  the  USA  are  performing  relatively  poorly.  To  try  to  answer  this  question 
the  USA  data  samples  were  broken  down  by  size  of  bank  (using  total  assets  as  a 
proxy  for  size)  and  by  type  of  bank.  Fitch  Ratings  provided  the  USA  bank 
accounting  data  in  a  number  of  different  templates  such  as  holding  companies, 
subsidiaries,  investment  banks  and  thrifts  so  it  was  possible  to  split  the  USA 
sample  of  banks  into  different  types. 
Used  in  all  3  regional 
models  for  Moody's,  S&P  & 
Fitch 
Shareholders  funds 
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10.2.4.1  Comparison  by  size 
The  data  sample  was  split  into  three  sections;  total  assets  of  less  than  £4bn,  total 
assets  of  greater  than  £4bn  and  less  than  £35bn  and  total  assets  of  greater  than 
£35bn. 
Tables  10.7  to  10.9  show  the  results  of  these  models  for  the  three  major  agencies. 
The  classification  accuracy  of  the  models  for  all  agencies  declines  with  bank  size. 
For  the  largest  banks,  classification  of  the  holdout  sample  at  the  zero  notch  level  is 
higher  than  the  whole  USA  sample  (by  25%,  10.5%  and  16%  for  Moody's,  S&P 
and  Fitch  respectively)  but  for  the  smallest  banks  the  classification  accuracy  is 
lower  than  the  whole  sample  (by  10%,  8%  and  2%  respectively). 
An  analysis  of  the  different  variables  selected  by  the  stepwise  process  of  each  of 
the  models  gives  some  interesting  results.  The  ratings  of  large  banks  appear  to 
be  determined  by  the  proportion  of  total  liabilities  to  total  deposits,  the  absolute 
value  of  operating  profit  after  loan  loss  provisions  and  the  value  of  loans.  Total 
liabilities  to  total  deposits  and  the  absolute  value  of  operating  profit  after  loan  loss 
provisions  are  variables  not  selected  by  any  of  the  other  models  in  this 
comparison. 
In  the  estimation  of  medium  sized  bank  ratings  the  items  non-interest  expense  to 
total  revenue  and  loans  appear  most  frequently.  For  small  banks  the  predominant 
variable  is  total  assets.  This  is  selected  by  all  three  models  for  small  banks  and  is 
the  only  variable  in  the  models  for  Moody's  and  Fitch. 
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10.2.4.2  Comparison  by  type 
The  sample  was  split  into  three  different  categories  of  banks;  holding  companies  and 
investment  banks,  subsidiaries  and  thrifts.  Tables  10.10  to  10.12  show  the  results  of 
comparison  by  type  for  the  three  major  agencies.  A  consistent  pattern  also  emerges 
from  this  comparison.  The  classification  accuracy  at  zero  notch  for  thrifts  is  higher 
than  the  other  two  categories  for  all  three  agencies.  The  improvements  in 
classification  accuracy  of  the  thrift  model  over  the  whole  USA  model  for  each  agency 
was  12%,  21%  and  25%  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  respectively.  However  the 
results  for  differences  one  notch  apart  are  not  as  good  as  the  holding  company  and 
subsidiary  models  for  Moody's  and  Fitch.  There  is  an  improvement  in  classification 
accuracy  for  holding  companies  and  investment  banks  for  Moody's  (4.5%)  and  Fitch 
(6%)  over  the  whole  model  but  not  for  S&P.  Classification  accuracy  at  one  notch  is 
better  for  all  models.  In  all  cases  the  worst  result  is  for  the  subsidiary  model. 
There  is  far  less  consensus  between  the  variables  selected  for  the  comparison  by  type 
than  by  size.  Shareholder's  funds  are  selected  by  two  models  for  the  holding 
companies  and  investment  banks,  non-interest  expenses  over  total  revenue  and 
shareholders'  funds  are  a  significant  determinant  for  the  subsidiary  models  and  loans 
are  significant  for  the  thrift  models. 
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10.3  Summary 
Using  logistic  regression  analysis,  this  study  has  compared  the  results  of  52  different 
models  of  worldwide  individual  bank  ratings  and  long  term  bank  ratings  for  10  different 
rating  agencies.  It  finds  that  models  can  estimate  two  thirds  of  the  ratings  of  the 
holdout  sample  correctly  for  individual  ratings  and  for  two  regions,  Japan  and  Europe. 
The  first  set  of  models  estimate  bond  ratings  for  Moody's  long  term  ratings,  Moody's 
BFSR  and  BFSR  using  financial  ratios  and  Moody's  long  term  ratings.  The  same 
comparison  is  made  for  Fitch  ratings;  Fitch  long  term  ratings,  Fitch  individual  ratings 
and  Fitch  Individual  ratings  estimated  using  financial  ratios  and  Fitch  long  term  ratings. 
The  results  of  the  models  comparing  Fitch  individual  and  Fitch  long  term  ratings  show 
that  the  individual  ratings  can  be  modelled  effectively  using  financial  ratios  while 
classification  accuracy  of  long  term  ratings  is  not  as  good.  Different  results  were 
observed  for  Moody's.  The  best  model  was  for  BFSRs  modeled  using  financial  ratios 
and  Moody's  long  term  ratings  suggesting  that  Moody's  BFSRs  are  not  providing  the 
same  information  as  Fitch  Individual  ratings  and  are  assessed  in  a  different  way. 
Table  10.2  compared  results  from  10  different  rating  agencies,  7  live  and  3  dead 
agencies.  Analysis  of  models  for  each  of  the  10  different  agencies  used  in  this  study 
shows  that  financial  variables  are  most  effective  at  predicting  the  ratings  of  Canadian 
and  Japanese  rating  agencies.  Prediction  of  the  long  term  bank  ratings  of  the  three 
major  USA  agencies,  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch,  does  not  yield  high  classification 
accuracies  at  the  zero  notch  level. 
Tables  10.3  to  10.5  compare  the  results  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  when  the  rated 
banks  are  split  into  country  regions.  Regions  for  which  bank  ratings  can  be  most 
accurately  predicted  are  Europe  and  Japan.  The  overall  classification  accuracy  of  the 
models  increases  when  country  regions  are  split  up  rather  than  when  the  data 
samples  are  considered  on  a  worldwide  basis.  This  suggests  that  banks  using  rating 
models  as  part  of  their  internal  credit  rating  process  should  split  rating  models  by 
country  or  region  where  possible. 
To  try  to  understand  the  relatively  poor  performance  of  the  USA  rating  models  the  data 
was  split  by  size  and  type  of  bank.  Tables  10.7  to  10.9  show  results  for  Moody's,  S&P 
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and  Fitch  when  the  banks  are  split  into  size  bandings  based  on  the  banks'  total  assets. 
The  final  set  of  tables,  10.10  to  10.12,  compare  the  results  for  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch 
when  the  banks  are  split  between  bank  holding  companies,  subsidiaries  and  thrifts. 
Classification  accuracy  for  all  agencies  declines  with  bank  size  and  at  zero  notch  is 
higher  by  approximately  7%  on  average  for  larger  banks,  thrifts  and  bank  holding 
companies  than  for  models  based  on  the  whole  USA  region.  However  classification 
accuracy  for  USA  banks  is  still  lower  than  for  other  regions.  This  may  arise  because 
the  support  element  has  greater  significance  to  the  long  term  ratings  in  the  USA  than 
in  other  regions  or  that  USA  based  agencies  have  greater  access  to  more  detailed 
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Conclusion 
This  thesis  has  focused  on  split  credit  ratings  and  the  prediction  of  bank  credit  ratings. 
The  first  three  chapters  of  the  thesis  cover  the  background  to  the  credit  rating  industry, 
Basel  II  and  the  literature  directly  relating  to  this  study.  In  the  area  of  split  credit 
ratings  previous  research  has  established  that  the  ratings  of  Moody's  and  S&P  are 
similar  and  that  the  Japanese  agencies  are  consistently  more  generous  than  those 
from  other  parts  of  the  world.  There  is  more  disagreement  between  agencies  over  low 
quality  issuers.  In  addition,  all  agencies  appear  to  be  more  generous  towards  issuers 
from  their  home  country  and  the  level  of  consensus  is  higher  between  agencies  from 
the  same  country. 
Chapters  six  to  nine  present  results  from  studies  into  many  aspects  of  split  ratings. 
This  thesis  confirms  the  finding  that  Moody's  and  S&P  have  very  similar  credit  ratings 
and  that  the  widest  difference  between  any  credit  rating  agencies  exists  between  the 
US  agencies,  especially  Moody's  and  S&P  and  the  Japanese  agencies,  R&I  and  JCR. 
A  ranking  of  agencies,  which  has  been  proved  using  significant  tests,  is  shown  to  exist 
between  agencies.  It  was  unclear  from  previous  research  whether  this  ranking  arises 
because  the  scales  of  all  the  agencies  are  skewed  in  one  direction  or  the  other  across 
all  rating  bands  or  whether  differences  arose  at  different  cut  off  points  between  grades. 
This  study  shows  that  the  two  Japanese  agency  rating  scales  are  skewed  higher  than 
all  other  agencies  across  the  whole  scale.  For  all  other  agencies  there  appear  to  be 
differences  at  certain  cut-off  points  but  not  consistently  across  the  rating  scale. 
A  study  looking  at  the  industry  and  geographic  characteristics  of  the  agencies  showed 
that  consensus  varies  between  different  industries  and  regions.  Three  groups  with 
statistically  significant  differences  in  mean  levels  of  split  ratings  appear  from  this 
research.  (1)  Sovereigns,  (2)  Finance/Insurance/Banking/Energy/Utilities/Leisure  and 
(3)  Manufacturing/  Consumer  goods/Transport/Healthcare/Technology/Forestry  and 
Building.  The  lowest  level  of  consensus  between  agencies  arises  for  group  3,  the 
manufacturing  group.  This  is  contrary  to  the  findings  of  previous  research  which  show 
banks  to  have  the  lowest  level  of  consensus.  The  level  of  consensus  within  an 
industry  group  appears  to  be  influenced  by  the  average  credit  quality  of  that  group,  the 
lower  the  credit  quality  the  lower  the  level  of  consensus. 
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Five  significantly  different  regional  groups  are  also  identified,  UK  and  Europe,  USA 
and  Canada,  Far  East,  Japan  and  South  America  and  the  Middle  East.  UK  and 
Europe  have  the  highest  level  of  consensus  and  the  Middle  East  and  South  America 
have  the  lowest.  As  above,  the  level  of  consensus  is  influenced  by  the  average  credit 
quality  of  the  region. 
The  final  chapter  of  the  split  rating  studies  considers  the  implications  of  split  ratings  on 
the  Standardised  approach  for  Basel  II.  Comparison  of  split  ratings  shows  that  there 
are  significant  differences  at  the  1%  level  between  the  mean  differences  between 
rating  agencies.  To  assess  the  impact  on  Basel  II  risk  assessments,  issuers  rated  by 
two  agencies  were  compared  and  the  credit  rating  assigned  by  each  was  mapped  to 
Basel  II  risk  weights  as  prescribed.  The  average  risk  weight  that  would  have  been 
assigned  by  each  agency  was  then  compared.  Although  most  of  the  differences 
between  agencies  were  in  the  expected  direction,  only  the  differences  between  the 
Japanese  agencies  and  Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  were  statistically  significant.  The 
conclusion  was  that  the  level  of  split  ratings  between  the  Japanese  agencies  and 
Moody's,  S&P  and  Fitch  could  have  a  significant  impact  on  Basel  II  risk  assessments  if 
supervisors  do  not  alter  the  mapping  of  those  agencies  ratings  to  the  Basel  II  risk 
weights. 
Although  there  is  extensive  research  into  the  area  of  prediction  of  credit  ratings,  most 
of  these  studies  focus  on  corporate  bonds  or  issuers  rather  than  banks.  There  are 
only  a  handful  of  studies  modelling  the  credit  ratings  of  banks.  This  study  used  credit 
rating  data  and  financial  ratios  and  variables  to  model  individual  bank  ratings  as  well 
as  long  term  ratings.  The  model  which  accurately  predicted  the  highest  level  of  credit 
ratings  was  that  estimated  and  tested  on  samples  of  Fitch  Individual  Ratings. 
Hypothetically,  it  should  be  possible  to  model  individual  ratings  of  Fitch  and  Moody's 
more  accurately  from  financial  data  than  the  long  term  ratings.  This  is  because 
individual  ratings  do  not  include  a  support  element.  The  support  element  reflects  the 
likelihood  of  financial  support  from  a  government  in  the  event  that  the  bank  runs  into 
serious  financial  trouble  and  it  would  be  more  appropriate  to  model  this  element  from 
economic  data  rather  than  bank  specific  financial  ratios.  As  expected,  the  model  for 
Fitch  long  term  ratings  shows  a  lower  prediction  accuracy  of  the  holdout  sample  than 
the  model  for  Fitch  individual  ratings. 
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The  model  using  Fitch  ratings  data  dearly  showed  that  a  model  using  solely  financial 
data  has  a  higher  prediction  accuracy  for  individual  ratings  than  for  long  term  ratings. 
Interestingly  the  Moody's  ratings  did  not  show  the  same  result.  The  model  of  Moody's 
BFSRs  successfully  predicted  only  4%  more  ratings  than  the  Moody's  model  for  long 
term  ratings.  The  prediction  accuracy  was  approximately  50%.  The  accuracy  for  the 
Moody's  model  was  improved  significantly  when  the  long  term  ratings  were  included 
as  one  of  the  independent  variables.  The  exact  reason  for  this  result  is  unclear  but  it 
can  be  concluded  that  Moody's  BFSRs  are  not  providing  the  same  information  as  Fitch 
Individual  ratings  and  that  they  are  assigned  in  a  different  way.  The  implication  for 
banks  modelling  bank  ratings  for  internal  purposes  is  that  the  long  term  rating  could  be 
used  as  one  of  the  inputs  to  the  model  to  improve  the  accuracy  of  estimates  of 
individual  bank  ratings. 
The  rest  of  the  models  estimated  in  chapter  ten  all  related  to  long  term  ratings. 
Despite  the  drawbacks  of  trying  to  model  a  rating  which  includes  a  support  element, 
some  of  the  models  did  have  a  high  prediction  accuracy  when  tested  with  the  holdout 
sample.  For  example  the  models  for  Canadian  agencies  and  one  of  the  Japanese 
agencies  successfully  predicted  two  thirds,  or  more,  of  the  holdout  sample  correctly. 
Models  for  European  and  Japanese  banks  also  showed  a  higher  classification 
accuracy  than  other  models.  The  overall  classification  accuracy  of  the  model 
increases  when  country  regions  are  split  up  rather  than  when  the  data  samples  are 
considered  on  a  worldwide  basis.  This  suggests  that  banks  using  rating  models  as 
part  of  their  internal  credit  rating  process  should  split  rating  models  by  country  or 
region  where  possible. 
The  US  bank  rating  models  performed  poorly.  To  try  to  explain  this  finding  the  data 
sample  was  split  by  size  and  type  of  bank.  Classification  accuracy  for  all  agencies 
declines  with  bank  size  and  the  accuracy  is  higher  by  approximately  7%  on  average 
for  larger  banks,  thrifts  and  bank  holding  companies  than  for  models  based  on  the 
whole  USA  region.  However  classification  for  USA  banks  is  still  lower  than  for  other 
regions.  This  may  arise  because  the  support  element  has  greater  significance  to  the 
long  term  ratings  in  the  USA  than  in  other  regions  or  that  the  USA  based  agencies 
have  greater  access  to  detailed  financial,  non-financial  and  qualitative  information  for 
US  banks  than  for  non-US  banks.  The  studies  into  split  ratings  found  evidence  of 
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home  country  bias  for  all  agencies,  this  factor  could  also  be  influencing  the  ratings  of 
US  banks. 
This  thesis  opens  new  areas  for  future  research.  A  comparison  of  split  ratings  by 
cumulative  default  probability  would  be  an  interesting  addition  to  the  studies  based  on 
ratings  scales.  The  default  probability  would  be  expected  to  take  account  of  the 
difference  in  rating  scales  so,  when  compared  over  a  period  of  several  years,  it  would 
be  expected  to  smooth  out  the  split  ratings  between  agencies. 
The  study  comparing  the  difference  between  individual  ratings  and  long  term  ratings 
would  be  greatly  enhanced  by  modelling  the  bank  support  ratings.  These  are  likely  to 
be  determined  by  country  and  macroeconomic  factors,  this  data  was  not  available  for 
this  thesis.  If  support  ratings  can  be  successfully  modelled,  a  long  term  bank  rating 
model  made  up  from  a  combination  of  financial  variables  and  relevant  macroeconomic 
data  could  yield  higher  classification  accuracy  than  achieved  in  this  study. 
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Rating  definitions 
Canadian  Bond  Rating  Service  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
Highest  Quality:  A++ 
This  category  encompasses  bonds  of  outstanding  quality.  They  possess  the  highest 
degree  of  protection  of  principal  and  interest.  Companies  with  debt  rated  A++  are 
generally  large  national  and/  or  multinational  corporations  whose  products  or  services 
are  essential  to  the  Canadian  economy. 
These  companies  are  the  acknowledged  leaders  in  their  respective  industries  and 
have  clearly  demonstrated  their  ability  to  best  withstand  adverse  economic  or  trade 
conditions  either  national  or  international  in  scope. 
Characteristically,  these  companies  have  had  a  long  and  creditable  history  of  superior 
debt  protection,  in  which  the  quality  of  their  assets  and  earning  has  been  constantly 
maintained  or  improved,  with  strong  evidence  that  this  will  continue. 
Very  Good  Quality:  A+ 
Bonds  rated  A+  are  similar  in  characteristics  to  those  rated  A  ++  and  can  also  be 
considered  superior  in  quality.  These  companies  have  demonstrated  a  long  and 
satisfactory  history  of  growth  with  above  average  protection  of  principal  and  interest  on 
their  debt  securities. 
These  bonds  are  generally  rated  lower  in  quality  because  the  margin  of  assets  or 
earnings  protection  may not  be  as  large  or as  stable  as  those  rated  A++.  In  both  these 
categories  the  nature  and  quality  of  the  asset  and  earning  coverages  are  more 
important  than  the  numerical  values  of  the  ratios. Appendix  I  Rating  definitions 
Canadian  Bond  Rating  Service  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
Good  Quality:  A 
Bonds  rated  A  are  considered  to  be  good  quality  securities  and  to  have  favourable 
long-term  investment  characteristics.  The  main  feature  that  distinguishes  them  from 
the  higher  rated  securities  is  that  these  companies  are  more  susceptible  to  adverse 
trade  or  economic  conditions.  Consequently  the  protection  is  lower  than  for  the 
categories  A++  and  A+. 
In  all  cases  the  A  rated  companies  have  maintained  a  history  of  adequate  asset  and 
earnings  protection.  There  may  be  certain  elements  that  may  impair  this  protection 
sometime  in  the  future.  Confidence  that  the  current  overall  financial  position  will  be 
maintained  or  improved  is  slightly  lower  than  for  the  securities  rated  above. 
Medium  Quality:  B++ 
Issues  rated  B++  are  classified  as  medium  or  average  grade  credits  and  are 
considered  to  be  investment  grade.  These  companies  are  generally  more  susceptible 
than  any  of  the  higher  rated  companies  to  swings  in  economic  or  trade  conditions  that 
would  cause  a  deterioration  in  protection  should  the  company  enter  a  period  of  poor 
operating  conditions. 
There  may  be  factors  present  either  from  within  or  without  the  company  that  may 
adversely  affect  the  long-term  level  of  protection  of  the  debt.  These  companies  bear 
closer  scrutiny  but,  in  all  cases,  both  interest  and  principal  are  adequately  protected  at 
the  present  time. 
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Canadian  Bond  Rating  Service  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
Lower  Medium  Quality:  B+ 
Bonds  which  are  rated  B+  are  considered  to  be  lower  medium  grade  securities  and 
have  limited  long-  term  protective  investment  characteristics.  Assets  and  earnings 
coverage  may  be  modest  or  unstable. 
A  significant  deterioration  in  interest  and  principal  protection  may  occur  during  periods 
of  adverse  economic  or  trade  conditions.  During  periods  of  normal  or  improving 
economic  conditions,  assets  and  earnings  protection  are  adequate.  However,  the 
company's  ability  to  continually  improve  its  financial  position  and  level  of  debt 
protection  is  at  present  limited. 
Poor  Quality:  B 
Securities  rated  B  lack  most  qualities  necessary  for  long-term  fixed  income 
investment.  Companies  in  this  category  have  a  general  history  of  volatile  operating 
conditions,  and  the  assurance  has  been  in  doubt  that  principal  and  interest  protection 
will  be  maintained  at  an  adequate  level.  Current  coverages  may  be  below  industry 
standards  and  there  is  little  assurance  that  debt  protection  will  improve  significantly. 
Speculative  Quality:  C 
Securities  in  this  category  are  clearly  speculative.  The  companies  are  generally  junior 
in  many  respects  and  there  is  little  assurance  that  the  adequate  coverage  of  principal 
and  interest  can  be  maintained  uninterrupted  over  a  period  of  time. 
Default:  D 
Bonds  in  this  category  are  in  default  of  some  provisions  in  their  trust  deed  and  the 
companies  mayor  may  not  be  in  the  process  of  liquidation. 
Intermediate  Categories 
(High)  and  (Low)  designations  after  a  rating  indicate  an  issuer'  s  relative  strength 
within  a  rating  category. 
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Capital  Intelligence  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
AAA 
The  highest  credit  quality.  Exceptional  capacity  for  timely  fulfillment  of  financial 
obligations  and  most  unlikely  to  be  affected  by  any  foreseeable  adversity.  Extremely 
strong  financial  condition  and  very  positive  non-financial  factors.  Very  strong  and 
stable  operating  environment. 
AA 
Very  high  credit  quality.  Very  strong  capacity  for  timely  fulfilment  of  financial 
obligations.  Unlikely  to  have  repayment  problems  over  the  long  term  and  unquestioned 
over  the  short  and  medium  terms.  Strong  operating  environment.  Adverse  changes  in 
business,  economic  and  financial  conditions  unlikely  to  affect  the  institution 
significantly. 
A 
High  credit  quality.  Strong  capacity  for  timely  fulfillment  of  financial  obligations. 
Possesses  many  favourable  credit  characteristics,  but  may  be  slightly  vulnerable  to 
adverse  changes  in  business,  economic  and  financial  conditions.  However,  operating 
environment  is  solid. 
BBB 
Good  credit  quality.  Satisfactory  capacity  for  timely  fulfillment  of  financial  obligations. 
Acceptable  credit  characteristics,  but  some  vulnerability  to  adverse  changes  in 
business,  economic  and  financial  conditions.  Medium  grade  credit  characteristics  and 
the  lowest  investment  grade  category. 
BB 
Speculative  credit  quality.  Capacity  for  timely  fulfillment  of  financial  obligations  is 
vulnerable  to  adverse  changes  in  internal  or  external  circumstances.  Financial  and/or 
non  financial  factors  do  not  provide  significant  safeguard  and  the  possibility  of 
investment  risk may  develop.  Unstable  operating  environment. 
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Capital  Intelligence  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
B 
Significant  credit  risk.  Capacity  for  timely  fulfillment  of  financial  obligations  is  very 
vulnerable  to  adverse  changes  in  internal  or  external  circumstances.  Financial  and/or 
non  financial  factors  provide  weak  protection;  high  probability  for  investment  risk 
exists.  Weak  operating  environment. 
C 
Substantial  credit  risk  is  apparent  and  the  likelihood  of  default  is  high.  Considerable 
uncertainty  as  to  timely  repayment  of  financial  obligations.  Credit  is  of  poor  standing 
with  financial  and/or  non  financial  factors  providing  little  protection. 
D 
Obligations  are  currently  in  default. 
Intermediate  Categories 
Long  term  ratings  from  AAA  to  C  may  be  modified  by  the  addition  of  a  plus  '+'  or minus 
=`  sign  to  indicate  that  the  strength  of  a  particular  institution  is  respectively,  slightly 
greater  or  less  than  that  of  similarly  rated  peers. 
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Dominion  Bond  Rating  Service  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
AAA 
Bonds  which  are  rated  'AAA'  are  of  the  highest  credit  quality.  The  degree  of  protection 
afforded  principal  and  interest  is  of  the  highest  order.  Earnings  are  relatively  stable, 
the  structure  of  the  industry  in  which  the  entity  operates  is  very strong,  and  the  outlook 
for  future  profitability  is  extremely  favourable.  There  are  few  qualifying  factors  present 
which  would  detract  from  the  performance  of  the  entity,  and  the  strength  of  liquidity 
and  coverage  ratios  is  unquestioned. 
AA 
Bonds  rated  'AA'  are  of  superior  credit  quality,  and  protection  of  interest  and  principal 
is  considered  high.  In  many  cases,  they  differ  from  bonds  rated'  AAA'  to  a  small 
degree. 
A 
Bonds  rated  'A'  are  of  upper  medium  grade  credit  quality.  Protection  of  interest  and 
principal  is  still  substantial,  but  the  degree  of  strength  is  less  than  with  'AA'  rated 
entities.  Entities  in  the  'A'  category  may  be  more  susceptible  to  adverse  economic 
conditions  and  have  greater  cyclical  tendencies. 
BBB 
Bonds  rated  'BBB'  are  of  medium  grade  credit  quality.  Protection  of  interest  and 
principal  is  considered  adequate,  but  the  entity  may  be  more  susceptible  to  economic 
cycles,  or  there  may  be  other  adversities  present  which  reduce  the  strength  of  these 
bonds. 
BB 
Bonds  rated  'BB'  are  of  lower  medium  grade  credit  quality,  and  are  considered  mildly 
speculative.  The  degree  of  protection  afforded  interest  and  principal  is  uncertain, 
particularly  during  periods  of  economic  recession,  and  the  size  of  the  entity  may  be 
relatively  small. 
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Dominion  Bond  Rating  Service  -  Long  term  bond  rating  scale 
B 
Bonds  rated  'B'  are  of  speculative  credit  quality.  Uncertainty  exists  as  to  the  ability  of 
the  entity  to  pay  interest  and  principal  on  a  continuing  basis  in  the  future,  especially  in 
periods  of  economic  recession. 
ccc 
Bonds  rated  'CCC'  are  considered  highly  speculative  and  are  in  danger  of  default  of 
interest  and  principal.  The  degree  of  adverse  elements  present  is  more  severe  than 
with  bonds  rated  U. 
cc 
Bonds  rated  'CC'  are  in  default  of  either  interest  or principal. 
C 
'C'  is  the  lowest  rating  provided  on  long-term  instruments.  Bonds  rated  'C'  differ  from 
bonds  rated  'CC'with  respect  to  the  relative  liquidation  values  and  rank. 
Intermediate  Categories 
(High)  and  (Low)  designations  after  a  rating  indicate  an  issuer'  s  relative  strength 
within  a  rating  category. 
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Duff  &  Phelps  Credit  Rating  Co  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
AAA 
Highest  credit  quality.  The  risk  factors  are  negligible,  being  only  slightly  more  than  for 
risk-free  US  Treasury  debt. 
AA+/AA/AA- 
High  credit  quality.  Protection  factors  are  strong.  Risk  is  modest  but  may  vary  slightly 
from  time  to  time  because  of  economic  conditions. 
A+/A/A- 
Protection  factors  are  average  but  adequate.  However  risk  factors  are  more  variable 
and  greater  in  periods  of  economic  stress. 
BBB+/BBB  1BBB- 
Below-average  protection  factors  but  still  considered  sufficient  for  prudent  investment. 
Considerable  variability  in  risk  during  economic  cycles. 
BB+  /  BB  /  BB- 
Below-investment  grade  but  deemed  likely  to  meet  obligations  when  due.  Present  or 
prospective  financial  protection  factors  fluctuate  according  to  industry  conditions  or 
company  fortunes.  Overall  quality  may  move  up  or  down  frequently  within  this 
category. 
B+/  B/B- 
Below-investment  grade  and  possessing  risk  that  obligations  will  not  be  met  when  due. 
Financial  protection  factors  will  fluctuate  widely  according  to  economic  cycles,  industry 
conditions  and/  or  company  fortunes.  Potential  exists  for  frequent  changes  in  quality 
rating  within  this  category  or  into  a  higher  or  lower  quality  rating  grade. 
ccc 
Well  below  investment  grade  securities.  May  be  in  default  or  have  considerable 
uncertainty  as  to  timely  payment  of  interest,  preferred  dividends  and/  or  principal. 
Protection  factors  are  narrow  and  risk  can  be  substantial  with  unfavourable 
economictindustry  conditions,  and/  or  with  unfavourable  company  developments. 
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Duff  &  Phelps  Credit  Rating  Co  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
DD/DP 
Defaulted  debt  obligations,  issuer  failed  to  meet  scheduled  principal  and/  or  interest 
payments. 
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Fitch  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
AAA 
Highest  credit  quality.  'AAA'  ratings  denote  the  lowest  expectation  of  credit  risk.  They 
are  assigned  only  in  case  of  exceptionally  strong  capacity  for  timely  payment  of 
financial  commitments.  This  capacity  is  highly  unlikely  to  be  adversely  affected  by 
foreseeable  events. 
AA 
Very  high  credit  quality.  'AA'  ratings  denote  a  very  low  expectation  of  credit  risk.  They 
indicate  very  strong  capacity  for  timely  payment  of  financial  commitments.  This 
capacity  is  not  significantly  vulnerable  to  foreseeable  events. 
A 
High  credit  quality.  'A'  ratings  denote  a  low  expectation  of  credit  risk.  The  capacity  for 
timely  payment  of  financial  commitments  is  considered  strong.  This  capacity  may, 
nevertheless,  be  more  vulnerable  to  changes  in  circumstances  or  in  economic 
conditions  than  is  the  case  for  higher  ratings. 
BBB 
Good  credit  quality.  'BBB'  ratings  indicate  that  there  is  currently  a  low  expectation  of 
credit  risk.  The  capacity  for  timely  payment  of  financial  commitments  is  considered 
adequate,  but  adverse  changes  in  circumstances  and  in  economic  conditions  are  more 
likely  to  impair  this  capacity.  This  is  the  lowest  investment-grade  category. 
BB 
Speculative.  'BB'  ratings  indicate  that  there  is  a  possibility  of  credit  risk  developing, 
particularly  as  the  result  of  adverse  economic  change  over  time;  however,  business  or 
financial  alternatives  may  be  available  to  allow  financial  commitments  to  be  met. 
Securities  rated  in  this  category  are  not  investment  grade. 
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Fitch  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
B 
Highly  speculative.  'B'  ratings  indicate  that  significant  credit  risk  is  present,  but  a 
limited  margin  of  safety  remains.  Financial  commitments  are  currently  being  met; 
however,  capacity  for  continued  payment  is  contingent  upon  a  sustained,  favourable 
business  and  economic  environment. 
ccc,  cc,  c 
High  default  risk.  Default  is  a  real  possibility.  Capacity  for  meeting  financial 
commitments  is  solely  reliant  upon  sustained,  favourable  business  or  economic 
developments.  A  'CC'  rating  indicates  that  default  of  some  kind  appears  probable.  'C' 
ratings  signal  imminent  default. 
DDD,  DD,  D 
Default.  Securities  are  extremely  speculative,  and  their  worth  cannot  exceed  their 
recovery  value  in  any  liquidation  or  reorganization  of  the  obligor.  'DDD'  designates  the 
highest  potential  for  recovery  of  amounts  outstanding  on  any  securities  involved.  For 
U.  S.  corporates,  for  example,  'DD'  indicates  expected  recovery  of  50%  -  90%  of  such 
outstandings,  and  'D'  the  lowest  recovery  potential,  i.  e.  below  50%. 
Intermediate  Categories 
'+'  (plus)  or  -'  (minus)  may  be  appended  to  ratings  to  denote  relative  status  within 
major  rating  categories.  Such  suffixes  are  not  added  to  the  'AAA'  long  -term  rating 
category  or  to  categories  below'CCC'. Appendix  I  Rating  definitions 
Fitch  -  Individual  Ratings  scale 
Individual  Ratings  are  assigned  only  to  banks.  These  ratings,  which  are  internationally 
comparable,  attempt  to  assess  how  a  bank  would  be  viewed  if  it  were  entirely 
independent  and  could  not  rely  on  external  support.  These  ratings  are  designed  to 
assess  a  bank's  exposure  to,  appetite  for,  and  management  of  risk,  and  thus  represent 
our  view  on  the  likelihood  that  it  would  run  into  significant  difficulties  such  that  it  would 
require  support. 
The  principal  factors  we  analyze  to  evaluate  the  bank  and  determine  these  ratings 
include  profitability  and  balance  sheet  integrity  (including  capitalization),  franchise, 
management,  operating  environment,  and  prospects.  Finally,  consistency  is  an 
important  consideration,  as  is  a  bank's  size  (in  terms  of  equity  capital)  and 
diversification  (in  terms  of  involvement  in  a  variety  of  activities  in  different  economic 
and  geographical  sectors). 
A: 
A  very  strong  bank.  Characteristics  may  include  outstanding  profitability  and  balance 
sheet  integrity,  franchise,  management,  operating  environment  or  prospects. 
B 
A  strong  bank.  There  are  no  major  concerns  regarding  the  bank.  Characteristics  may 
include  strong  profitability  and  balance  sheet  integrity,  franchise,  management, 
operating  environment  or  prospects. 
C 
An  adequate  bank,  which,  however,  possesses  one  or  more  troublesome  aspects. 
There  may  be  some  concerns  regarding  its  profitability  and  balance  sheet  integrity, 
franchise,  management,  operating  environment  or  prospects. 
D 
A  bank,  which  has  weaknesses  of  internal  and/or  external  origin.  There  are  concerns 
regarding  its  profitability  and  balance  sheet  integrity,  franchise,  management, 
operating  environment  or  prospects.  Banks  in  emerging  markets  are  necessarily  faced 
with  a  greater  number  of  potential  deficiencies  of  external  origin. 
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Fitch  -  Individual  Ratings  scale 
E 
A  bank  with  very  serious  problems,  which  either  requires  or  is  likely  to  require  external 
support. 
Intermediate  Categories 
Gradations  may  be  used  among  the  five  ratings:  i.  e.  A/B,  B/C,  C/D,  and  D/E. 
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Japan  Credit  Rating  Agency  Ltd  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
AAA 
The  highest  level  of  capacity  of  the  obligor  to  honour  its  financial  commitment  on  the 
obligation. 
AA 
A  very  high  level  of  capacity  to  honour  the  financial  commitment  on  the  obligation. 
A 
A  high  level  of  capacity  to  honour  the  financial  commitment  on  the  obligation. 
BBB 
An  adequate  level  of  capacity  to  honour  the  financial  commitment  on  the  obligation. 
However,  this  capacity  is  more  likely  to  diminish  in  the  future  than  in  the  cases  of  the 
higher  rating  categories. 
BB 
Although  the  level  of  capacity  to  honour  the  financial  commitment  on  the  obligation  is 
not  considered  problematic  at  present,  this  capacity  may  not  persist  in  the  future. 
B 
A  low  level  of  capacity  to  honour  the  financial  commitment  on  the  obligation,  having 
cause  for  concern. 
ccc 
There  are  factors  of  uncertainty  that  the  financial  commitment  on  the  obligation  will  be 
honoured,  and  a  possibility  of  default. 
CC 
A  high  default  risk. 
C 
A  very  high  default  risk. 
D 
In  default. 
With  respect  to  rating  symbols  ranging  from  'AA  to  B'  only  ,a  plus  '+'  or  minus  ='  sign  ay  be  used  after  a  rating  symbol  In  order  to 
indicate  relative  standing  within  a  rating  category. 
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Moody's  Investors  Service  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
Moody's  'Aaa-C'  long-term  ratings  are  applied  to  bonds  and  other  obligations  with  an 
original  maturity  in  excess  of  one  year. 
Aaa 
Obligations  are  judged  to  be  of  the  best  quality.  They  carry  the  smallest  degree  of 
investment  risk  are  generally  referred  to  as  'gilt  edged'.  Interest  payments  are 
protected  by  a  large  or  by  an  exceptionally  stable  margin  and  principal  is  secure.  While 
the  various  protective  elements  are  likely  to  change,  such  changes  as  can  be 
visualized  are  most  unlikely  to  impair  the  fundamentally  strong  position  of  such 
issues. 
Aa 
Obligations  are  judged  to  be  of  high  quality  by  all  standards.  Together  with  the'  Aaa' 
group  they  what  are  generally  known  as  high-grade  bonds.  They  are  rated  lower  than 
the  best  bonds  because  margins  of  protection  may  not  be  as  large  as  in  'Aaa' 
securities  or  fluctuation  of  protective  elements  may  be  of  greater  amplitude  or  there 
may  be  other  elements  present  which  make  the  long-term  risk  appear  somewhat 
larger  than  the  'Aaa'  securities. 
A 
Obligations  possess  many  favourable  investment  attributes  and  are  to  be  considered 
as  upper-  medium-grade  obligations.  Factors  giving  security  to  principal  and  interest 
are  considered  adequate,  but  elements  may  be  present  which  suggest  a  susceptibility 
to  impairment  some  time  in  the  future. 
Baa 
Obligations  are  considered  as  medium-grade  obligations  (i.  e.,  they  are  neither  highly 
protected  nor  poorly  secured).  Interest  payments  and  principal  security  appear 
adequate  for  the  present  but  certain  protective  elements  may  be  lacking  or  may  be 
characteristically  unreliable  over  any  great  length  of  time.  Such  bonds  lack  outstanding 
investment  characteristics  and  in  fact  have  speculative  characteristics  as  well. 
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Moody's  Investors  Service  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
Ba 
Obligations  are  judged  to  have  speculative  elements;  their  future  cannot  be  considered 
as  well-  assured.  Often  the  protection  of  interest  and  principal  payments  may  be  very 
moderate  and  thereby  not  well  safeguarded  during  both  good  and  bad  times  over  the 
future.  Uncertainty  of  position  characterises  bonds  in  this  class. 
B 
Obligations  generally  lack  characteristics  of  the  desirable  investment.  Assurance  of 
interest  and  principal  payments  or  of  maintenance  of  other  terms  of  the  contract  over 
any  long  period  of  time  may  be  small. 
Caa 
Obligations  are  of  poor  standing.  Such  issues  may  be  in  default  or  there  may  be 
present  elements  of  danger  with  respect  to  principal  or  interest. 
Ca 
Obligations  are  speculative  in  a  high  degree.  Such  issues  are  often  in  default  or  have 
other  marked  shortcomings. 
C 
Obligations  are  the  lowest  rated  class,  and  issues  so  rated  can  be  regarded  as  having 
extremely  poor  prospects  of  ever  attaining  any  real  investment  standing. 
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Moody's  Investors  Service  -  Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings  (BFSRs) 
Moody's  Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings  (BFSRs)  represent  Moody's  opinion  of  a 
bank's  intrinsic  safety  and  soundness  and,  as  such,  exclude  certain  external  credit 
risks  and  credit  support  elements  that  are  addressed  by  Moody's  traditional  debt  and 
deposit  ratings.  Factors  considered  in  the  assignment  of  Bank  Financial  Strength 
Ratings  include  bank-specific  elements  such  as  financial  fundamentals,  franchise 
value,  and  business  and  asset  diversification,  as  well  as  some  risk  factors  in  a  bank's 
operating  environment  like  the  quality  of  banking  regulation  and  supervision. 
The  definitions  for  Moody's  BFSRs  are  as  follows: 
A 
Banks  rated  'A'  possess  exceptional  intrinsic  financial  strength.  Typically,  they  will  be 
major  institutions  with  highly  valuable  and  defensible  business  franchises,  strong 
financial  fundamentals,  and  a  stable  operating  environment. 
B 
Banks  rated  'B'  possess  strong  intrinsic  financial  strength.  Typically,  they  will  be 
important  institutions  with  valuable  and  defensible  business  franchises,  good  financial 
fundamentals,  and  an  attractive  and  stable  operating  environment. 
C 
Banks  rated  'C'  possess  good  intrinsic  financial  strength.  Typically,  they  will  be 
institutions  with  valuable  and  defensible  business  franchises.  These  banks  will 
demonstrate  either  acceptable  financial  fundamentals  within  a  stable  operating 
environment,  or  better  than  average  financial  fundamentals  within  an  unstable 
operating  environment. 
D 
Banks  rated  'D'  possess  adequate  intrinsic  financial  strength,  but  may  be  limited  by 
one  or  more  of  the  following  factors:  a  vulnerable  or  developing  business  franchise; 
weak  financial  fundamentals,  or  an  unstable  operating  environment. 
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Moody's  Investors  Service  -  Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings  (BFSRs) 
E 
Banks  rated  'E'  possess  very  weak  intrinsic  financial  strength,  requiring  periodic 
outside  support  or  suggesting  an  eventual  need  for  outside  assistance.  Such 
institutions  may  be  limited by  one  or  more  of  the  following  factors:  a  business  franchise 
of  questionable  value;  financial  fundamentals  that  are  seriously  deficient  in  one  or 
more  respects;  or a  highly  unstable  operating  environment. 
Intermediate  Categories 
For  long  term  ratings  and  Bank  Financial  Strength  Ratings,  where  appropriate,  a  '+' 
may  be  appended  to  ratings  below  the  'A'  category,  and  a  '2  (minus)  may  be  appended 
to  ratings  above  the  'E'  category,  in  order  to  distinguish  those  banks  that  fall  into 
intermediate  categories. 
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Rating  and  Investment  Information  Inc  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
AAA 
The  highest  degree  of  certainty  regarding  the  discharge  of  debt,  with  excellence  in 
many  key  factors  of  evaluation. 
AA 
A  very  high  degree  of  certainty  regarding  the  discharge  of  debt,  with  excellence  in 
several  key  factors  of  evaluation. 
A 
A  high  degree  of  certainty  regarding  the  discharge  of  debt,  with  excellence  in  a  few 
key  components. 
BBB 
An  adequate  degree  of  certainty  regarding  the  discharge  of  debt,  but  requires  attention 
in  some  factors  of  evaluation  in  the  event  of  major  environmental  change. 
BB 
No  problem  for  the  present  in  the  degree  of  certainty  regarding  the  discharge  of  debt, 
but  requires  close  attention  in  some  key  factors  of  evaluation  in  the  event  of 
environmental  change. 
B 
A  degree  of  uncertainty  regarding  the  discharge  of  debt,  and  requires  continuous 
monitoring  of  some  factors  of  evaluation. 
CCC 
A  substantial  possibility  of  default  in  the  discharge  of  debt;  key  components  of 
evaluation  cast  doubt  on  future  discharge  of  debt. 
cc 
A  very  substantial  possibility  of  default  in  the  discharge  of  debt;  many  key  factors  of 
evaluation  cast  serious  cast  serious  doubt  on  future  discharge  of  debt. 
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Rating  and  Investment  Information  Inc  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
C 
The  lowest  rating.  The  debt  is in  default,  or  the  probability  of  default  is  extremely  high. 
Intermediate  Categories 
Plus  '+'  and  minus  '-'signs  may  be  added  to  ratings  symbols  within  a  range  from  'AA 
to  CCC'  to  indicate  their  relative  standing  within  each  category.  Said  signs  may  also 
be  added  to  'CC'  or  lower  ratings  as  well  in  case  such  ratings  reflect  the  subordinated 
character  of  the  debt. 
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Standard  and  Poor's  Ratings  Group  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
AAA 
The  highest  rating  assigned  by  Standard  &  Poor's.  Capacity  to  pay  interest  and  repay 
principal  is  extremely  strong. 
AA 
A  very  strong  capacity  to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal  and  differs  from  the  highest 
rated  issues  only  in  small  degree. 
A 
A  strong  capacity  to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal  although  it  is  somewhat  more 
susceptible  to  the  adverse  effects  of  changes  in  circumstances  and  economic 
conditions  than  debt  in  higher  rated  categories. 
BBB 
Regarded  as  having  an  adequate  capacity  to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal. 
Whereas  it  normally  exhibits  adequate  protection  parameters,  adverse  economic 
conditions,  or  changing  circumstances  are  more  likely  to  lead  to  a  weakened  capacity 
to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal  for  debt  in  this  category  than  in  higher  rated 
categories. 
Speculative  grade  Debt 
Debt  rated  'BB,  B,  CCC,  CC  and  C'  is  regarded  as  having  predominantly  speculative 
characteristics  with  respect  to,  capacity  to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal.  'BB' 
indicates  the  least  degree  of  speculation  and  'C'  the  highest.  While  such  debt  will  likely 
have  some  quality  and  protective  characteristics,  these  are  outweighed  by  large 
uncertainties  or  major  exposures  to  adverse  conditions. 
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Standard  and  Poor's  Ratings  Group  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
BB 
Less  near-term  vulnerability  to  default  than  other  speculative  issues.  However,  it  faces 
major  ongoing  uncertainties  or  exposure  to  adverse  business,  financial,  or  economic 
conditions  which  could  lead  to  inadequate  capacity  to  meet  timely  interest  and 
principal  payments.  This  category  is  also  used  for  debt  subordinated  to  senior  debt 
that  is  assigned  an  actual  or  implied  'BBB-'  rating. 
B 
A  greater  vulnerability  to  default  but  currently  has  the  capacity  to  meet  interest 
payments  and  principal  repayments.  Adverse  business,  financial,  or  economic 
conditions  will  likely  impair  capacity  or  willingness  to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal. 
The  'B'  rating  category  is  also  used  for  debt  subordinated  to  senior  debt  that  is 
assigned  an  actual  or  implied  'BB  or  BB-'  rating. 
ccc 
A  currently  identifiable  vulnerability  to  default,  and  is  dependent  upon  favourable 
business,  financial,  and  economic  conditions  to  meet  timely  payment  of  interest  and 
repayment  of  principal.  In  the  event  of  adverse  business,  financial,  or  economic 
conditions,  it  is  not  likely  to  have  the  capacity  to  pay  interest  and  repay  principal.  The 
'CCC'  rating  category  is  also  used  for  debt  subordinated  to  senior  debt  that  is  assigned 
an  actual  or  implied  'B  or  B-'  rating. 
cc 
Typically  applied  to  debt  subordinated  to  senior  debt  that  is  assigned  an  actual  or 
implied  'CCC'. 
C 
Typically  applied  to  debt  subordinated  to  senior  debt  which  is  assigned  an  actual  or 
implied  'CCC-'  rating.  The  'C'  rating  may  be  used  to  cover  a  situation  where  a 
bankruptcy  petition  has  been  filed,  but  debt  service  payments  are  continued. 
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Standard  and  Poor's  Ratings  Group  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
CI 
Reserved  for  income  bonds  on  which  no  interest  is  being  paid 
D 
In  payment  default.  The  '0'  rating  category  is  used  when  interest  payments  or  principal 
payments  are  not  made  on  the  date  due  even  if  the  applicable  grace  period  has  not 
expired,  unless  S&P  believes  that  such  payments  will  be  made  during  such  grace 
period.  The  'D'  rating  also  will  be  used  upon  the  filing  of  a  bankruptcy  petition  if  debt 
service  payments  are  jeopardized. 
R 
An  obligor  rated  'R'  is  under  regulatory  supervision  owing  to  its  financial  condition. 
During  the  pendency  of  the  regulatory  supervision,  the  regulators  may  have  the  power 
to  favour  one  class  of  obligations  over  others  or  pay  some  obligations  and  not  others. 
SD 
An  obligor  rated  'SD'  (Selective  Default)  has  failed  to  pay  one  or  more  of  its  financial 
obligations  (rated  or  unrated)  when  it  became  due.  An  'SD'  rating  is  assigned  when 
Standard  &  Poor's  believes  that  the  obligor  has  selectively  defaulted  on  a  specific 
issue  or  class  of  obligations  but  it  will  continue  to  meet  its  payment  obligations  on 
other  issues  or classes  of  obligations  in  a  timely  manner. 
Intermediate  Categories 
Plus'+'  or  minus'-':  The  ratings  from'  AA  to  CCC'  may  be  modified  by  the  addition  of  a 
plus  or  minus  sign  to  show  relative  standing  within  the  major  rating  categories. 
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Thomson  Bank  Watch  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
Investment  Grade 
AAA 
Indicates  that  the  ability  to  repay  principal  and  interest  on  a  timely  basis  is  extremely 
high. 
AA 
The  second-highest  category:  indicates  a  superior  ability  to  repay  principal  and  interest 
on  a  timely  basis,  with  limited  incremental  risk  compared  to  issues  rated  in  the  highest 
category, 
A 
Indicates  the  ability  to  repay  principal  and  interest  is  strong.  Issues  rated  A  could  be 
more  vulnerable  to  adverse  development  (both  internal  and  external)  than  obligations 
with  higher  ratings. 
BBB 
Indicates  an  acceptable  capacity  to  repay  principal  and  interest.  Issues  rated  BBB  are, 
however,  more  vulnerable  to  adverse  developments  (both  internal  and  external)  than 
obligations  with  higher  ratings. 
Non-investment  Grade 
BB 
While  not  investment  grade,  the  BB  rating  suggests  that  the  likelihood  of  default  is 
considerably  less  than  for  lower-rated  issues.  However,  there  are  significant 
uncertainties  that  could  affect  the  ability  to  adequately  service  debt  obligations. 
B 
Issues  rated  B  show  a  higher  degree  of  uncertainty  and  therefore  greater  likelihood  of 
default  than  higher-rated  issues.  Adverse  developments  could  negatively  affect  the 
payment  of  interest  and  principal  on  a  timely  basis. 
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Thomson  Bank  Watch  -  Long  term  credit  rating  scale 
ccc 
issuers  rates  CCC  clearly  have  a  high  likelihood  of  default  with  little  capacity  to 
address  further  adverse  changes  in  financial  circumstances. 
cc 
CC  is  applied  to  issuers  that  are  subordinate  to  other  obligations  rated  CCC  and  are 
not  afforded  less  protection  in  the  event  of  bankruptcy  or reorganisation. 
D  default 
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Countries  for  which  bank  financial  data  and  credit  ratings  were 
collected 
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Turkey Appendix  4  Accounting  template 
Template  used  for  standardisation  of  bank  accounting  data 
Assets 
A5  Loans  to  banks 
A10  Customer  loans 
A15  Other  loans 
A20  Non-performing  loans 
A25  Loan  loss  reserve 
A30  Total  loans 
A35  Cash 
A40  Investments 
A45  Earning  assets 
A50  Tangible  assets 
A55  Intangible  assets 
A60  Other  assets 
A70  Total  assets 
Liabilities 
L5  Deposits  by  banks 
L10  Customer  accounts 
L15  Total  deposits 
L20  Debt  securities 
L25  Subordinated  loans/debt 
L30  Total  debt 
L35  Loan  loss  reserve 
L40  Other  liabilities 
L45  Total  liabilities 
L50  Share  capital  -  common 
L55  Capital  -  other 
L60  Total  common  equity 
L65  Reserves 
L70  Shareholders'  funds 
L75  Minority  interests 
L80  Difference 
L85  Total  liabilities  and  Shareholders'  funds 
Income  statement 
P5  Total  interest  income 
P10  Total  interest  expense 
P15  Net  interest  income 
P20  Non-interest  income 
P25  Non-interest  expense 
P30  Net  non-interest  income 
P35  Provision  for  loan  loss 
P40  Operating  profit 
P45  Exceptional  items 
P50  PBT 
P55  Tax 
P65  PAT 
P70  Minority  interest 
P75  Extraordinary  and  other 
P85  Net  income 
P90  Dividends 
IV-  I Appendix  4  Accounting  template 
P91  Preference  Dividends 
P95  Retained  profit 
Note  items 
N5  Tier  1  Capital 
N10  Total  Capital  (as  per  Basle) 
N15  Weighted  risks  -  on-balance  sheet 
N20  Weighted  risks  -  total 
N25  Tier  1  Capital  Ratio 
N30  Total  Capital  Ratio 
N105  Net  Charge-offs 
IV-2 Appendix  5  Independent  variables 
Ratios  and  accounting  data  used  as  independent  variables 
duPont  ratios 
*Return  on  equity:  Net  income/Shareholder's  funds 
*Return  on  assets:  Net  income/Total  assets 
Equity  multiplier:  Total  assets/Shareholder's  funds 
Total  expenses/  Total  assets 
*Interest  expense/Total  assets 
Noninterest  expense/Total  assets 
Provision  for  loan  losses/Total  assets 
*Income  tax  /Total  assets 
Total  revenue/Total  assets 
Interest  income/Total  assets 
Noninterest  income/Total  assets 
Net  interest  margin:  Net  interest  income/earning  assets 
Burden  ratio:  (Non-int  exp  -  non-int  inc)/Total  assets 
*Efficiency  ratio:  Non-int  expense/Total  revenue 
Non-interest  income/Non-interest  expense 
`Interest  expense/Interest  bearing  liabilities 
Margin  analysis 
*Net  interest  income/Total  revenue 
*Non-interest  income/Total  revenue 
Operating  income  after  loan  loss  provisions/Total  revenue 
Operating  income  before  loan  loss  provisions/Total  revenue 
*Loan  loss  provisions/Total  revenue 
Profit  before  tax/Total  revenue 
*Net  income/Total  revenue 
Leverage 
Shareholders'  funds/Loans  (net) 
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